Date: 19 Aug 98 00:57:47 From: firstname.lastname@example.org (Malcolm Weir) Organization: Little to None References: 1
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On 06 Aug 98 11:26:15 , email@example.com caused to appear as if it was written: >When the big twins first started transatlantic operation this was the formula >that the mathematicians produced to predict the first twin ditching through >multiple engine failure.(The original date I don't recall) Needless to say >that time passed a long time ago. > >The probability of a double power unit shutdown from independent causes is >expressed as (2 P1 P2 T Y )where P1 is the probability of a single engine >failure in cruise per hour, P2 is the probibility of second engine failure, T >is the flight time duration, and Y is the diversion time at single engine >cruise speed to the nearest suitable aerodrome. > >P1 is conservatively assessed by the ICAO study group as the recorded >shut-down rate fo the mature aircraft -engine combination. > >P2 the probability of second engine failure from an independent cause, will >be higher than P1 because the second engine will be operating at higher >power; sot the study group recommends that P2 is 2P1. One thing that I've never been very clear on is the proportion of in-flight engine shutdowns that are, as it were, "optional". It is clear that there are two basic varieties of shutdown: those that are, essentially, precautionary, and those that were necessary as a result of (say) the engine leaving large chunks of its fan on the runway (like the GE-90 did on BA's 777 at LHR). By contrast, Cathay's Trent 700 problems on their A330s were precautionary, apparently motivated by a desire to avoid turning a multi-million dollar engine into a pile of junk (and, of course, the realization that as soon as said engine becomes said junk, you now have the same situation as BA had...) Which leads to the (operational, not regulatory) question: speaking purely theoretically, what is the likelihood that in the event that an ETOPS aircraft did have unrelated problems with both engines, how far could the aircraft travel in a "bugger the resale value, I want to get home" mode? (This is partly prompted by the infamous Eastern L-1011 incident, which got home *because* the number 2 engine had been shut down, and so had some remaining run time before it seized; numbers 1 & 3 seized virtually simultaneously, as I recall, and well short of the runway). In other words, from an statistical standpoint, shouldn't P2, which really ought to be defined as the probability of a total loss of power given that you have one engine failure, be *less* than P1, to account for the cases where the Captain basically decides that if the company doesn't like it, they can damn well take the cost of the engine out of his pay... if he lives. Malc.