Date: 10 Nov 96 04:52:44 From: firstname.lastname@example.org (Scott Odle) Organization: Earthlink Network, Inc. References: 1 2 3 4
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In article <airliners.1996.2269@ohare.Chicago.COM>, email@example.com says... >On 5 Oct 1996 03:33:07 GMT, firstname.lastname@example.org(RD Rick) wrote: >>In <email@example.com> firstname.lastname@example.org (Luc >>Bauwens) writes: >>>No matter how hard a bunch of prejudiced Germans tried to >>>ascribe the responsibility to the Turkish crew, I thought >>>it had been generally recognized that the key factor in the >>>accident was the conflicting reactions of two computers or >>>software to a plugged pitot tube? >>> >>>One of them producing an (incorrect) overspeed warning while the >>>other, a stall warning. Faced with 50/50 odds, the pilots picked >>>the wrong bet... >Not too different from another crash initially blamed on the Turkish >crew by the American press, that of the THY DC-10 back in March '74. >This crash initially ascribed to pilot error turned out to be faulty >design of the cargo door latching mechanism. Mc D-D (and the American >press) implying the crew being "Turkish" was somehow to blame. Wrong! 50/50 odds, not even close. What about the standby instruments? What about other clues that should have been noted in the cockpit such as if you have to keep pulling and reducing power (and your looking at the sky instead of the ground)? Why did they not pick up on the other clues/instruments? I don't remember any report statingthat everything else in the cockpit was inoperative (and L mean the real reports not news media reports) Also, Saying that the Turkish crew may be to blame is not the same thing as saying they are to blame because they are Turkish.