From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: daa@nic.cerf.net (David A. Avery) Subject: Re: Risks articles References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: CERFnet Dial n' CERF Customer Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:37 PDT I have been participating in the FAA side to the tests . The FAA Tech Center @ ACY has benn running various ATC/DATALINK tests for the past few years. This year they have moved from "simulated" equipment to real CDU's in flight simulators, using airline pilots as subjects and networking the realtime data thru the "National Simulation Facility" @ACY to controllers. This years first run was in simulated RDU approach airspace (<50 mi. to apt.) and we expect to do a second run this fall in simulated ORD airspace. dave -- ================================================================== David A. Avery daa@cerf.net Avia Research Flight Simulation From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:39 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Scott Jacobson <75706.2201@CompuServe.COM> Subject: RE: AF retires 707 970 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:39 PDT Seems that there is confusion about what makes an airplane "officially" Air Force One. True any air force jet carrying the Big Boss has the radio call sign "air force 1", however there is only one jet that is exclusively reserved for the use of the president. This "official" air force 1 gets real special treatment from the maintenance folks!! It is also the jet which is publicly recognized as AF-1, radio call signs aside. Scott From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:40 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: RE: AF retires 707 970 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:40 PDT >Seems that there is confusion about what makes an airplane "officially" >Air Force One. True any air force jet carrying the Big Boss has the radio >call sign "air force 1", however there is only one jet that is exclusively >reserved for the use of the president. This "official" air force 1 gets >real special treatment from the maintenance folks!! Indeed there is some confusion, but I'm afraid you don't have it quite right either. There are actually several specially-equipped "Presiden- tial" aircraft. Currently there are a pair of Boeing VC-25A (747-2G4B) presidential aircraft, with two VC-137C (707-353B) aircraft possibly still in the fleet. JP actually does list one VC-25A (82-8000) as being Air Force One but the two aircraft are idential and either one could be the "real" Air Force One at any given moment. For example, if memory serves, when JFK was assasinated LBJ flew down to Dallas on the second presidential aircraft, the first having taken JFK to Dallas. He flew back to Washington on the same aircraft, which became Air Force One when LBJ was sworn in during the flight. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:42 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ditka!sgiblab!trystero.com!trystro!quagga (Quagga) Subject: 737-plus? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: The Trystero System (617) 625-7155 v.32/v.42bis Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:42 PDT Hiya guys. News report just mentioned that Boeing plans to create a new 737 derivative to compete with the Airbus. Anybody have any meaningful details? equus quagga, unofficial mascot, nellis afb nevada "my other car does mach 8" "my other car is a parachute" <--pick one From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:43 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: 737-plus? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:43 PDT >News report just mentioned that Boeing plans to create a new 737 >derivative to compete with the Airbus. Anybody have any meaningful >details? Boeing has referred to it (them) as the 737-X for some time now, but only recently received board approval to begin offering it to the airlines and other customers. This doesn't constitute a launch of the program, just the start of the sales effort, though apparently some recent 737-TBD (series To Be Determined) orders and options include the 737-X amongst the alternatives. If launched, initial deliveries of the 737-X would be in 1997. The 737-X being offered is actually a family of three aircraft. The 108-seat version would presumably replace the 737-500 while a larger version would be comparable in size to the 737-300. The largest, at 157 seats, would be larger than the 737-400 and would more directly compete with the Airbus A320. (At least one report I've seen said there are four versions, but there were no details on where the 4th model fit into the lineup.) While the fuselage would remain a derivative of the existing 737, the wing would be an entirely new design with greater area and fuel capacity as well as improved aerodynamics. These changes would help the 737-X go both faster (Mach 0.80 vs. 0.78) and farther (2,900 nm (5,200 km), slightly greater than the A320's range and sufficient to fly from one coast of the U.S. to the other) than the existing 737 family. Engines are the other major change, and were at least a bit of a surprise, at least to me. Based on past reports I had expected the IAE V2500 to at least be an option but apparently the engine will be the CFM56-3XS, which offers lower fuel burn, emissions, and noise than the current generation CFM56. Boeing has also announced several other proposals and improvements recently. A 767-300ERX, with 6,800 nm (12,200 km) range had been proposed but has been revised to a 767-300ERY with 7,200 nm (13,000 km) range. MTOW increases to 441,000 lbs (200,000 kg) vs. 400,000 lbs for the current 767-300(ER) with 62,000 lb thrust engines vs. 60,000 lb thust from the current plane. The 767-300ERY also includes a wing chord extension and increased span and other aerodynamic improvements allowing an increase in speed from Mach 0.82 to 0.84 in addition to the range improvements. Meanwhile, the 747-400 is receiving modifications including a redesigned composite dorsal fin fairing and fuel distribution system which will allow a 2,000 lb increas in MTOW. The changes will be integrated into new production 747-400s and will be available as a retrofit for existing 747-400s. According to Airliners Monthly News, "a more extremem modification [to the 747-400] is planned for 1996, which would offer a 60,000 lb (27,215 kg) increase in MTOW, additional fuel, and a range of 8,000 nm (14,400 km)." And if that wasn't enough, the first 747-400F made its first flight on May 4th. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:46 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Robert Dorsett Subject: Re: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: rdd@cactus.org Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:46 PDT In article pab@po.CWRU.Edu (Pete Babic) once wrote: >I'm a total layman when it comes to piloting but I've been following the A320 >views with great interest. If the cocoon approach continues to be used would >it make sense to setup some kind of logging mechanism in the aircraft to >keep track of the times when the system "saves the pilots bacon"? If a pilot >uses the automation to let him get away with sloppy flying this would show up >in the log resulting in disiplinary action from his supervisors. This would >serve as incentive to not push the envelope too much. The technology already exists to do this, and other interesting things, like videotaping the crews and recording the voice-track of entire flights (not just the last 30 minutes). The major problem is the ramification this has on the pilot's decision-making authority. By legislative fiat, the pilot is the final authority as to the safe and responsible operation of the aircraft. Thus, once the doors are closed, the pilot is King. If he crashes, he's liable. If he accepts an airplane with a known squawk, he's liable. In fact, the notion of responsibility is so severe that he's theoretically liable for regulatory omissions that could be buried deep within a modern airline's chain of responsibility. It's therefore a position of absolute responsibility, both for the airplanes and the lives on board (in fact, one rhetorical line against Airbus' FBW design is the extent to which it limits pilot *authority*). Despite a captain's demi-god status, airlines (and the feds) regulate and provide guidelines for a truly awesome number of operational issues. Everything from which hand one should use to set a heading selector to how the pilot should be dressed when he goes to the bathroom (e.g., hat and coat vs. "merely" shirt and tie). Like all "rules," these are best viewed as guidelines. It is occasionally desirable and necessary to deviate from the guidelines. For example, a pilot may not wish to depart with one generator inoperative, even if that's kosher with the minimum equipment list, if he has doubts about a remaining generator: this could, for instance, be based in a large number of "squawks" in the maintenance logs for the remaining generator. The airline, however, may hold to the letter of the rules (cf. Eastern and Continental under Lorenzo) and discipline the pilot for not accepting the airplane. In such a case, the airline would be within its rights, but the pilot, under FAR 91.3, is also legally and morally obligated to act. What results is a conflict of priorities which usually place the pilot at a disadvantage when it comes to arguing his case. Most airlines are run professionally, but the regulatory framework can support some startling excesses, when conditions are ripe (again, cf. the reign of terror of Lorenzo). With full-time monitoring, the pilot, knowing that every action is being followed and is subject to review, might be more likely to "toe the company line," or follow the rules to the letter--even if that raises the probability of flying into cumulus granite. Take, for example, the early FMS experience. The airlines had bought into the technology, and required the crews to use the FMS. This resulted in generally unsafe conditions under 18,000': as time went by, more and more pilots opted to "click it off" in the terminal environment. Initially, these people were characterized as not being proficient or as "fogies" unable to cope with the high tech. But research and experience validated the click- it-off philosophy, which eventually got absorbed as part of most airlines' operational policies. These days, FMS use is generally discouraged under 10,000' (often under 18,000'). But at the time, a pilot flying an airplane the "old fashioned way," selected-autopilot, would have been censured. Or consider in-flight deviations: if the dispatcher's instantaneous satellite picture from ten minutes ago shows moderate weather, but the pilot sees a monster thunderstorm evolving ahead of of him, it becomes problematic defending the decision to adopt a potentially costly re-routing, rather than continuing with the straight-line course. Especially if the next satellite pict shows clear weather, after the cells break down. :-) So a major issue is that there's an awesome spectrum of second-guessing that will go on, both after and during the flight (with telemetry). A conscious decision has to be made by all parties (regulators, airlines, manufacturers, pilots, ATC) as to *how* this will work: so far, nobody has adjusted their operating policies significantly--but there's already a spectre of the possibility that with real-time monitoring, "unpopular" decisions can have serious consequences to one's livelihood. Yet, despite the most "blue sky" theories, and the encroachment on pilot authority, the regulatory authorities maintain the sanctity of 91.3, out of the simple realization that "shit happens," and that carefully analyzed *systems* don't always work as planned in the real world. My point is simply that we *cannot* plan for "business as usual" and expect to maintain a halfway decent safety culture. Other, related problems with monitoring are that the pilots are only human: should *every* utterance in-flight go on the record? More likely, they'd learn to keep their mouths shut, which would create a tense, stressful atmosphere, which isn't conducive to safety, either. In high-workload environments, it's best to keep to the job at hand (the "sterile cockpit" concept), but 12 hours at cruise is hardly high-workload, and having Big Brother listen in isn't fun. And what if, in these politically correct times, "inappropriate" views are held against someone? There isn't a single profession where the potential for such an extreme invasion of privacy exists-- even IF it's on the company's time. ALPA's drawn some very firm lines on these issues: as satellite commun- ications evolves and the potential for in-flight monitoring increases, ALPA's been very aggressive about preserving the pilot's command prerogatives. Access to cockpit voice and data recorders are also tightly regulated, as are tapes made during training (CRM training, for example, is videotaped and analyzed by the students in a classroom session--then the footage is promptly destroyed). There is no doubt but that more sophisticated monitoring capabilities will come, and rightfully so, as they will be critical in crash investigation--but they shouldn't be used as a management tool. The airlines are paying pilots enough and training them to the degree that they should let them do their job. The deepest bureaurcratic instinct, however, is to distribute responsibility as widely as possible. The word "supervisor" is a hallmark of this philosophy (pilot-populations within an airline tend to operate on a peer basis, and are subject to the oversight of fleet captains and chief pilots). It's something to be aware of, and fought, IMHO. Some passengers don't like the idea of their lives being in the hands of two or three individuals in the front, and would prefer that people on the ground be involved: I, however can think of nothing more harrowing. At least I know that if I buy it, the crew is toast, too, and will do its best to avoid that fate. A ground-based dispatcher doesn't face death if he makes a boo-boo. On the OTHER hand, it would certainly be interesting to run a study using the avionics now available, to determine just how many "marginal" situations pilots (as a population) manage to get into. Airbus' rationale for its protections on the A320, for instance, claimed support from the "accident" record. But I'm really unable to duplicate this reasoning: what kills most airplanes is controlled flight into terrain--not g-loaded stalls, overspeed break-ups, etc. More rambling, from... --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: Airbus crash in Katmandu: "Pilot error" Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:52 PDT Daily Mail, 29th June 1993:- The investigation of the crash of a Pakistan Airlines Airbus near Katmandu last year has concluded that it was due to pilot error. The pilot radioed ATC shortly before impact, quoting an altitude which was 1000 ft. above the actual altitude of the aircraft at the time. The article was extremely short and gave no details. It was not even clear to which of the two Airbus crashes in Nepal it referred. (One was of an A310, the other of an A300, I seem to recall.) Pete ------ Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Thu Jul 8 01:27:55 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Francis.Jambon@imag.fr (Francis Jambon) Subject: A320 crash repport - Mont Saint Odile (Strasbourg) Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: IMAG Institute, University of Grenoble, France Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:27:55 PDT According to Air & Cosmos of this week, the official repport of the Mont Saint Odile A320 crash (Strasbourg) will not be availlable before October 1993. -- Francis JAMBON - Francis.Jambon@imag.fr __|__ Research in Human-Computer Interaction *---o--(_)--o---* Phone: (+33) 76 51 48 54 - Fax: (+33) 76 44 66 75 ! ! ! Laboratoire de Genie Informatique, B206, BP 53, 38041 Grenoble cedex 9, France From kls Thu Jul 8 01:28:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright) Subject: Re: Boeing fuse pin revisited References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:28:00 PDT In article rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes: >It does contain an interesting note, though, that Airbus apparently doesn't >believe in "break-away" engines (the fuse pins installed on Boeing airplanes >are there to permit the engine to shear away following substantial engine >vibration, on the theory that it's better to drop an engine than risk damage >to the airframe or wing). "If an Airbus crash-lands, the plane can even skid >on its engines without their falling off." The main reason for the "Break-Away" engines was to keep the engines from rupturing the fuel cells in the wing in the event of a crash landing. >An issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology reported earlier this year that >Boeing had found the problem was that Boeing had underestimated shear forces >in one part of the assembly by 1000% or so. It wasn't really underestimated, more like we found 'hidden' forces. In a new FE analysis of the part on a new generation of computers it was found that there existed very small areas of very high forces. In the past it was to computationally intensive to find these. -- ________Greg Wright________ OS2 2.1!!!! High Lift Development | gregory@bcstec.boeing.com | Falcon 3.0 747/767 Aerodynamics | gregory@halcyon.com | |__uunet!bcstec!gregory_____| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON. From kls Thu Jul 8 01:28:02 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson) Subject: Re: A320 and a bit on the bloody DC-10 (was: cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: John Fluke Mfg. Co., Inc., Everett, WA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:28:02 PDT In article rdd@cactus.org writes: >>thus far, pilots have been surprisingly good at working around the problems >posed by glass (maybe it does have a benefit--at least in most glassy >airplanes, it keeps 'em on their toes? :-)) Please, for those among us who only lurk - - - what is "glass" ? I`ve read this any number of times referring to some quality of an airliner's cockpit. What does this mean? -- Gary Benson-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-inc@sisu.fluke.com_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- One cannot build life from refrigerators, politics, credit statements and crossword puzzles. That is impossible. Nor can one exist for any length of time without poetry, without colour, without love. -Antoine de St. Exupery From kls Thu Jul 8 01:28:06 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.aviation.piloting Path: bounce-back From: kosower@nxth02.cern.ch (David Kosower) Subject: Info about commercial pilots Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: CERN European Lab for Particle Physics Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 01:28:06 PDT I realize this is off the topic for these groups, but perhaps a reader will know the answer to the following questions: How many flights, and how many flight-hours, does a typical pilot for a major scheduled American carrier, fly per year? Ditto for commuter carriers. Given my address, I can't just look it up in my local library :-), nor do I have regular access to AW&ST. Thanks David A. Kosower kosower@nxth02.cern.ch From kls Thu Jul 8 14:18:32 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jge@cs.unc.edu (John Eyles) Subject: Re: 747-400 mods (was: 737-plus?) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 14:18:32 PDT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >Meanwhile, the 747-400 is receiving modifications including a >redesigned composite dorsal fin fairing and fuel distribution system >which will allow a 2,000 lb increas in MTOW. The changes will be >integrated into new production 747-400s and will be available as a >retrofit for existing 747-400s. Can this be for real ? I know that in the airline industry, weight is money; but can this be worth the trouble ? It allows another 10 or so pax, or another ton of fuel. I assume (maybe incorrectly) that number of passengers is limited more by seating space than MTOW, so we're talking another ton of fuel. I believe these babies consume about 10 tons of fuel an hour at cruise, so we're talking 6 more minutes of flight or about 50 nm. How much can this retrofit cost and be worth it ? From kls Thu Jul 8 14:18:36 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: 737-plus? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 08 Jul 93 14:18:36 PDT >>Meanwhile, the 747-400 is receiving modifications including a >>redesigned composite dorsal fin fairing and fuel distribution system >>which will allow a 2,000 lb increas in MTOW. The changes will be >Can this be for real ? >It allows another 10 or so pax, or another ton of fuel. Or another ton of cargo. I recall hearing at one point that United was perfectly happy flying 747SPs between San Francisco and Tokyo with half of the seats empty -- they could devote that much more capacity to cargo, and were taking their empty seats straight to the bank. Think of that extra ton as 2,000 overnight parcels at an average of a pound apiece, at a fare of $10 each. (Maybe more for international -- I'm just picking ballpark numbers here.) $20k per flight can add up quick. Beyond that, the redesigned fuel distribution system may be the more important piece here. I don't know the details, but keep in mind two points. First, the 747-400 has fuel tanks in the tailplane (an option, but likely to be present on any high-weight aircraft). Second, any jetliner is somewhat noseheavy and thus requires the tailplane to push downward in flight, which in turn creates some drag. I believe planes with tail tanks already have some ability to manage trim by moving fuel to the tail, thereby requiring less downforce from the tailplane and thus less drag. However, if the new system on the 747-400 does a better job of this it could result in a significantly reduced fuel burn, which would likely be worth quite a bit. Anybody from Boeing care to provide some details? -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Sat Jul 10 02:01:36 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Robert Dorsett Subject: Glass (Re: A320 and a bit on the bloody DC-10) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: rdd@cactus.org Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 10 Jul 93 02:01:36 PDT In article inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson) writes: >In article rdd@cactus.org writes: >>>thus far, pilots have been surprisingly good at working around the problems >>posed by glass (maybe it does have a benefit--at least in most glassy >>airplanes, it keeps 'em on their toes? :-)) > >Please, for those among us who only lurk - - - what is "glass" ? > >I`ve read this any number of times referring to some quality of an >airliner's cockpit. What does this mean? Conventional cockpits (since the late 50's) used something called "electro- mechanical" instrumentation. These were instruments which used mechanical means to show information, but often got their source data in the form of electrical signals sent by transducers in various parts of the airplane. There were only a few "conventional" flight instruments, of the form familiar to private pilots, with direct link-ups to the pitot/static system, for instance. The only "direct linkup" flight instruments were the backup instruments. In the late 70's, manufacturers began to replace these electromechanical displays with color cathode ray tubes. Initially, the CRT's were used for artificial horizon and HSI information, with electromechanical instruments "completing the T" (airspeed, altitude, vertical speed). Then engine instrumentation was repaced by CRT's, Flight Management Systems (a new service) were integrated, etc. With the FMS's came more sophisticated navigation displays, which could produce a plan view of the airplane's flight plan, in addition to a standard "HSI" format. The 757/767/A310 generation were the first major transport aircraft to reach this level. By the late 80's, there was pressure to eliminate the rest of the electro- mechanical displays (which deriders referred to as "steam gauge" instruments). So the airspeed, altitude, and vertical speed data was incorporated into the artificial horizon CRT (usually called a "Primary Flight Display", also an "integrated display") and the electromechanical displays were eliminated. Voila, the current stage of flight instrumentation. Along with all these changes came different philosophies in how pilots should fly the airplane (the "manager-of-systems" concept became quite pervasive). When I refer to glass, I'm usually referring to CRT/FMS-based airplanes which reflect the changes in flight management introduced in the 1980's. I think this is probably a fairly common interpretation: but it should be noted that some airplanes, like the 737-200 and -300, have FMS's without the glass. And the use of glass in other categories of airplanes can range from the very simple (such as a small CRT simply "replacing" an artificial horizon, with no additional services) to airliner-level complexity. There were early concerns as to the mechanical reliability of CRT's, but these have been mostly groundless: CRT's have been very reliable. Pilots like the "clear" displays, without parallax. Pending issues include display design formats, as well as the total inte- gration qualities of glassy airplanes (i.e., flight displays + engine/system monitoring + FMS). I've also wondered about over-reliance on the quality of instrumentation (losing track of the nuts & bolts physical basis for data in the face of nicely polished, pretty computer-based results), but I haven't read anything on this. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Sat Jul 10 02:01:40 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: 747-400 mods (was: 737-plus?) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 10 Jul 93 02:01:40 PDT In article jge@cs.unc.edu (John Eyles) writes: >In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >>Meanwhile, the 747-400 is receiving modifications including a >>redesigned composite dorsal fin fairing and fuel distribution system >>which will allow a 2,000 lb increas in MTOW. The changes will be >>integrated into new production 747-400s and will be available as a >>retrofit for existing 747-400s. > >Can this be for real ? > >I know that in the airline industry, weight is money; but can this be worth >the trouble ? > >It allows another 10 or so pax, or another ton of fuel. I assume (maybe >incorrectly) that number of passengers is limited more by seating space >than MTOW, so we're talking another ton of fuel. For short missions (under 3,000 miles or so) you are correct, it doesn't really matter. One runs into problems at the longer ranges with high load factors (ie, lots of bodies in those seats). That extra weight can make the difference in whether the airplane can be directly dispatched to a destination, or must use redispatch procedures. It can make the difference in whether the flight must be diverted or can go straight in (winds). But add the extra weight and combine it with new electronics and software that give the airplane the ability to seek out the most efficient route, and you've added significant capability to the airplane for a modest investment. You might also keep in mind that one seat can add several million dollars in revenue to an airline. >I believe these babies consume about 10 tons of fuel an hour at cruise, >so we're talking 6 more minutes of flight or about 50 nm. > >How much can this retrofit cost and be worth it ? Depends on who you are. Literally. :-) -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Sat Jul 10 02:01:42 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rna@leland.Stanford.EDU (Robert Ashcroft) Subject: Re: A340 long distance reord References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 10 Jul 93 02:01:42 PDT In article ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis) writes: >According to Aviation Week (June 28, 1993, p33), they did, in fact, add >supplemental tanks. "The A340-200, equipped with five additional fuel >tanks that increased total capacity by 28.5 tons, burned 125.4 metric tons >of fuel on this leg [Paris-Auckland] and had 14.6 tons remaining in the >tanks on landing, crewmembers said." > >Coupled with the stripping of cabin furnishings mentioned earlier in this >thread, I can hardly call this flight anything more than a publicity stunt. What about the publicity flight of the 747-400 from London to Sydney (?). Did they use extra tanks on that flight? RNA From kls Sat Jul 10 02:01:45 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: weiss@hurricane.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) Subject: Re: Strange 727 Flight References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, UCLA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 10 Jul 93 02:01:45 PDT In article rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) writes: >It's ATC's responsibility to maintain separation in IFR: they'll clear >aircraft below before they ask aircraft above to descend. I think you misunderstood me. The goal would be to get the bottom plane off the stack as quickly as possible. The next step would be to get the "new" bottom of the stack to descend as quickly as possible, and so on up the stack. This is not to imply that the airplanes would be descending simultaneously, but rather that until the plane at the bottom descends, you can't tell the next one up to do same. The faster you move each member of the stack, the faster you can get the next plane at the bottom cleared for landing, and the sooner you can add a new plane to the stack. >The 727 is a flying brick (apologies to F-4 fans): if you dropped the nose >ten degrees while holding, you could easily punch 4000 fpm (or even peg the >IVSI at 6000), I would think. This creates other problems, and isn't really >desirable in a terminal environment. I doubt that it was truly a 10 deg difference, but I don't know enough about the alphas for 727s, so I didn't bother to discount that assessment. >It sounds more like porpoising: improper technique (hands-on or autopilot), a >faulty autopilot, or some kind of a control system failure. Good point. I didn't think of that, but that could well be the cause. Nonetheless, I would be surprised to find pilots porpoising much unless the weather conditions were a bit abnormal. Perhaps a "new" pilot (unfamiliar with the 727, in relative terms)? >Airline pilots are trained to "fly by the numbers." Professional pilots will >tend to politely decline ATC requests to "expedite" approaches, and will tend >to fly approaches safely, how they are trained to. Granted. Again, I think you misunderstood me. Since each aircraft has an envelope, pilots can fly anywhere in that envelope. Some fly closer to the edge than others, and those that do would be inclined to accept those ATC requests. I just gather this information from listening to ATC transmissions during rush hour at LAX. Anyway, my point is that he may have been on a flight where the pilot felt safer nearer the edge of the envelope than most other pilots. It happens. >It is ATC's responsibility to adapt to pilot requirements for safe flight, >NOT the pilot's responsibility to keep things "orderly" for ATC. Nonetheless, sometimes reality doesn't match theory. When things get tight around major airports (O'Hare, for example) during rush hour, ATCs tend to make somewhat unreasonable requests. -- \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | / - Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science - - Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles - / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \ From kls Sat Jul 10 02:01:50 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kerry@ingres.com (Kerry Kurasaki) Subject: Re: Info about commercial pilots References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Ingres Corporation, A subsidiary of The ASK Group, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 10 Jul 93 02:01:50 PDT In article kosower@nxth02.cern.ch (David Kosower) writes: > I realize this is off the topic for these groups, but perhaps a reader will >know the answer to the following questions: > > How many flights, and how many flight-hours, does a typical pilot for a >major scheduled American carrier, fly per year? Ditto for commuter carriers. > By regulation (FAR 121.xxx) pilots are limited to something like 1000 hours a year of commercial flying. A UA captain in our CAP squadron flies something like 80 hours/month (more or less) so the math works out pretty well. From kls Sat Jul 10 18:49:27 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: Workshop: "The Application of Software Metrics and Quality Assurance in Industry" Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 10 Jul 93 18:49:27 PDT The annual workshop of the Centre for Software Reliability will be held this year in Amsterdam from 29th September to 1st October, co-hosted with the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers. The theme is "The Application of Software Metrics and Quality Assurance in Industry". Keynote speakers are Vic Basili, University of Maryland, and Yoshinori Iizuka, University of Tokyo. Programme and application form can be supplied in paper or electronic form. Under the Human Capital and Mobility scheme of the Commission for the European Community, 100% support is available for up to 15 delegates to attend from those areas of the EC which qualify for special support (which include Greece and Portugal). Applications are therefore particularly invited from people in these areas (although naturally, all applicants are very welcome!). Please respond preferably by e-mail. If you happen to know of anyone in one of the supported areas of Europe who might be interested but who does not receive e-mail or read the relevant lists, please pass the information on and ask them to respond by fax or snail-mail. Many thanks, Pete Mellor ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, UK. Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422 (Direct line to P. Mellor), Tel: +44(0)71-477-8421 (Direct line to Ms. C.A. Allen, Centre Manager), Fax: +44(0)71-477-8585 e-mail: p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk, c.a.allen@csr.city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Thu Jul 15 03:46:53 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk (Mike Collins) Subject: Re: 747-400 mods (was: 737-plus?) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk Organization: DIS(organised) Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 15 Jul 93 03:46:53 PDT In article drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com writes: ). That extra weight can make the difference in whether the airplane can be directly dispatched to a destination, or must use redispatch procedures. Can you explain the difference between these procedures for me please? Thanks. - *************************************************************************** * Mike Collins "Turn your face to the sun and * * Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk the shadows fall behind you" * * Telephone +44817886988 * * Maori proverb * **************************************************************************** From kls Thu Jul 15 03:46:59 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk (Mike Collins) Subject: Re: A340 long distance reord References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk Organization: DIS(organised) Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 15 Jul 93 03:46:59 PDT In article rna@leland.Stanford.EDU writes: >In article ckd@eff.org (Christopher > Davis) writes: >>According to Aviation Week (June 28, 1993, p33), they did, in fact, add >>supplemental tanks. "The A340-200, equipped with five additional fuel >>tanks ... >What about the publicity flight of the 747-400 from London to Sydney (?). >Did they use extra tanks on that flight? I am not sure but I read the other day that they used special fuel to increase the range (Flight International). Judgeing from that same item in FI, I think it was a like for like comparison. The A340 may have had additional fuel tanks but they are available on the production aircraft. The A340 also taxied to the takeoff point whereas (according to Flight International) the 747 was towed to the takeoff point before startup. *************************************************************************** * Mike Collins "Turn your face to the sun and * * Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk the shadows fall behind you" * * Telephone +44817886988 * * Maori proverb * **************************************************************************** From kls Thu Jul 15 03:47:06 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jacobs@charly.acclog.af.mil (SSgt Scott Jacobson;93D APS/TROS;981-7441) Subject: Re: Af retires 707 970 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 15 Jul 93 03:47:06 PDT t *Indeed there is some confusion, but I'm afraid you don't have it quite *right either. There are actually several specially-equipped "Presiden- *tial" aircraft. Currently there are a pair of Boeing VC-25A (747-2G4B) *presidential aircraft, with two VC-137C (707-353B) aircraft possibly *still in the fleet. JP actually does list one VC-25A (82-8000) as being *Air Force One but the two aircraft are idential and either one could be *the "real" Air Force One at any given moment. Those two 707-353Bs are still in the fleet along with 2 second hand 707-300s. The two original 707-353Bs (62-6000 & 72-7000) have been reconfigured since they served as AF-1 and no longer have all the extras and are no longer designated presidential aircraft. One visible sign of this is the paint scheme - The designated presidential aircraft has a light blue area beneath the nose along with a presidential seal. 62-6000 & 72-7000 used to have this scheme, but were repainted when deconfigured. Again, the President can and does use other Air Force aircraft besides the 2 747s. And when he is aboard these other aircraft they carry the radio call sign AF-1. But they do not get the special MX, comm gear, etc. that the "officially" designated AF-1 (the 747) gets. *For example, if memory serves, when JFK was assasinated LBJ flew down *to Dallas on the second presidential aircraft, the first having taken *JFK to Dallas. He flew back to Washington on the same aircraft, which *became Air Force One when LBJ was sworn in during the flight. LBJ took 58-6970 down to Dallas and returned to DC aboard 62-6000. 62-6000 was the "official" AF-1 at the time and it has been suggested that LBJ was eager to assert his official right to the aircraft. Also he was sworn in on the ground, but aboard the aircraft, before take-off. Secret Service was eager to get him to a "safe" place and the jet was selected - thats why he was sworn aboard the jet. Scott From kls Thu Jul 15 03:47:08 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ctillier@phoenix.princeton.edu (Clemens Emmanuel Tillier) Subject: A340 Landing gear Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Princeton University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 15 Jul 93 03:47:08 PDT I visited the Bourget airshow a few weeks ago, and I noticed during the in- flight demonstration of the Airbus A340 that the main gear does something peculiar on landing. The rear wheels touch first, the bogie rotates and only a few seconds later the front wheels touch. (Front wheels here have nothing to do with nose gear) You can see it really easily: there are two widely spaced puffs of smoke when the aircraft lands. I presume this is to reduce shear forces as the wheels are spun up,(two small backwards yanks instead of one big one) but I really have no idea. Why is the design like this? Regards Clem Tillier From kls Thu Jul 15 03:47:09 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: purvis@sun-valley.Stanford.EDU (Chris Purvis) Subject: Re: Info on Commercial Pilots References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 15 Jul 93 03:47:09 PDT kosower@nxth02.cern.ch (David A. Kosower) asks: >> How many flights, and how many flight-hours, does a typical >> pilot for a major scheduled American carrier, fly per year? >> Ditto for commuter carriers. Dave, At Mesa Airlines in 1990-91 we operated two aircraft, EMB-120 "Brasi- lias" and BE-1900 "Airliners," flying passengers from small towns in rural AZ,CO,NM,WY, and SD to the hubs in Denver, Albuquerque, and Phoe- nix. Our pilot senority list had approximately 200 pilots (con- sisting roughly of 50% Captains, 50% First Officers). When I flew the line as a First Officer for 215 days, I recorded time from engine startup to shutdown (aircraft operating time). On average I estimate 10% of operating time was spent on the ground, either at the gate or taxiing. Gate and taxi time at rural apts would be about 4%, at less-congested hubs about 7%-10%, and in Denver probably over 20% of total operating time. Here's what my logbook says: TIME IN TYPE: 673 hrs AVERAGE HOURS/MONTH: 95 hrs AVERAGE HOURS/FLIGHT LEG: 0.9 hrs The following figures can vary considerably from month to month, I took these from memory: DUTY DAYS PER MONTH: approx 19 days DUTY HOURS PER MONTH: approx 160 hrs DUTY HRS PER DUTY DAY (SHIFT): approx 8.4 hrs FLT HRS PER DUTY DAY (SHIFT): approx 5.0 hrs DUTY HRS / FLT HOUR : approx 1.7 - LEGS FLOWN PER SHIFT: approx 5.6 legs Chris P. purvis@sun-valley.stanford.edu From kls Thu Jul 15 03:47:11 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) Subject: Re: Info about commercial pilots References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 15 Jul 93 03:47:11 PDT In article kerry@ingres.com (Kerry Kurasaki) writes: >In article kosower@nxth02.cern.ch (David Kosower) writes: >> How many flights, and how many flight-hours, does a typical pilot for a >>major scheduled American carrier, fly per year? Ditto for commuter carriers. > >By regulation (FAR 121.xxx) pilots are limited to something like 1000 hours >a year of commercial flying. A UA captain in our CAP squadron flies >something like 80 hours/month (more or less) so the math works out >pretty well. Don't forget, though, that "duty time" can be significantly more than this... it's not unusual to spend as many hours taking care of company business, getting weather briefings, etc. as you spend flying. Michael T. Palmer | "Freedom lost, and then regained, bites with m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov | keener fangs than freedom never endangered." RIPEM key on server | Cicero, 106-43 B.C. From kls Thu Jul 15 03:47:12 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: greg@apldbio.com (Greg Ellis) Subject: Re: A340 long distance reord References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: greg@apldbio.com Organization: Applied Biosystems, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 15 Jul 93 03:47:12 PDT In article 509@ohare.Chicago.COM, rna@leland.Stanford.EDU (Robert Ashcroft) writes: >What about the publicity flight of the 747-400 from London to Sydney (?). >Did they use extra tanks on that flight? After having actually flown on the Qantas 747-400 which set this record flight from London to Sydney, I was able to converse with the pilots about it. They told me that they did not add extra fuel tanks but did infact use a specially designed fuel. They also had only 20 crew members on the plane and no cargo. I am not sure if they took out the furniture. It took slightly over 20 hours. -Greg greg@intron.apldbio.com From kls Fri Jul 16 03:21:36 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: gtoye@pssparc2.mitek.com (Gene Toye) Subject: American Airlines Museum Open near DFW Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 16 Jul 93 03:21:36 PDT Organization: OpenConnect Systems, Dallas, TX For those interested in the history of airlines, especially American, the C. W. Smith Museum is now open at the AA Flight Academy, south of DFW Airport. (360 at FAA road) I found it interesting with a lot of good stuff on display. Highlights include: restored DC-3 on display outside building (can't go on board :( ) 20 minute film on AA, lots of in flight views of AA planes. display of 757 cockpit with video explanation of FMS displays (not a realistic view, line drawings of instruments) more realistic mockup of F100 cockpit. Most items are airline related rather than airplane related, but there are two jet engines on display as well as a 727 nose gear. Lots of video on airline jobs, including video of airliner rebuilds (C checks as I recall ?) Museum shop All in all, an interesting visit and its FREE. Open Wed - Sunday 11 to 6. Not related to AA in any way, just found the museum interesting. -- Gene Toye, Senior Software Engineer gtoye@pssparc2.oc.com OpenConnect Systems, 2711 LBJ Freeway, Dallas, TX 75234 214/888-0454 DISCLAIMER: My employer had no idea I was going to say that. From kls Fri Jul 16 03:21:40 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: 747-400 mods (was: 737-plus?) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 16 Jul 93 03:21:40 PDT In article Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk writes: >In article drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com writes: > >). That extra weight can make the difference in whether the airplane can be >directly dispatched to a destination, or must use redispatch procedures. > >Can you explain the difference between these procedures for me please? Maybe. :-) In a direct dispatch, the airplane has a flight plan filed for the advertised destination. It is the simple, uncomplicated case, and works as you would expect. In redispatch, the flight plan is for some destination closer than the advertised one. And not neccessarily in the same direction as the advertised destination (there maybe some 30 or 40 degrees difference). The airplane will fly towards its advertised destination, and if the winds are favorable, it will file and updated flight plan and land at the advertised destination. If the winds are bad, it will continue on to its *planned* destination, with Captain Speaking telling the passengers of the unfortunate diversion for fuel. The dispatcher and the pilot have figured out where the decision point for that flight is, and the pilot (and the dispatcher) make the decision based on fuel remaining and projected fuel requirements. Is that sufficiently obscure? :-) -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Sat Jul 17 01:37:11 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: gtoye@pssparc2.mitek.com (Gene Toye) Subject: Re: American Airlines Museum Open near DFW References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: OpenConnect Systems, Dallas, TX Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jul 93 01:37:11 PDT gtoye@pssparc2.mitek.com (Gene Toye) writes: >For those interested in the history of airlines, especially American, >the C. W. Smith Museum is now open at the AA Flight Academy, south >of DFW Airport. (360 at FAA road) >I found it interesting with a lot of good stuff on display. Ooops, thats C. R. Smith I think. Damn this memory anyway :) -- Gene Toye, Senior Software Engineer gtoye@pssparc2.oc.com OpenConnect Systems, 2711 LBJ Freeway, Dallas, TX 75234 214/888-0454 DISCLAIMER: My employer had no idea I was going to say that. From kls Sat Jul 17 01:37:13 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Landing gear design Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jul 93 01:37:13 PDT Not to long ago, someone asked a question about landing gear design. Specifically, why some airplanes have those cool, tilted bogies on the mains. For those of you who haven't been able to sleep since seeing that question - relief is in sight. :-) Main gear bogies often have (relatively) small springs on them to put them in the proper position for stowage on retraction. They are designed to have that cant for efficient use of the space in the wheelwell, ie, the wheelwell can be made shorter, allowing more space in the lower hold for baggage, revenue cargo, ECS stuff, and sundry electronics. The truly observant will note that the 757s mains have the trailing tires down, and the 767s have the leading tires down. Hope that helps. :-) If you have any other obscure airplane configuration questions, don't hesitate to ask - I learn lots tracking this stuff down... -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Sat Jul 17 01:37:20 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: Edward Hasbrouck Subject: New Airliner In Service Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jul 93 01:37:20 PDT Following is some information from trade sources on the newest commercial aircraft, a new longe-range widebodied passenger jet which makes its first commercial flight today. I thought this might be news, and of interest, to readers of sci.aeronautics.airliners and rec.travel.air. Most discussion of aeronautics in "the West" focuses on only three (Boeing, Airbus, and McDonnell Douglas) of the Big Four commercial aircraft builders, omitting the fourth, Ilyushin. But today's introduction of a longe-range, widebodied Ilyushin should make clear that Russia is fulfilling its commitment to remain a major supplier of commercial aircraft worldwide. Even scoffing Russia-bashers can ill afford to ignore Ilyushin. Soviet equipment has a huge installed base and predominates in many regions of the world. The depressed ruble gives high-tech Russian products like airplanes an incredible competive edge in the world market. A new Tupolev-154 costs less than US $2 million, less than a tenth the cost of the most comparable (although smaller and shorter range) Western plane, a Boeing 737. Russian aircraft makers have lost some gound, most notably in China. CAAC, which once operated entirely with Soviet equipment, now buys MD-11's assembled in China. But new markets are opening to Ilyushin as Cold War barriers to its sales are relaxed. The first thirty IL-96's have been ordered with Russian Soloviev engines for several Aeroflot divisions and Uzbekistan Airways. But Ilyushin is making the planes even more atractive to foreign buyers by making them compatible with foreign engines. Il-96 prototypes with Pratt and Whitney engines are already flying, and the first five sales (plus options on five more) of IL-96's to a Western operator (the Dutch charter operator Partnairs) were announced recently during this year's Paris Air Show. [following are excepts from press release:] Aeroflot To Introduce Fastest Nonstop Service Between New York And Moscow With New Ilyushin IL-96 Wide-Body Jetliner --------------------------------------------- Aeroflot Russian International Airlines has announced twice-weekly nonstop service between New York's JFK Sirport ans Moscow, effective July 16, 1993. The flights will be operated by Aeroflot's newest intercontinental jetliner, the four-engine wide-body IL-96-300. The aircraft, which recently received Federal Aviation Administration approval for commercial flights into the US, will operate on Tuesdays and Fridays in both directions. Flight SU 316 will depart JFK at 5:00 p.m., arriving at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport at 10:00 a.m. the next day. Westbound, flight SU 315 will depart Moscow at 1:00 p.m. arriving New York (JFK) at 3:00 the same afternoon. [...] Conceived by the world-renowned Ilyushin Design Bureau and manufactured at the Voronesh Aviation Complex, the IL-96-300 brings fly-by-wire technology, impressive range and added passenger comforts. The plane is the latest generation of the popular IL-86 jetliner that has been flying both domestically and internationally for over a decade. The spacious IL-96 provides almost double the range of the IL-86, thanks to a lighter structure of new alloys and composites combined with aerodynamic improvements, including the addition of winglets. The new IL-96 will offer three-cabin service: First Class with 22 seats, Business Class with 40, and Economy Class with 173, for a comfortable total of 235 passengers. The IL-96 will span the 4,672 mile distance in just 9 hours eastbound, making the flight the fastest nonstop service on the route. These new nonstops will save travelers over 4 hours compared to the time taken on Aeroflot's scheduled IL-86 flights, which make refueling stops in Gander, Newfoundland and Shannon, Ireland. Like other Aeroflot aircraft, the Economy class seat pitch, or distance between seats, is over 34 inches allowing ample knee room even for the longest of legs, and there's more room still in First and Business classes. On board the IL-96, Aeroflot passengers will also enjoy in-flight movies and stereo audio entertaainment pluss international meal service provisioned by Caterair (formerly Mariott) flight kitchens. Aeroflot Russian International Airlines serves more than 135 international destinations around the globe. The airline offers 35 weekly flights on its summer schedule between the US and Russia from six US gateways: New York, Washington, Miami, San Francisco, Chicago, and Anchorage. [...] The new IL-96-300 is designated "IL9" in computer reservation systems. [following are excerpts from IL-96 specifications:] passengers - one class 300 passengers -three classes 235 payload 40 metric tons (92,109 lbs.) cruise speed 900 km/h (559 mph) cruising altitude 12 km (39,700 ft.) range - 15 metric ton payload 11,000 km (6836 miles) range - 30 metric ton payload 9,000 km (5594 miles) engines 4 Soloviev PS-90A turbofans thrust/engine 16,000 kg (35275 lbs.) seat pitch - first class (2-2-2) 1020 mm (40.2 in.) seat pitch - business (2-3-2) 900 mm (35.4 in.) seat pitch - economy (3-3-3) 870 mm (34.2 in.) takeoff distance 2600 m (8530 ft.) landing distance 2000 m (6561 ft.) ----- Edward Hasbrouck Aereo Travel Group 731 Market St., Ste. 401 San Francisco, CA 94103 U.S.A. 1-415-882-5400, fax 1-415-957-3777 1-800-755-8747 toll free in the U.S.A. telex 49577256 AERO UD From kls Sun Jul 25 00:21:34 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ejnichol@eos.ncsu.edu (ERIC JOHNSON NICHOLSON) Subject: ABS brake systems on airplanes Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Jul 93 00:21:34 PDT Reply-To: ejnichol@eos.ncsu.edu (ERIC JOHNSON NICHOLSON) Organization: North Carolina State University, Project Eos I'm going to give a talk that will provide an overview on anti- lock brake systems for all classes of wheeled transportation ie motorcycles, cars , trucks(tractor/trailer) and aircraft during landing/takeoff. Does anyone on this net work with Aircraft ABS could you tell me if the system if self-contained on each strut ie a secondary flywheel system or is it more like on late model cars with a wheel speed sensor on each wheel hooked to a main computer with valving(sp?) controlled by same though hydraulic control send back to each strut/wheel assembly.. I don't have access to much on aircraft brakes, but from what little I've found, the early (late 1940's) aircraft anitlock systems relied on a flywheel spooled up by the repsective ground wheel and some form of analog or mechanical 'computer' telling it to dump pressure off of pads if wheel speed fell to less than say 80% of flywheel memory speed. Then flywheel would then reference/calibrate its speed to new ground wheel speed. This process repeated until brakes were no longer needed. Any information is greatly appreciated. Eric/ME/NCSU From kls Sun Jul 25 00:21:36 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: g88l4256@warthog.ru.ac.za (MR DJ LOVEDAY) Subject: BAe ATP performance Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Jul 93 00:21:36 PDT Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa I have read that the British Aeorospace ATP has been selling rather slowly. I would like to know if there are any reasons (other than a depressed market) for the low number of orders of these aircraft. The early advertisements suggested that the ATP was very fuel efficient which, I would assume, promote higer sales volumes of the this type of aircraft. Any comments. Derek From kls Sun Jul 25 00:21:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: pstinson@pbs.org Subject: Pan Am records & photos Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Jul 93 00:21:37 PDT Organization: PBS:Public Broadcasting Service, Alexandria, VA Does anyone have any idea where Pan Am flight records and the photo archives are now kept? I believe they used to be housed in the former Pan Am Building in New York City. Are they now headed for the Smithsonian in Washington, D.C.? From kls Sun Jul 25 00:22:05 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: Task 2.1.1: Updated review of AMJ 25.1309 (ACK) Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Jul 93 00:22:05 PDT Dear Jen, Please find following the latest version of my review of AMJ 25.1309, for inclusion in the state-of-the-art report. I have taken account of your pencilled comments on the first draft (in most cases! :-) and included some important points which arose in discussion with Lorenzo. I have taken the liberty of broadcasting this to the airliners list. Any comments from its readers are more than welcome. Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Review of AMJ 25.1309 and Related Documents Summary The "Joint Airworthiness Requirements" (JAR) contain the European requirements for any design of aircraft to be awarded "type certification". Part 25 applies to "large aeroplanes". These requirements were originally established jointly by the Airworthiness Authorities of France, Germany, The Netherlands and the UK. JAR-25 merely states requirements for certification that a given aircraft design is safe, usually with no guidance on how a manufacturer is to demonstrate that the design complies with them. JAR-25 must therefore be applied together with a set of "advisory material", which interprets the requirements, and gives guidelines for demonstrating compliance. Paragraph JAR 25.1309 covers airborne systems and the effects of their failure on the whole aircraft and its occupants. It is supplemented by AMJ 25.1309 "System Design and Analysis", which is one document in the "Advisory Material Joint" series. It came into force at JAR-25 change level 13. At previous change levels, a similar role was played by ACJ No. 1 to 25.1309 ("Advisory Circular Joint"). The equivalent regulations in the USA are the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), and JAR-25 is very similar to FAR-25. There is also a correspondence between the advisory material issued by the European and US authorities. In particular, AC 25.1309-1A ("Advisory Circular") corresponds to AMJ 25.1309. This review covers the advisory material which supplements JAR 25.1309, and should be considered together with the review of JAR-25. AMJ 25.1309 clarifies and quantifies the notions of risk which JAR 25.1309 introduces. It classifies failure conditions by their severity, and specifies a maximum permissible probability (both in terms of categories such as "improbable" and "extremely improbable", and in terms of numerical probabilities such as "10^-9 per flight hour") with which failure conditions in each class may arise. With regard to failure conditions which could arise from the anomalous behaviour of the software in a programmable system, it states that their probabilities cannot be assessed, and invokes a set of process guidelines (RTCA DO-178A) for the development of the software. ACJ No. 1 to 25.1309 defines the same failure condition severities and probability levels as AMJ 25.1309, but does not contain as much information. In particular it makes no reference to systems containing software. There are several other ACJs to JAR 25.1309, all very brief. 1. Introduction Originating organisation: JAA (Joint Airworthiness Authority) Numbers: AMJ 25.1309 (Advisory Material Joint relating to JAR 25.1309) This review also covers ACJ Nos. 1 to 8 to JAR 25.1309 (Advisory Circulars Joint). Status: Guidelines for means of demonstrating compliance with JAR 25.1309 for aircraft type certification. Version: Amendment 90/1 Date: Effective 11.05.90 Title: System Design and Analysis Language: English Purpose of AMJ 25.1309: (Quote from Section 1: Purpose) This AMJ describes various acceptable means for showing compliance with the requirements of JAR 25.1309 (b), (c) and (d). These means are intended to provide guidance for the experienced engineering and operational judgement that must form the basis for compliance findings. They are not mandatory. Other means may be used if they show compliance with this section of the requirements. (End quote) Compliance with JAR-25, and particularly with JAR 25.1309 must be demonstrated before any aircraft design is awarded an airworthiness type certificate. AMJ 25.1309 contains the following sections:- 1. Purpose (See above) 2. Reserved (for future use, should anyone think of a reason for having a section 2! This may be included to preserve a similar layout to AC 25.1309-1A.) 3. Applicability 4. Background 5. The Fail-Safe Design Concept 6. Definitions 7. Discussion 8. Acceptable Techniques 9. Qualitative Assessment 10. Quantitative Assessment 11. Operational and Maintenance Considerations 12. Step-by-step Guide Fig. 1. Relationship between probability and severity of failure condition Fig. 2. Depth of Analysis Flowchart AMJ 25.1309 clarifies and quantifies the notions of risk which JAR 25.1309 introduces. It classifies failure conditions by their severity, and specifies a maximum permissible probability (both in terms of categories such as "improbable" and "extremely improbable", and in terms of numerical probabilities such as "10^-9 per flight hour") with which failure conditions in each class may arise. With regard to failure conditions which could arise from the anomalous behaviour of the software in a programmable system, it states that their probabilities cannot be assessed, and invokes a set of process guidelines (RTCA DO-178A) for the development of the software. ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.1309 " ... consists of interpretive material and acceptable means of compliance, together with definition of the terms associated with probabilities." It defines the same failure condition severity categories and corresponding maximum permissible probabilities of occurrence as AMJ 25.1309, but without some of the more detailed explanation and description of methods. In particular, it does not mention software, and does not invoke RTCA DO-178A. ACJ Nos. 2 to 8 to JAR 25.1309 are all extremely short, and simply raise particular details that should be taken into account when assessing compliance. The ACJs are listed and summarised in an appendix to this review. The versions of the ACJs reviewed apply to JAR-25 at change 11. The latest JAR is change 13, at which level AMJ 25.1309 superseded ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.1309. Later versions of ACJ Nos. 2 to 8 (if any) were not available for review. The rest of this review deals solely with AMJ 25.1309, associated with JAR-25 change 13. 2. PLANT SAFETY CONTEXT 2.1. Relevant Safety Legislation/Regulation - What laws apply to the industry (e.g. EC Health and Safety Directives) National statutes govern civil aviation in each country, and each country has its own regulatory authority to enforce legal requirements and other national regulations on manufacturers, carriers, and airport and air traffic control autorities. - Is there explicit regulation and licensing? Yes. Without compliance with JAR-25, a manufacturer cannot obtain "type certification", which is essential before any carrier may operate the given type of aircraft in a civil transport fleet. - if so what body regulates safety in the industry? The various national civil airworthiness authorities establish regulations and monitor all aspects of safety in civil air transport in their own countries. For the purposes of drafting regulations and awarding type certificates, the airworthiness authorities of France (Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile - DGAC), Germany (Luftfahrt Bundesamt - LBA), The Netherlands (Rijksluchvaartdienst Directie Luchvaartinspectie - RLD) and the UK (Civil Aviation Authority - CAA) came together in the late 1980s to form the Joint Airworthiness Authority (JAA), and established the JAR as the common set of regulations for all four countries (with minor national variants). In the USA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) performs the same function according to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). - How does the company interact with the regulators, and at what stages during the development of a safety-related system? Methods of demonstrating compliance are agreed between the manufacturer and the authorities, making use of the associated advisory material. The two parties then work together closely throughout the whole of development from the concept phase onward to agree on, and apply, acceptable means of demonstrating compliance with the requirements of JAR-25, and particularly those of JAR 25.1309. AMJ 25.1309 states explicitly in several places that this close cooperation should be established as early as possible, since none of the acceptable means which it describes is mandatory, and hence the means for every system must be agreed in advance with the authority. This applies from the functional hazard analysis (which establishes the severity of every failure condition), through the more detailed analyses of individual hazardous and catastrophic failure conditions, down to the actual running of tests or provision of other evidence to establish the safety case by showing that each failure condition has an acceptably low probability of occurrence. For example, AMJ 25.1309 section 8 "Acceptable Techniques" states: (Quote) The methods outlined in this section provide acceptable techniques, but not the only techniques, for determining compliance with the requirements of JAR 25.1309 (b), (c) and (d). Other comparable techniques exist and may be proposed by an applicant for use in any certification programme. Early agreement between the applicant and the Certifying Authority should be reached on the methods of assessment to be used. (End quote) 2.2. Applicable Standards JAR-25 is a set of mandatory requirements for safety in aircraft design. In addition to Part 25, JAR-AWO applies to types of aircraft intended for all-weather operation, and JAR-E applies to engine certification. Minor national variants of these standards are retained by the various JAA members. The US requirements for design safety (FAR-25) are very similar. Paragraph JAR 25.1309 states the requirements concerning the effects of failure of avionics systems on the whole aircraft. Compliance with these is at the heart of the manufacturer's safety case. The AMJ and ACJ documents clarify the requirements and describe means of demonstrating compliance. The means described are not mandatory, but may be used in any particular certification by agreement between the manufacturer and the airworthiness authorities. The software in a programmable system must be developed according to the process guidelines described in RTCA DO-178A, (Requirements and Technical Concepts for Aviation, document 178 "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification"). Almost identical guidelines are referred to in Europe as EUROCAE ED-12A (European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment). AMJ 25.1309 and AC 25.1309-1A) explicitly invoke RTCA DO-178A, or later revisions thereto. (The version currently in force is version B.) In addition, each aircraft manufacturer will have its own internal company standards. For example, Airbus Industrie applies "ABDs" (Airbus Directives) both to in-house development and to procurement from suppliers. ABDs clarify and expand the certifying authorities' regulations to an even greater level of detail than the advisory material, or other standards invoked, such as RTCA DO-178A. Where certification is sought from several authories (e.g., JAA and FAA), ABDs will normally be aimed to guarantee compliance with the most stringent regulatory requirement imposed by any of the authorities. Manufacturers will normally be certified according to ISO-9000. 2.3 Approach to Safety Assurance The general principle applied (AMJ 25.1309 section 4a) is that: "... an inverse relationship should exist between the probability of loss of function(s) or malfunction(s) ... and the degree of hazard to the aeroplane and its occupants arising therefrom." The AMJ defines several levels of severity, together with corresponding levels of probability of failure (loss of function, etc.), expressed both quantitatively (numerical probabilities) and qualitatively (probability categories). In addition, the "fail-safe design concept" is recommended. A functional hazard analysis is recommended as a preliminary step to identify the possible failure conditions and their severity, and those graded as "hazardous" or "catastrophic" should be subjected to more detailed analysis to show that their occurrence is acceptably improbable. In particular, numerical probabilities should be used when assessing the probability of a catastrophic failure condition, but should not be the sole means of assessment. 2.3.1 Defining Safety a) Describe how the safety limits are set. - What are the tolerable risks for: plant personnel and the public? The following is adapted from AMJ 25.1309 4a:- The acceptability of a design in terms of the probability of it causing death is based on historical statistics of serious aircraft accidents (resulting in fatalities) which were due to operational and air-frame related causes. A conservative figure for the frequency of these is 1 per million hours of flight. (Recent statistics show a great improvement on this figure.) About 10% of these accidents can be attributed to failure conditions arising from the aeroplane's systems. On the principle that new designs should not be allowed a higher probability than already exists of causing serious accidents, the maximum frequency of serious accident due to all failure conditions is set at 1 per ten million hours. It is assumed that there are 100 possible failure conditions on an aircraft which can prevent continued safe flight and landing. (This assumption is somewhat arbitrary. It is similar to assuming that there are 100 safety-critical systems on each aircraft. To take a real example, there are around 70 safety-critical systems on the A320.) The allowable probability of failure is then apportioned equally among the 100 failure conditions, giving a maximum permissible frequency of occurrence of each failure condition of one per billion hours of flight, or the famous probability of catastrophic failure of 10^-9 per hour of flight. This establishes an upper limit for "Extremely Improbable" as used in JAR 25.1309 to characterise any failure condition "... which would prevent continued safe flight and landing". Higher probabilities of failure are permitted for less severe failure conditions. - Are there limits for different grades of injury/accident ? Four grades of Failure Condition are defined as follows in AMJ 25.1309, section 6j:- (1) MINOR: Failure Conditions which would not significantly reduce aeroplane safety, and which involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as routine flight plan changes, or some inconvenience to occupants. (2) MAJOR: Failure Conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries. (3) HAZARDOUS: Failure Conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be: (i) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; (ii) Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or (iii) Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants. (4) CATASTROPHIC: Failure Conditions which would prevent the Continued Safe Flight and Landing. Minor failure conditions may be "Probable". Major failure conditions may be at most "Remote". Hazardous failure conditions may be at most "Extremely Remote". Catastrophic failure conditions may be at most "Extremely Improbable". (The probability categories are defined in AMJ 25.1309, sections 9e and 10b.) - Are the frequencies of such events expressed qualitatively or quantitatively? (e.g. 0.1/year, or `unlikely', `remote', etc.) Both qualitative and quantitative assessments are recommended. The probability categories are defined qualitatively as follows (AMJ 25.1309, 9e):- Probable: anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire operational life of a single aeroplane. Remote: Unlikely to occur to each aeroplane during its total life but which may occur several times when considering the total operational life of a number of aeroplanes of the type. Extremely Remote: Unlikely to occur when considering the total operational life of all aeroplanes of the type, but nevertheless has to be considered as being possible. Extremely Improbable: So unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all aeroplanes of one type. The probability categories are defined quantitatively as follows (AMJ 25.1309, 10b):- Probable: probability greater than of the order of 1 x 10^-5. Remote: probability of the order of 1 x 10^-5 or less, but greater than of the order of 1 x 10^-7. Extremely Remote: probability of the order of 1 x 10^-7 or less, but greater than of the order of 1 x 10^-9. Extremely Improbable: probability of the order of 1 x 10^-9 or less. Notes:- 1. Probabilities are usually quantified "... in terms of acceptable numerical probability ranges for each flight hour, based on a flight of mean duration for the aeroplane type. However, for a function which is used only during a specific flight operation; e.g., take-off, landing, etc., the acceptable probability should be based on, and expressed in terms of, the flight operation's actual duration." (Quoted from AMJ 25.1309, 10b) 2. The term "Improbable" is used to include both "Remote" and "Extremely Remote" in both numeric and non-numeric assessment. 3. The phrase "of the order of" is used to indicate that a numerical assessment will not usually be precise. b) How is this transcribed into design targets for the plant? - Is there a direct link between plant failures and injury? Yes. The severity categories of failure condition are defined partly in terms of the degrees of injury. Each severity category has a maximum permissible probability of occurrence for the failure conditions within it. - If indirect, how are the plant safety targets established? N/A. 2.3.2 Implementing Safety a) How are the plant hazards identified ? - Is some systematic procedure followed? Yes. A functional hazard assessment is recommended to identify every failure mode of every system and classify the resulting potential faliure condition as minor, major, etc. The procedure for assessing the probability of failure conditions is shown in flowchart form in AMJ 25.1309 Fig. 2. b) How are the risks of these hazards assessed? On the basis of operational and engineering judgement, and the results of testing and previous operational experience with similar equipment. According to AMJ 25.1309 section 8 and the flowchart in Fig. 2, any failure condition shown to be minor need not be analysed further. Major failure conditions should be assessed qualitatively to be "remote". Provided the system has low "complexity" and is similar in its relevant "attributes" to those on other aircraft, then design and installation appraisals, and satisfactory service history will suffice. FMEA or fault tree analysis should be used for complex systems with functional redundancy, to rule out the existence of common cause failures, and to show that there are no effects on other functions. Hazardous and catastrophic conditions should be assessed to be "extremely remote" and "extremely improbable", respectively. This is usually done by a combination of qualitative and quantitative assessment, but catastrophic failure conditions should not be assessed by quantitative methods alone. For simple conventional systems, assessment can be made using "experienced engineering judgement", based on the degree of redundancy and on satisfactory service history of similar equipment, where this exists. The terms "complex" and "conventional" are defined in AMJ 25.1309 section 6 as follows:- COMPLEX: Applicable to systems whose architecture and logic are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical tools, e.g., Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Fault Trees, Reliability Block Diagrams. CONVENTIONAL: An attribute of a system is considered to be conventional if it is the same as, or closely similar to, that of previously-approved systems that are commonly used. A failure condition resulting from a single failure mode of a device cannot be accepted to be extremely improbable, except in very unusual cases. AMJ 25.1309 section 7i states that: "In general, the means of compliance described in this AMJ are not directly applicable to software assessments because it is not feasible to assess the number or kinds of software errors, if any, that may remain after the completion of system design, development and test. RTCA DO-178A and EUROCAE ED-12A, or later revisions thereto, provide acceptable means for assessing and controlling the software used to program digital-computer-based systems." In practice, this means that a reliability of 1 is apportioned to the software when assessing the risk from the failure of any programmable system. What the AMJ recommends, in effect, is:- For non-critical systems, use judgement. For simple systems, use judgement. For conventional systems, appeal to previous satisfactory service record of something similar. For the rest, use numerical probabilities (but not as the sole means of assessment). By any criteria, computer-based systems are complex and unconventional, and can be critical (e.g., the A320 EFCS). Even if the hardware architecture is conventional (e.g., there is a close similarity between the dual-channel fail-passive computers in the A320 EFCS and those in earlier non-critical systems in the A310 and other aircraft), the presence of different software immediately destroys any similarity between two computer-based systems. AMJ 25.1309 is therefore sending out contradictory messages:- On the one hand, it recommends that computer-based systems be assessed using numerical failure probabilities (since they are complex and unconventional). On the other hand, it states that the probability of anomalous behaviour of the software which is at the heart of such systems cannot be assessed at all, numerically or otherwise! This is a serious deficiency in the whole of the regulations as applied to airborne computer-based systems. c) What design approach is followed to reduce unacceptable risks? - plant redesign The detection of any unacceptably probable failure condition during functional hazard analysis would result in a modified design being proposed prior to certification. Detection during operation, e.g., by an accident investigation, would result in a post-certification modification and recertification. In some cases, modifications may be enforced by Airworthiness Directives. - plant control systems Assessment of compliance with JAR 25.1309 (c) and (d)4 (warning information) is described in AMJ 25.1309 section 8g. Warnings must be "timely, rousing, obvious, clear and unambiguous" and must be issued in time for the crew to take corrective action. The failure monitoring and warning system should be reliable in not failing to give genuine warnings and in not giving excessive false alarms. - independent plant safety systems (mechanical protection, computer protection, etc.) The "fail-safe design concept" is recommended. (See below.) - human operators and safety procedures. Procedures to be followed after a warning should be described in the Aeroplane Flight Manual. Certification Check Requirements (CCR) (see below) should not be used in lieu of a reliable failure monitoring and warning system. Quantitative assessment of the probability of crew error is not considered feasible. (AMJ 25.1309 8g(5)) - what assumptions are made about the independence of the various safety systems (e.g.: fully independent) -if so how is this demonstrated? The "fail-safe design concept" (AMJ 25.1309 section 5) requires that the failure of any single element or component must be assumed when assessing a system. FMEA or fault-tree analysis may be used to demonstrate independence. d) What policy is followed in reducing the plant safety risks? - Does the plant have a safe shutdown state? No. From decision point during take-off onward, certain systems must continue to function to allow continued safe flight and landing. - How do you balance safety against availability (e.g. shut-down, or degraded operation)? Certain systems must be available in order to ensure safety. There is no trade-off. The fail-safe design concept recommends error-tolerance and a "designed failure path" to proceed in an orderly way to degraded operation following failure of a system. The manufacturer may draw up a Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) without which the aeroplane will not be allowed to take-off for safety reasons. - What level of reliance is placed on the operators (is safety-action automated or operator-dependent)? Certain systems will respond automatically to failure conditions or external events (e.g., wind gusts) which may affect safety, but in many cases safety depends on the crew responding correctly to warnings. Certain types and phases of flight are necessarily automated, e.g., category 3 landings (zero visibility and no decision height) using instrument landing systems (ILS). - How much does the operator rely on automatically processed data? (filtering, expert systems, "glass" consoles) ? The crew rely heavily on information displayed in the cockpit by failure monitoring and warning systems. 2.3.3 Maintaining Safety - Does the plant design explicitly consider the impact of maintenance and repair on safety? AMJ 25.1309 section 11 considers operation and maintenance. - Are there explicit maintenance procedures? AMJ 25.1309 section 11 allows the manufacturer to define Certification Check Requirements (CCRs), which are periodic checks carried out by ground or flight crew to detect latent faults. Where these are done by flight crew, the procedures should be described in the AFM. Where they are done by ground crew, they should be made available to the carrier in time to be incorporated in the maintenance programme. - What procedures are followed for a plant modification? The manufacturer will apply to the airworthiness authority for approval of any modification. - How is the impact of modification on plant safety assessed? The recertification after a modification follows a subset of the procedures for original type certification. 2.3.4 Assessing/Assuring Safety a) How is the risk of the combined plant, control, protection systems and operational personnel assessed? By showing that all identified failure conditions have the appropriate probability of occurrence. This should then mean that the probability of loss of hull through all system-related causes is no greater than 10^-6 per hour of flight. (See above.) b) For regulated industries, how is the plant safety justified to the regulators? By making out a safety case using criteria agreed upon in close consultation with the airworthiness authority during the development of the aircraft type. c) For non-regulated industries, is there an internal safety body that approves the safety of the plant? N/A d) Is there an established procedure for feed-back from the safety assessment to the designers? The designers are closely involved in the safety assessment. 2.3.5 Methods and Techniques The following specific assessment techniques are recommended in AMJ 25.1309: Functional hazard assessment: A preliminary assessment of the design to identify possible failure conditions and grade their severity, taking into account external events (e.g., weather conditions) which may affect safety in combination with system failure. Installation appraisal: A qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of an installation, using expeienced judgement. Fault Tree Analysis: This may be applied qualitatively (AMJ 25.1309 section 9d) or quantitatively (AMJ 25.1309 section 10a). Dependence diagram: This is more commonly known as a reliability block diagram, and is similar to FTA, but is success-oriented rather than failure-oriented. It may be used qualitatively (AMJ 25.1309 section 9d) or quantitatively (AMJ 25.1309 section 10a). Failure modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): This may be applied qualitatively (AMJ 25.1309 section 9c) or quantitatively (AMJ 25.1309 section 10a). Common Cause Failure Analysis: This is referred to in several places where the risk from failure of a given system is to be assessed. It is stated that Fault Tree Analysis or FMEA could uncover common cause failures. 3. DEALING WITH DESIGN ERROR The following sections describe what AMJ 25.1309 recommends under each main heading. 3.1. Fault Avoidance Project Controls: Evidence must be presented to establish the safety of each system on the aircraft. Quality Control Systems: Experts drawn from the airworthiness authorities closely supervise design and development at all stages. The FAA uses the DER system for supervision, and a similar system of "authorised signatories" exists in the UK. Design Reviews, Inspections, etc.: These are recommended as part of establishing the safety case. See above. Staff Competency: AMJ 25.1309 makes no specific statement about this. However, aircraft designers would normally be expected to be chartered engineers in some field. Aircrew must be formally qualified on any type of aircraft before being allowed to fly it. This involves training in simulators and flight, followed by check flights with a qualified pilot to check the trainee's performance. No formal qualifications exist for maintenance crews, but they would be expected to pass through the training programme of either the carrier company or the aircraft manufacturer, and to be able to follow CCR and other procedures related to safety. Design Tools and Methods: Not specifically mentioned by AMJ 25.1309, other than the analysis procedures menti9oned above. Plant simulation: Simulation tests are mentioned as a means of establishing compliance with JAR 25.1309. 3.2. Fault Detection - Prototyping: Not explicitly mentioned. - Reviews, Inspections, HAZOP, etc.: Most of the assessment techniques recommended fall into this category. - Plant/system simulation: See above. - Testing: Mentioned as one of the means of demonstrating compliance with JAR 25.1309 3.3. Failure Toleration/Mitigation AMJ 25.1309 section 5 describes the "fail-safe design concept", and other sections of the document refer to the use of redundancy. - Design conservatism (safety factors): Section 5 (11) recommends the incorporation of safety margins. - Claim limits on reliability: Single point failures may not be assessed as "extremely improbable". - Fail-safe design: This is recommended, and involves:- 1. Designed integrity and quality 2. Redundancy or back-up systems 3. Isolation to prevent failure propagation 4. Proven reliability 5. Failure warning 6. Defined flightcrew procedures 7. Checkability: the ability to check a component's condition. 8. Failure containment to limit the impact of a failure 9. Designed failure path to control and direct the effects of a failure. 10. Error-tolerance 11. Margins or factors of safety - Design diversity: Not specifically recommended. - Treatment of common cause failure (CCF): Recommended in several places, but not as an activity on its own. - use of Beta factors in design: Not mentioned. 3.4 Incident Reporting and Analysis This is not specifically covered by AMJ 25.1309, however:- - Failure databases The airworthiness authorities maintain databases of equipment failures, and pilots may report incidents anonymously to a reporting forum. - Incident analysis Any aircraft accident is officially investigated to establish its causes, using data from the CVR and DFDR. - Design reassessment Would occur frequently during the process of obtaining a type certificate. - Design modification Would be carried out in the light of functional hazard assessment and assessment of individual failure conditions. 3.5 Assessment See section 2.3.5 above. 4. 10^-9 and all that ... ... the non-assessment of safety-critical avionics software. AMJ 25.1309 states that catastrophic failure conditions should be assessed as "extremely improbable", and that this assessment may be numerical. It is also concerned that systems which are "complex" (require FMEA or FTA in order to be understood) should be carefully assessed, and also those which are not "conventional". By any criteria, digital computer based systems are complex and unconventional, and so would be expected to be analysed carefully and numerically. However, AMJ 25.1309 specifically does not recommend probabilistic assessment of software, and instead invokes RTCA DO-178A, which is a set of process guidelines. In practice, this means that the software in a system is apportioned a reliability of 1 when the system is assessed. For example, the A320 EFCS is a safety-critical system. Its individual computers have a hardware failure probability of the order of 10^-3 to 10^-4. The individual computers are connected in such a way that the whole EFCS can be shown to have the required probability of failure of 10^-9, but this is with respect to hardware failure only. There would seem to be a good case for having AMJ 25.1309 impose a claim limit on the reliability of software in such systems. APPENDIX: Advisory Circulars to JAR 25.1309 The following ACJs apply to JAR-25 at change 11. ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.1309 " ... consists of interpretive material and acceptable means of compliance, together with definition of the terms associated with probabilities." It contains the same failure condition severity categories and associated probabilities of occurrence as AMJ 25.1309, but without some of the detailed explanation and discussion. It does not mention computer-based systems specifically, and does not invoke RTCA DO-178A. ACJ No. 2 to JAR 25.1309 states simply: "The effects of fluid or vapour contamination, due either to the normal environment or accidental leaks or spillage, should be taken into account." (Applies to JAR 25.1309(a)) ACJ No. 3 to JAR 25.1309 states simply: "The effects of mechanical damage or deterioration including short circuits or earths caused by such damage, in particular the failure of an earth connection should be taken into account." (Applies to JAR 25.1309(b)) ACJ No. 4 to JAR 25.1309 states that each source of electrical supply (generator or battery) should be provided with a warning light to give the crew immediate warning of failure of its output. (Applies to JAR 25.1309(c)) ACJ No. 5 to JAR 25.1309 states that, for compliance with JAR 25.1309(e), all possible combinations of electrical power source failure should be considered, except those that are shown to be extremely improbable. This should include loss of all main generated power, and emergency supplies should be provided for essential services. These emergency supplies should be mechanically and electrically isolated from the normal system, so that no single failure can affect both. ACJ No. 6 to JAR 25.1309 states that the separation of redundant electrical and hydraulic circuits should be such as to minimise the probability of a single failure affecting all. (Applies to JAR 25.1309(e)) ACJ No. 7 to JAR 25.1309 states that for aeroplanes for which "two-power-units-inoperative performance is scheduled" (i.e., they are expected to keep flying after two engines out of three or four have failed) sufficient services should remain to enable continued safe flight and landing, although a certain degradation in some services may be expected. (Applies to JAR 25.1309(e)(3)) ACJ No. 8 to JAR 25.1309 states simply: "1 The reliability of each warning system should be compatible with the reliability of the system for which it provides a warning. 2 Each warning system should be designed so as to minimise unnecessary warnings." (Applies to JAR 25.1309(c)) It will be seen that most of the ACJs to JAR 25.1309 are fairly trivial, and address specific small details, apart from ACJ No. 1, which was superseded by AMJ 25.1309 at JAR change 13. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Sun Jul 25 00:22:26 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: CSR Workshop 1993 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Jul 93 00:22:26 PDT CSR Centre for Software Reliability TENTH ANNUAL WORKSHOP CO-HOSTED WITH JUSE Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers APPLICATION OF SOFTWARE METRICS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE IN INDUSTRY PROVISIONAL PROGRAMME Supported by the CEC under the Human Capital and Mobility Programme The Grand Hotel, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 29th September - 1st October, 1993 CENTRE FOR SOFTWARE RELIABILITY Tenth Annual Workshop Application of Software Metrics and Quality Assurance in Industry When, ten years ago, the Centre for Software Reliability (CSR) was formed, one of its major objectives was to raise awareness of the importance of measurement for software quality assurance and control. At that time software measurement research and practice was restricted largely to academic environments. Ten years on, the issue of measurement is considered to be central for turning software engineering into a true engineering discipline. This is now recognised by most major software development companies throughout the world. It is therefore timely that the 10th Annual CSR Workshop should bring together many of the leading industrial and academic figures who have played a key role in this transformation. The speakers represent companies and institutions from all around the world. In addition to the many top European speakers, we are delighted to have from the USA Vic Basili, Bill Hetzel, and Shari Lawrence-Pfleeger, who have all made such an impact in software metrics, and from Japan Yoshinori Iizuka (Tokyo University), Sadahiro Isoda (Nippon), Minoru Itakura (Fujitsu), Ryuzo Kaneko (NEC), Masanobu Hattori (Fujitsu Ltd) and Katsuyuki Yasuda (Hitachi). To add even more of an international flavour the workshop is being supported by a grant from the CEC under the Human Capital and Mobility Programme; this will allow the participation as delegates of a number of active researchers and practitioners from the poorer parts of Europe. The emphasis of the workshop is on state-of-the-art experience with software metrics and quality assurance programmes. There will be a unique opportunity to contrast practices between different companies, countries, continents and cultures. It is a special privilege that the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) are co-hosting the workshop with CSR. For several years the prestigious JUSE software quality group have visited CSR during their annual world study tour. During these visits CSR has been fortunate to learn first hand about metrics and quality assurance practices at the major Japanese companies. Since JUSE arranged for the workshop to coincide with their annual world study tour in 1993, the opportunity to share experiences is now open to all participants. We are delighted that JUSE are providing an impressive list of speakers and delegates. The format for the three-day workshop is largely that which has been so successful in previous years. The first day is devoted to tutorials and keynote talks. The second and third days are devoted to shorter, invited presentations. A special session, introduced for the first time this year, is devoted to submitted papers, of which the best six were selected. As usual the emphasis of the workshop is on informality and audience participation. This is encouraged through ample question time (speakers leave at least 10 minutes each) and a panel discussion. Numbers at the workshop are restricted to enable proper interaction. WEDNESDAY 29TH SEPTEMBER 08.30-0930 REGISTRATION AND REFRESHMENTS Chair: Norman Fenton, City University, UK 09.30-10.30 Keynote Address: "Applying the Goal/Question/Metric Paradigm in the Experience Factory" Vic Basili, University of Maryland, USA 10.30-11.00 REFRESHMENTS 11.00-13.00 Tutorial: "Management Aspects of Software Reuse" Sadahiro Isoda, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp., Japan 13.00-14.15 LUNCH Chair: Bev Littlewood, City University, UK 14.15-15.15 Keynote Address: "Now it's the turning point for the Japanese Software Industry" Yoshinori Iizuka, The University of Tokyo, Japan 15.15-15.45 REFRESHMENTS 15.45-17.45 Tutorial: "Setting up a Software Metrics Programme in Industry" Shari Lawrence-Pfleeger, Systems/Software, USA and City University, UK THURSDAY 30TH SEPTEMBER Chair: Robin Whitty, South Bank University, UK 09.00-09.30 "The Role of Quality Staff in Software Development" Masanobu Hattori, Fujitsu Ltd, Japan 09.30-10.00 "Making Software Metrics and QA happen: practical experiences in Italy" Gualtiera Bazzano, ETNOTEAM, Italy 10.00-10.30 "Product Development and Quality Assurance in the Software Factory" Katsuyuki Yasuda, Hitachi Ltd., Japan 10.30-11.00 REFRESHMENTS 11.00-11.30 "Industrial Experience - Working with AMI" Richard Espley, GEC-Marconi Avionics Ltd., UK 11.30-12.00 "Software Measurements - an Evolutionary Approach" Norbert Fuchs, Alcatel, Austria 12.00-12.30 Title to be announced Karl-Heinrich Mueller, Siemens, Germany 12.30-14.00 LUNCH Chair: Yoshinori Iizuka, University of Tokyo, Japan 14.00-14.30 "Using Function Points for Software Cost Estimation - Some Empirical Results" Barbara Kitchenham, NCC, UK 14.30-15.00 "Evaluating Effort Prediction Systems" Claude Stricker, University of Lausanne, Switzerland 15.00-15.30 "Use of Function Points for Estimation and Contracts" Jolyn Onvlee, Onvlee Opleidingen, The Netherlands 15.30-16.00 REFRESHMENTS 16.00-16.30 "Quality Practice in the Industry" Roberto Ciampoli, O. Group SpA, Italy 16.30-17.00 "Beyond SEI's CMM - the BOOTSTRAP Approach for Profiling and Measuring Software Engineering Processes" Gunter Koch, 2i Industrial Informatics GmbH, Germany 17.00 PANEL DISCUSSION: "Do Quality Assurance Procedures Lead to Measurable Quality Improvements?" Tom Anderson, Bev Littlewood (CSR, UK) Vic Basili (Maryland, USA) Bill Hetzel (SQE, USA) Sinclair Stockman (British Telecom, UK) Yoshinori Iizuka (University of Tokyo, Japan) Toshiro Ohno (Toshiba, Japan) Mitsuru.Ohba (IBM, Japan), Ayatomo Kanno (Science University, Tokyo, Japan) 19.30 WORKSHOP BANQUET FRIDAY 1ST OCTOBER PARALLEL SESSIONS Chairs: Norman Fenton, Tom Anderson, Univ. of City University, UK Newcastle upon Tyne, UK 09.30-10.00 "Complexity Traces: an Instrument "Introducing Metrics into for Software Project Management" Industry:a Perspective on GQM" Christof Ebert, University of Richard Bache, Infometrix, Stuttgart, Germany UK, & Martin Neal, Lloyd's Register, UK 10.00-10.30 "Measurement through the Software "Practical Implementation Life-cycle: a Comparative Case of Process Improvement Study" Initiatives" Bob Cole and Derek Woods, Paul Goodman, Brameur, UK Glasgow Caledonian University 10.30-11.00 "Integrating Software Quality "A Case History of Automated Assurance into the Teaching of Incremental Improvement of Programming" Software Product Quality" Edmund Burke, University of Les Hatton, Programming Nottingham, UK Research Ltd., UK 11.00-11.30 REFRESHMENTS 11.30-12.00 "QUANTUM - A Measurement-based "Experience of Introducing Framework for Software Quality and Measurement in Quality Assurance" Telecommunication Software Development" Chris Miller, Praxis, UK Sinclair Stockman, British Telecom, UK 12.00-12.30 Title to be announced Title to be announced Francois de Nazelle, Yannis Kliafis, Greece Q-Sys, France 12.30-13.45 LUNCH Chair: Barbara Kitchenham, NCC, UK 13.45-14.45 "Measuring the Measurements: the Technology for Measuring Software Practice" Bill Hetzel, Software Quality Engineering, USA 14.45-15.15 "A Framework for System Development Activities and Responsibilities - Quality Improvement by filling up the Communication Gap" Minoru Itakura, Fujitsu Ltd., Japan 15.15-15.45 REFRESHMENTS 15.45-16.15 "Situational Measurement" Hans van Vliet, Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands 16.15-16.45 "The Behavioural Analaysis makes the Company Mature" Ryuzo Kaneko, NEC Corp., Japan 16.45-17.15 "Function Points" (exact title to be announced) Martin Hooft van Huysduynen, Ing Bank, The Netherlands REGISTRATION AND INFORMATION ---------------------------- To register for the Conference, please complete the enclosed Registration Form and send together with your remittance to: Ms Carol Allen Centre Manager Centre for Software Reliability The City University Northampton Square London EC1V OHB Tel: +44 71 477 8421 Fax: +44 71 477 8585 e.mail: c.allen@csr.city.ac.uk VENUE The Conference will take place at: The Grand Oudezijds Voorburgwal 197 1001 EX Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel: +31 20 555 3 111 Fax: +31 20 555 3 222 The Hotel is situated in the heart of Amsterdam's historic, shopping and financial districts, two blocks from Dam Square. It is 20km/12 miles, 30 minutes from Schiphol-Amsterdam Airport. ACCOMMODATION The Grand, Amsterdam, is a historic Dutch monument, originally built in the 15th Century as a Royal Inn and later as home to the Dutch Admiralty and local municipality as Amsterdam's City Hall. It has now been restored and renovated as a five star deluxe hotel. It has many recreational facilities including an indoor swimming pool, Health Club with sauna, Turkish bath, massage and jet stream. The gourmet cuisine is under the supervision of Albert Roux, Maitre Cuisinier de France. A special room rate of NLG 370 per room, per night including tax and service charges but excluding breakfast which is an additional NLG 27.50, has been negotiated with the hotel. All rooms are double and this rate is for single or double occupancy. The Hotel has agreed to hold this special rate for those delegates who wish to stay for the weekend prior to the conference (25th and 26th September) and/or the weekend after the conference (2nd and 3rd October). Delegates wishing to take advantage of this special rate should complete the enclosed Hotel Reservation form and fax or mail it to the Hotel direct. Delegates are responsible for their own accounts. Alternative accommodation may be booked through: The Netherlands Reservation Centre: Tel: +31 703 202500 Fax: +31 703 202611 and further information can be obtained from: Amsterdam Tourist Office Stationsplein 10 Postbus 3901 1001 AS Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel: +31 205 512512 Fax: +31 206 252869 CONFERENCE REGISTRATION The Conference Registration costs (pounds Sterling)450. A specially reduced registration of (pounds Sterling)375 will be available to academics. The Conference Registration includes attendance at all sessions of the Conference (including the tutorials) lunch and refreshments on each day, and a bound copy of the draft Conference Proceedings. The Conference Registration can be paid by cheque in pounds Sterling drawn on a UK Bank, by Bank Draft or by Direct Transfer to our bank: The National Westminster Bank plc 15 Bishopsgate P.O. Box 34 London, EC2P 2AP UK Sort code: 50-00-00-T Account number: 03028836 Cheques should be made payable to: "The City University - CSR Conference" . CONFERENCE BANQUET An optional Conference Banquet has been arranged for the Thursday evening (30th) at the hotel at an additional cost of (pounds Sterling)40. CEC GRANT ----------------------------- This workshop is being supported by a grant from the CEC under the Human Capital and Mobility programme to enable the participation of delegates from the poorer parts of Europe. Applications for support under this programme must be made in writing to: Ms Carol Allen Centre Manager Centre for Software Reliability The City University Northampton Square London, EC1V OHB UK Tel.: +44 71 477 8421 Fax.: +44 71 477 8585 e-mail: c.allen@csr.city.ac.uk Note: Since only a relatively short time is available before the workshop, initial enquiries regarding support under this CEC grant may be made by e-mail. However a written application will be required. This may be sent by fax. Please state your full address, institution, field of research, sex and date of birth. (Town and country of residence are obviously required in order to assess eligibility. Grants will normally be made to applicants from the appropriate areas of Europe who are either female, under the age of 35, or both.) The areas which qualify for support include the whole of Greece and Portugal, and at least parts of Spain, Germany (ehemahlige DDR), Eire, and the UK. If in doubt, please ask. ----------------------------- N.B. CSR reserve the right to make alterations to the programme without notification. ----------------------------- R E G I S T R A T I O N F O R M APPLICATIONS OF SOFTWARE METRICS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE IN INDUSTRY THE GRAND HOTEL, AMSTERDAM 29TH SEPTEMBER - 1ST OCTOBER 1993 Please complete in block capitals 1. PARTICIPANT Surname: ......................................................... First name(s): ......................................................... Title (Prof. Dr. Mr. Ms. etc.): ......................................................... Business address: ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... ......................................................... Daytime Tel. No.: ......................................................... Fax: ......................................................... e-mail: ......................................................... Details of special dietary requirements: ......................................................... ......................................................... 2. REGISTRATION Please register me as a delegate at the following rate [* delete as appropriate] *Standard Delegate rate (pounds Sterling)450 *Academic rate (pounds Sterling)375 *Please book ___ place(s) at the Conference Banquet on 30th September @ (pounds Sterling)40 per person. Total remittance payable: (pounds Sterling)....................... 3. PAYMENT *Please invoice my Company *I enclose a Sterling Cheque drawn on a UK Bank *I enclose a Bank Draft in pounds Sterling *I will pay by Direct Transfer in pounds Sterling to: The National Westminster Bank plc 15 Bishopsgate PO Box 34 London EC2P 2AP UK Sort Code: 50-00-00-T Account number: 03028836 Cheques should be made payable to: "The City University - CSR Conference" Registration form and remittance should be returned to: Ms Carol Allen, Centre Manager, Centre for Software Reliability, The City University, Northampton Square, London, EC1V OHB, UK. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Sun Jul 25 12:44:48 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: ABS brake systems on airplanes References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Jul 93 12:44:48 PDT In article you write: >Does anyone on this net work with Aircraft ABS could you tell me if the system >if self-contained on each strut ie a secondary flywheel system or is it more >like on late model cars You might want to try: _Landing Gear Design Handbook_, by Norman S. Currey, January 1982, published by Lockheed-Georgia, Marietta, Georgia 30063. It's a highly readable book, covering every facet of landing gear design I can think of, at least (no great task :-)). I used this to dig up an answer to the great pre-spinning wheel debate last year. :-) --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Mon Jul 26 00:32:58 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: spagiola@leland.Stanford.EDU Organization: DSO, Stanford University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 26 Jul 93 00:32:58 PDT MR DJ LOVEDAY writes > I have read that the British Aeorospace ATP has been selling > rather slowly. I would like to know if there are any reasons > (other than a depressed market) for the low number of orders of > these aircraft. The early advertisements suggested that the ATP > was very fuel efficient which, I would assume, promote higer > sales volumes of the this type of aircraft. The ATP has been selling slowly from way before the market became depressed. I think the reasons for its lack of success are two-fold: (1) although the aircraft is reasonably economic, it is too large for most turbo-prop markets. 60 seats is just too many; the only aircraft that has done well in this size range is the ATR72, which has the advantage of commonality with the smaller ATR42. (2) The BAe marketing team has, over the years, proven remarkably inept at selling anything. The two problems are, of course, related to each other: poor market analysis leads to both poor design choices and poor marketing. Another example is the BAe 146; BAe originally thought it would sell primarily on the strength of its small-field performance, to 3rd world countries. Instead most of its sales have been on the strength of its quietness, to developed country airlines. BAe thought the small 146-100 would be the most popular model; instead the -100 sold in very small numbers, with the larger -200 taking most of the orders; today most orders tend to be for the even larger -300. These problems are then compounded by the problems inherent in any low-volume, slow-production program. (1) you never get very far down the learning curve (a problem that BAe compounded by opening 2 production lines); and (2) it takes a while for bugs to be sorted out (which gives you a rep as an unreliable airplane). -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@leland.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Tue Jul 27 12:33:31 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) Subject: Re: New Airliner In Service References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: University Of Kentucky, Dept. of Math Sciences Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 Jul 93 12:33:31 PDT Edward Hasbrouck writes: About the IL-96 ... >passengers - one class 300 >passengers -three classes 235 >payload 40 metric tons (92,109 lbs.) >cruise speed 900 km/h (559 mph) >cruising altitude 12 km (39,700 ft.) >range - 15 metric ton payload 11,000 km (6836 miles) >range - 30 metric ton payload 9,000 km (5594 miles) >engines 4 Soloviev PS-90A turbofans >thrust/engine 16,000 kg (35275 lbs.) >seat pitch - first class (2-2-2) 1020 mm (40.2 in.) >seat pitch - business (2-3-2) 900 mm (35.4 in.) >seat pitch - economy (3-3-3) 870 mm (34.2 in.) >takeoff distance 2600 m (8530 ft.) >landing distance 2000 m (6561 ft.) So, what plane would be closest to these stats? And how would the cost compare to the IL-96? -Thanks From kls Tue Jul 27 12:33:32 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press) Subject: Re: New Airliner In Service References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press) Organization: Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 Jul 93 12:33:32 PDT Russian aircraft makers have lost some gound, most notably in China. CAAC, which once operated entirely with Soviet equipment, now buys MD-11's assembled in China. But new markets are opening to Ilyushin as Cold War barriers to its sales are relaxed. Correction: MD-11's are not assembled in China, only the MD-80 is assembled there as a joint venture with McDonnell Douglas. Speaking only for myself. Hayes N. Press e-mail address: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov phone (804) 864-2715 fax (804) 864-7793 Good old Postal Service: Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Co. 144 Research Drive MS 156A Hampton, Virginia 23666 From kls Tue Jul 27 12:33:35 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: A340 flight: the straight dope Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 Jul 93 12:33:35 PDT There's been a high level of conjecture on the A340 round-the-world flight. The following is from the June 28 issue of AvLeak: 1. The airplane was an A340-200, with four CFM56-5C's, five crewmembers, and 17 passengers. The airplane ID isn't given, but there's a big "79" forward of the front door. 2. The flight route was Le bourget-Auckland-Le Bourget. It departed June 16. The flight lasted 48 hours and 22 minutes, including a 5 hour, 4 minute stop in Auckland. First leg: 21:32, 10307 nm, fuel burn 125.4 tons (276,500 lbs), 14.6 tons (32,200 lbs) remaining. Second leg: 21:46, 10392 nm, fuel burn 134.8 (297,200 lbs) tons of fuel. (just barely international IFR reserves left?) 3. The airplane DID use additional fuel tanks: five, with a total additional capacity of 28.5 tons (62,800 lbs). No mention is made of whether they used special fuel, or supercooled it before takeoff (ala the 747-400 record-setting attempt). 4. The article notes the following records will be certificated by Federation Aeronautique Inernationale: - Longest flight by a commercial transport. - Fastest around-the-world flight in the 250-300 metric ton MTOW category. - Fastest flight between Paris to Auckland and Auckland to Paris. - First nonstop flight between the two cities, both directions. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Tue Jul 27 23:49:39 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jimakine@cc.helsinki.fi (Jari Isto Makinen) Subject: Re: A340 flight: the straight dope References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: University of Helsinki Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 Jul 93 23:49:39 PDT Robert Dorsett (rdd@cactus.org) wrote: > 1. The airplane was an A340-200, with four CFM56-5C's, five crewmembers, and > 17 passengers. The airplane ID isn't given, but there's a big "79" forward > of the front door. To be exact, they had a crew of four and 18 passengers. The plane itself was MSN4 F-WWBA, and that "79" is just a number at the Le Bourget Air Show. They had also about one tonne of spare parts aboard. > Second leg: 21:46, 10392 nm, fuel burn 134.8 (297,200 lbs) tons of fuel. > (just barely international IFR reserves left?) They had about seven tonnes of fuel remaining, equivalent to about one and a half hour flight. > 3. The airplane DID use additional fuel tanks: five, with a total additional > capacity of 28.5 tons (62,800 lbs). No mention is made of whether they used > special fuel, or supercooled it before takeoff (ala the 747-400 record-setting > attempt). The fuel was normal at normal temperature, and these additional tanks are available as option for A310, A330 and A340 - so there were not special either. The aircraft used also normal ATC procedures, so it wasn't given any priority when taxiing or approaching. They also flew the routes used by ordinary airliners. > 4. The article notes the following records will be certificated by > Federation Aeronautique Inernationale: > - Longest flight by a commercial transport. > - Fastest around-the-world flight in the 250-300 metric ton MTOW category. > - Fastest flight between Paris to Auckland and Auckland to Paris. > - First nonstop flight between the two cities, both directions. The people aboard told after the flight also that it was one of their most exiting flights - the feeling during the flight was high, athough one of the toilettes was broken down. They sleeped on inflatable mattresses and had in fact just nearly 50-hour-party aboard... Jari Makinen (who saw the plane landing and had a dinner afterwards with the crew) Univ. of Helsinki From kls Tue Jul 27 23:49:43 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rna@leland.Stanford.EDU (Robert Ashcroft) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 Jul 93 23:49:43 PDT In article spagiola@leland.Stanford.EDU writes: >The two problems are, of course, related to each other: poor market >analysis leads to both poor design choices and poor marketing. >Another example is the BAe 146; BAe originally thought it would sell >primarily on the strength of its small-field performance, to 3rd >world countries. Instead most of its sales have been on the strength >of its quietness, to developed country airlines. BAe thought the >small 146-100 would be the most popular model; instead the -100 sold >in very small numbers, with the larger -200 taking most of the >orders; today most orders tend to be for the even larger -300. There's another market for the BAe 146 (soon to be the BAe RJ). That's service to small downtown airports, based on it's short take off and landing capability. London City Airport and Stockholm Bromma come to mind. I think it's also capable of using Miegs Field (Chicago) and Lakefront (Cleveland) but other (non-flight) regulations prohibit this at the moment (anyone know the details about this). The decision to allow the 146 to use London City had to be a no-brainer for the British govt: it's the only jet that could ever use the airport, and so opening LCY to the 146 could only stimulate 146 sales. And it really is extraordinarily quiet. British commercial aircraft development has been a farce since the end of WWII (with certain exceptions, e.g. BAC 1-11, maybe the Viscount). It's a pity, because some of their aircraft were really quite nice. I've always been fond of the VC-10, which I think is one of the most beautiful post-war aircraft. The Russians paid it the ultimate compliment by ripping off the design, wholesale, for the IL-62. RNA From kls Tue Jul 27 23:49:45 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: acunerbb@csugrad.cs.vt.edu (B. Bilal Acuner) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Virginia Tech Computer Science Dept, Blacksburg, VA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 Jul 93 23:49:45 PDT spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) writes: > MR DJ LOVEDAY writes > > I have read that the British Aeorospace ATP has been selling > > rather slowly. I would like to know if there are any reasons > > (other than a depressed market) for the low number of orders of > > these aircraft. The early advertisements suggested that the ATP > > was very fuel efficient which, I would assume, promote higer > > sales volumes of the this type of aircraft. > > The ATP has been selling slowly from way before the market became > depressed. I think the reasons for its lack of success are two-fold: > (1) although the aircraft is reasonably economic, it is too large for > most turbo-prop markets. 60 seats is just too many; the only Last year I made two flights with those ATPs back at home in Turkey. They were just 2 years old and from the friends in Turkish Airlines and from the captains that I chat with I learned that it was really economic to put those planes in service. Four of them are serving in THT which is a kinda Turkish Airlines Express Those planes are used to connect small cities to hubs like Istanbul and Ankara. They're also used between hubs in off-peak hours. The problem was as the one above. They're too big to connect small cities to hubs and too small to serve hubs even during off peak hour. The first idea of Turkish Airlines was to replace some of its old DC9-30 ,which are not economical at all, with ATPs for the flights in off-peak hours. I think they've decided to buy some B737-400s for that purpose after they've seen that they had lots of potential customers even during off-peak hours. ----------------------------------------------------------------- | Bahadir Acuner | I S T A N B U L | | Virginia Tech | | | Blacksburg, VA | "Let's meet where continents meet" | | U.S.A | | |acunerbb@csugrad.cs.vt.edu| 2 0 0 0 | ----------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Wed Jul 28 00:41:35 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: A319 and A321 ? References: <1993Jul1.183940.18997@leland.Stanford.EDU> Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jul 93 00:41:35 PDT In article colonius@dragi.dinoco.de (Stephan Muhs) writes: >Robert Ashcroft (rna@leland.Stanford.EDU) wrote: >> The insane thing is that A321s have final assembly in Hamburg (or somewhere >> in Germany) and A320s have final assembly in France. That's the price for >> German pride, I guess. Insane, yes. Pride, yes. But the real insanity is way the Airbus products other than the A321 are handled, due to French pride. The A321 is the first to be handled in any intelligent manner. >Hardly - Airbus is a project by several european countries, so construction >an assembly takes place in several countries. It really does not matter, if >you ship all the parts to France or Germany fo final assembly. It is not a >matter of pride, but of jobs that made Germany go for the A321 assembly. That may have been the motivation for the Germans to push so hard to get the A321 (and eventually A319) assembly, but there were some very good financial reasons for Airbus to do this. For all previous Airbus products, the basic airframe was assembled at Toulouse, then flown to Hamburg for interior outfitting and various other finishing steps. The trouble with this is that the engines are a *very* expensive part of an aircraft. Boeing (and, I assume, McDonnell Douglas) installs the interior and such soon after the fuselage/wing join, leaving the job of hanging the engines until quite late in the assembly process. Prior to the A321, Airbus had to hang the engines much earlier -- the figure I once saw was 30 to 45 days sooner, relative to delivery and thus payment. Figuring US$6 million apiece for CFM56 or V2500 engines used on the A320 family (very, very rough, but in the ballpark) and a cost of money equal to the current US prime rate (6%), that's between $60k and $90k additional cost to Airbus over Boeing's costs. For the larger planes with either more (A340) or larger (hence more expensive) engines the cost is even worse. There's been some talk of moving the A320 itself to Hamburg, and while it would be naive to think there wasn't a lot of politics going on in this, it also makes a lot of financial sense. It would be even better if they not only moved A320 assembly to Hamburg, but at the same time moved A300-600/A310/A330/A340 final outfitting to Toulouse. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed Jul 28 13:48:21 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: spagiola@leland.Stanford.EDU Organization: DSO, Stanford University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jul 93 13:48:21 PDT Robert Ashcroft writes > There's another market for the BAe 146 (soon to be the BAe RJ). > That's service to small downtown airports, based on it's short > take off and landing capability. London City Airport and Stockholm > Bromma come to mind. I think it's also capable of using Miegs > Field (Chicago) and Lakefront (Cleveland) but other (non-flight) > regulations prohibit this at the moment (anyone know the details > about this). I know BAe has flown the 146 into Miegs Field; I'm not sure why services from there never developed. Is there any service at all out of Miegs? I'd imagine that if service was practical it would start with a fast turbo-prop. Another close-in airport you might add to the list is Toronto's Island airport. Again, the 146 has been demo'd there. I think the lack of a bridge from downtown has been the main constraint to development of service from there. Along these lines, one might add that the Swedish Aviation Authority has now banned Malmo Aviation from operating their service from Bromma to London City, in what looks very suspiciously like a move to quash competition to SAS. > The decision to allow the 146 to use London City had to be a > no-brainer for the British govt: it's the only jet that could > ever use the airport, and so opening LCY to the 146 could only > stimulate 146 sales. And it really is extraordinarily quiet. Well, letting the 146 in did require extending the runway and preventing development of tall buildings, so some trade-offs had to be made. And yes, it is extremely quiet. I once almost backed into a taxiing 146 when i was photographing on the ramp at Denver because I didn't hear it over the whine of jets taxiing to the runway several times further from me than the 146 was. One exception to the quietness: the 146 has a very distinctive whine when it lowers its flaps; back in the glory days before PSA got gobbled by USAir, you could alwys tell when the 146s came in over Stanford on long finals to SFO. > British commercial aircraft development has been a farce since > the end of WWII (with certain exceptions, e.g. BAC 1-11, maybe > the Viscount). It's a pity, because some of their aircraft were > really quite nice. I've always been fond of the VC-10, which I > think is one of the most beautiful post-war aircraft. The Russians > paid it the ultimate compliment by ripping off the design, > wholesale, for the IL-62. Well, lets not start that debate again ;-) (interested readers might want to refer to R.E.G. Davies' latest book, on Aeroflot, for a discussion of that very point). But I definitely agree that british commercial aircraft development has been a farce. Lots of technical talent combined with very little marketing acumen, a blinkered vision of the world (they were still designing `Empire' planes into the 1950s), and political shenanigans that make the US congress look good. What a pity. (Another thing that got lost along the way is the tradition of giving aircraft names; getting people to pronounce Viscount correctly (vigh-count, _not_ viss-count) may have given Vickers' marketing people ulcers, but it does not justify them coming up with appelations like `VC10' (no hyphen). And whoever thought up the RJ70/RJ85/RJ100/RJ115 name sequence should be shot.) Still, with over 240 airframes built, the 146 looks set to be the best-selling British jetliner, and might rival the Viscount in sales. I won't complain; its one of the few airliners with character in today's plethora of cookie-cutter twins. -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@leland.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Wed Jul 28 13:48:24 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jul 93 13:48:24 PDT >I know BAe has flown the 146 into Miegs Field; I'm not sure why >services from there never developed. Is there any service at all out >of Miegs? Merrill C. Meigs (not Miegs) field was slated to be closed entirely at one point. I vaguely recall that it actually did close for a bit before there was enough outcry to keep it open. I suspect the main problem is operational -- there is one rather short runway with runs due north-south. Being on the lakefront there must be some hellacious crosswinds a great deal of the time, and probably severe problems with ice from breakers off the lake coating everything in sight. To my knowledge, there's never been any scheduled service out of Meigs, just private stuff, especially a lot of corporate aircraft. But United did land a 727-22 there -- the final flight of one donated to the Museum of Science and Industry, which is several miles south along the lakefront. They planned on moving it those last few miles via barge. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Jul 29 00:55:39 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jul 93 00:55:39 PDT B. Bilal Acuner writes > ... Four [ATPs] are serving in THT which is a kinda Turkish > Airlines Express Those planes are used to connect small cities > to hubs like Istanbul and Ankara. They're also used between hubs > in off-peak hours. [But] they're too big to connect small cities > to hubs and too small to serve hubs even during off peak hour. > The first idea of Turkish Airlines was to replace some of its > old DC9-30 ,which are not economical at all, with ATPs for the > flights in off-peak hours. I think they've decided to buy some > B737-400s for that purpose... I believe the 737-400s are primarily replacing the 727s on European routes. THT (which is to be merged into parent THY) has in fact now ordered RJ100s (ie BAe 146-300s). -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@leland.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Thu Jul 29 10:45:34 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: libove@libove.alf.dec.com (Jay Vassos-Libove) Subject: BAC 111 information? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jul 93 10:45:34 PDT Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Atlanta Customer Support Center I had (mistakenly I think) thought that the BAC 111 was a Boeing craft, but a recent post indicated that it was of British make. Could someone please post technical details and history of this craft? Thanks -- Jay Vassos-Libove libove@alf.dec.com Digital Equipment Corporation decwrl!alf.dec.com!libove Atlanta Customer Support Center Opinions? They're mine, mine, all mine! Alpharetta, Georgia and D.E.C. Can't have 'em! From kls Thu Jul 29 11:36:13 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: BAC 111 information? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jul 93 11:36:13 PDT In article libove@libove.alf.dec.com (Jay Vassos-Libove) writes: >Could someone please post technical details and history >of this craft? The British Aircraft Corporation 111 (pronounced One-Eleven) first flew in 1963, and entered service in 1965. It somewhat resembles a DC-9 but has Rolls-Royce Spey engines and, except for the series 500, is somewhat smaller than all but the most diminutive DC-9 variants. The 111 was intended as a replacement for the Vickers Viscount. The series 200, 300, and 400 all shared a 93.5 foot length, allowing for up to 89 passengers, and an 88.5 foot wingspan. These versions differed only in increasing capacity, up to 87,000 lbs. MGTOW on the series 400. The series 500 had a fuselage stretch to 107 feet, with up to 119 passengers, along with an increased wingspan of 93.5 feet. Combined with higher-rated engines this version had a MGTOW of 104,500 lbs. Finally, the series 475 used the series 500 wing and engines on the series 400 fuselage, with a MGTOW of 98,500 lbs. Range varied up to about 1,865 miles. Unlike other pre-Airbus European jetliners, the BAC 111 had a significant presence in the U.S. Mohawk flew a sizeable fleet, which via merger became part of Allegheny's fleet and continued on with US Air until quite recently. American also operated a substantial 111 fleet as did Braniff. Western ordered them as well though that order was cancelled. The last BAC 111 was built in 1982, but the line was sold (?) to the Romanian firm ROMAERO SA which built a few series 500s as the ROMBAC 111. After being dormant for years, the line has been revived with an order from Kiwi International for an updated series 2500, using the Rolls-Royce Tay 650 engine. First delivery is scheduled for November, 1994. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Fri Jul 30 13:28:19 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk (Mike Collins) Subject: Re: Russian aircraft. Was BAe ATP Performance (was: BAe ATP performance ) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk Organization: DIS(organised) Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 30 Jul 93 13:28:19 PDT >British commercial aircraft development has been a farce since the >end of WWII (with certain exceptions, e.g. BAC 1-11, maybe the Viscount). >It's a pity, because some of their aircraft were really quite nice. I've >always been fond of the VC-10, which I think is one of the most beautiful >post-war aircraft. The Russians paid it the ultimate compliment by >ripping off the design, wholesale, for the IL-62. > >RNA This brings me nicely to a subject I have been wondering about recently. What do people think about the sales prospects for the new Russian aircraft? I am not sure about the technical merits but the prices being quoted can not be ignored. I guess that it would be an unlikly prospect that United or AA (given the anguish a purchase of Airbus products cause) will ever buy Russian but such a purchase could transform their balance sheets. I flew on a number of Russian aircraft a few years ago and I must say that they did not seem that different from western aircraft. *************************************************************************** * Mike Collins "Turn your face to the sun and * * Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk the shadows fall behind you" * * Telephone +44817886988 * * Maori proverb * **************************************************************************** From kls Fri Jul 30 13:28:22 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Russian aircraft. Was BAe ATP Performance (was: BAe ATP performance ) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 30 Jul 93 13:28:22 PDT >What do people think about the sales prospects for the new Russian aircraft? >I am not sure about the technical merits but the prices being quoted can >not be ignored. I've talked with some folks at the competition about this and they certainly aren't ignoring the potential threat. I'll be interested in seeing their answers, but as I see it there are many potential pitfalls: Russian engines are inefficient and unreliable compared to modern Western designs. Obviously the Russian airframe manufacturers are dealing with this by hanging on Western engines. Russian avionics apparently aren't up to Western standards, hence the move to Western equipment in this area as well. This is just conjecture on my part, based on what's happening -- there may be other real motivations for the shift. There appears to be some concern about the safety standards embodied in the Russian aircraft. There don't appear to be any show-stoppers here, but it could delay Western certification and require some lengthy and costly modifications. Probably of more concern in this area is perception rather than reality. (There's also a perception of Russian airliners having rather unpleasant interiors, but seats are a customer option anyway and outfitting a Russian plane with Western interior equipment shouldn't be of any great problem. None of this matters for cargo, of course, and with the image problem not significant this may well be the best opening for the Russians.) Support is tremendously important. Boeing has a reputation for wonderful support, anywhere on the globe. The issue represented a major uphill battle for Airbus, though they seem to have passed at least the worst of it. The Russians are starting from zero in this area, and the problem is further compounded by the political instability of the region. Would you invest millions in a piece of equipment that you'd have to live with for thirty years if you couldn't be sure the manufacturer's home country wouldn't be in a civil war in only a year or two? On the other hand, the Russians seem to have some genuine talents in airframe design and espeically aerodynamics, I believe. Boeing is opening a design center in Moscow precisely to tap in some of this ability. Russian airframes, with Western engines and other equipment, plus collaborative support deals such as the one for the Rolls-Royce- engined Tu-204, may also be a promising answer to the problems which I mentioned above. As for the planes themselves, the Tu-204 compares quite favorably with Boeing's 757. I'm not saying it's a copy, though there certainly are some strong resemblances, but it appears to be a good, solid aircraft with competetive performance specs when using the same RB.211 or PW2000 engines as the 757. (Well, not exactly the same, since there are undoubtedly differences in auxiliaries, mountings, the nacelle, etc., but the basic engine is the same.) The Il-96-M probably doesn't have as much potential, if only because of its four-engined design. From the sketchy numbers I have it seems to fit rougly in the A300-600 or 767-300 segment, and having more than two engines is a serious marketing liability. It may reach the A340 and MD-11 in performance, both of which are having at least a bit of a fight to carve out a significant market niche. (It's hard to tell on the A340 as everyone seems to have a different opinion of how well it is doing!) Finally, I read something a while back about the Russians having a serious interest in building a 600-800 seat long-range aircraft in response to the current interest in such a beast. It should be interesting to see if they pursue this, or perhaps join the NLA collaboration led by Boeing and DASA. Since most of the other Airbus members (is that the right word?) appear to be involved in this as well, if the Russians joined in, it seems that only McDonnell-Douglas would be left out in the cold. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Fri Jul 30 23:32:44 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: mbullock@ads.com (Mike Bullock) Subject: AA paint scheme Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 30 Jul 93 23:32:44 PDT Does the fact that AA has unpainted aluminum require any special manufacturing for the aircraft? I've heard that they use specially matched aluminum for appearance. But what about other things such as does the aluminum skin need to be thicker for strength or corrosion protection? Any special coatings? Does AA do this strictly for appearance, or does it save on weight by not hauling all that paint around? Mike Bullock From kls Sat Jul 31 20:50:03 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: Russian aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 31 Jul 93 20:50:03 PDT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >>What do people think about the sales prospects for the new Russian aircraft? >>I am not sure about the technical merits but the prices being quoted can >>not be ignored. > >I've talked with some folks at the competition about this and they >certainly aren't ignoring the potential threat. I'll be interested >in seeing their answers, but as I see it there are many potential >pitfalls: > > Russian engines are inefficient and unreliable compared to modern > Western designs. Obviously the Russian airframe manufacturers are > dealing with this by hanging on Western engines. There are a couple of issues here. One is maintenance training. A Pratt or a GE has an established base of mechanics and suppliers familiar with their products. Perm doesn't. Add higher fuel burn, more maintenance, and some doubt as to long-term parts availability and you can see where an airline might not want the domestic Russian engine. This becomes a nonissue for airlines who have a history of using Russian products or for those without much cash. > Russian avionics apparently aren't up to Western standards, hence > the move to Western equipment in this area as well. This is just > conjecture on my part, based on what's happening -- there may be > other real motivations for the shift. My understanding of Russian avionics reliability is limited, but I have heard that their fly-by-wire system is very rugged and has a long service history with military aircraft. I think one major problem is that everyone is familiar with the system used to get your Collins box fixed, but what do you do to get a Russian one fixed? > There appears to be some concern about the safety standards > embodied in the Russian aircraft. There don't appear to be any > show-stoppers here, but it could delay Western certification and > require some lengthy and costly modifications. Probably of more > concern in this area is perception rather than reality. (There's > also a perception of Russian airliners having rather unpleasant > interiors, but seats are a customer option anyway and outfitting > a Russian plane with Western interior equipment shouldn't be of > any great problem. None of this matters for cargo, of course, and > with the image problem not significant this may well be the best > opening for the Russians.) I have to agree with that. > Support is tremendously important. Boeing has a reputation for > wonderful support, anywhere on the globe. The issue represented > a major uphill battle for Airbus, though they seem to have passed > at least the worst of it. The Russians are starting from zero in > this area, and the problem is further compounded by the political > instability of the region. Would you invest millions in a piece > of equipment that you'd have to live with for thirty years if you > couldn't be sure the manufacturer's home country wouldn't be in a > civil war in only a year or two? In areas where the Soviets used to have a big presence, I feel sure we will find the support to be adequate. The working relationships will already have been established, systems partly in place. [...] >Finally, I read something a while back about the Russians having a >serious interest in building a 600-800 seat long-range aircraft in >response to the current interest in such a beast. It should be >interesting to see if they pursue this, or perhaps join the NLA >collaboration led by Boeing and DASA. Since most of the other Airbus >members (is that the right word?) appear to be involved in this as >well, if the Russians joined in, it seems that only McDonnell-Douglas >would be left out in the cold. The Tu-404 model was shown in the most recent Aerospace America. Apparently it was on display at the Paris Airshow. Interesting. The Russians have always fascinated me. They have gobs of industrial capacity, raw materials, skilled designers and workers, and yet can't quite seem to make it in the world market. Presumably that had to do with their government and will shortly be rectified. Interestingly enough, most Western airframers seem to be afraid of the Japanese breaking into the commercial airplane industry from below with a small (100 seat class) airplane. The Russians seem to pose a threat from the other end of the spectrum, large aircraft. -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Sat Jul 31 20:50:08 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: AA paint scheme References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 31 Jul 93 20:50:08 PDT In article mbullock@ads.com (Mike Bullock) writes: > >Does the fact that AA has unpainted aluminum require any special >manufacturing for the aircraft? I've heard that they use specially >matched aluminum for appearance. But what about other things such as >does the aluminum skin need to be thicker for strength or corrosion >protection? Any special coatings? Does AA do this strictly for >appearance, or does it save on weight by not hauling all that paint >around? As I recall, all aircraft skins at Boeing are 'matched'. Even Airbus has adopted this standard of skin quality. :-) By 'matched', I mean that all the skins look the same, ie, highly polished, with the grain running in the same direction, and with the same color (it's weird, but aluminum can come in slightly different colors). A bare skin, like American's, does not require any additional material. These skins are a pain to manufacture because every little imperfection shows up clearly. The advantage is in weight savings, two or three hundred pounds on a 737-sized airplane, and a little more on the 757. The outer layer of material on these bare skins is pure aluminum, and requires no special coatings, though I think we use a clear Alodine for corrosion resistance. Bare skins do require more inspections and more maintenance than painted ones, but some customers think they pay off. -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Sat Jul 31 20:50:10 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: AA paint scheme References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 31 Jul 93 20:50:10 PDT Terry Drinkard writes: >As I recall, all aircraft skins at Boeing are 'matched'. Even Airbus has >adopted this standard of skin quality. :-) One of Airbus' arguments in favor of painting was the use of composite materials. Airbus finally broke down and started delivering A300-600Rs to American sans paint, though even at that a noticeable amount of the aircraft is painted -- the entire empennage in particular. >Bare skins do require more inspections and more maintenance than >painted ones, but some customers think they pay off. After the Aloha "convertible" 737 incident, when everyone started looking at things a lot more closely, American was making a lot of noise about how much easier it was to inspect for cracks with their paintless scheme, since you didn't have to strip it. I wonder how much this changed the equation? I'd think it must be pretty close to an even tradeoff, since in these times I can't imagine nearly every airline other than American being so vain as to paint their aircraft knowing it cost more in the long run. Well, maybe a lot are foolish enough to do so, but Southwest certainly isn't! :-) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Mon Aug 2 01:26:41 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: AA paint scheme References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Aug 93 01:26:41 PDT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >After the Aloha "convertible" 737 incident, when everyone started >looking at things a lot more closely, American was making a lot of >noise about how much easier it was to inspect for cracks with their >paintless scheme, since you didn't have to strip it. I wonder how >much this changed the equation? Shortly before the Aloha accident, FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL ran a story on non-destructive testing: a major point brought up in the article was the benefit of nicotine staining running down the the fuselage: it made finding cracks *really* easy. There was a comment that maintenance engineers weren't very happy with the advent of the (then new) no-smoking rules... I've kept an eye open for follow-up comments, but there haven't been any. I do wonder how this has changed things. Certainly Aloha brought on a slew of AD's and tightened FAA oversight, which continues to this day. Also a broad- ened market for test equipment. >I'd think it must be pretty close to an even tradeoff, since in these >times I can't imagine nearly every airline other than American being >so vain as to paint their aircraft knowing it cost more in the long >run. Conventional wisdoms run deep... I can easily visualize bean counters judging risks and deciding that an aluminum finish is too "flashy" or makes the final product look less refined. Then again, how many "aluminum" air- line paint schemes could look particularly unique? Perhaps they feel the market can only tolerate one. Even with AAL, one can generally only make out the silver and a splash of color on the tail, from any distance. Besides, aluminum also tends to look pretty lousy on models, which corporate types like to adorn their offices with. :-) Me? I side with Captain X: paint them all Day-Glo orange. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Mon Aug 2 01:26:44 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: AA paint scheme References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Aug 93 01:26:44 PDT Robert Dorsett writes: >benefit of nicotine staining running down the the fuselage: it made finding >cracks *really* easy. There was a comment that maintenance engineers weren't >very happy with the advent of the (then new) no-smoking rules... On the other hand I'll bet they were ecstatic over not having to clean all the glop out of the air conditioning systems. >Then again, how many "aluminum" airline paint schemes could look >particularly unique? How many "all white" paint schemes can look particularly unique? I suppose white is a more neutral base than aluminum to start from, but you can slap stripes and a tail logo on either one just as easily. I would never pretend that Eastern's "hockey stick" scheme was remotely attractive on aluminum, as it was on white, but you could tell that it wasn't one of American's planes. Let's just hope United isn't setting a trend for "all grey" schemes in the future. Bleah. I think I prefer it to aluminum, but not by a whole lot. (The worst thing about German race cars is that their racing color is silver. At least the Brits got this part right. But I digress ... replies to this thread via mail!) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue Aug 3 23:06:48 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: pmc@merit.edu (Philip M. Chuang) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Merit Network, Inc. Ann Arbor, MI Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 03 Aug 93 23:06:48 PDT >There's another market for the BAe 146 (soon to be the BAe RJ). That's >service to small downtown airports, based on it's short take off and >landing capability. London City Airport and Stockholm Bromma come to >mind. I think it's also capable of using Miegs Field (Chicago) and >Lakefront (Cleveland) but other (non-flight) regulations prohibit this >at the moment (anyone know the details about this). > Washington National would also be ideal for the 146, especially for the late-night New York Shuttles. Unfortunately, an official at National told me a month a ago that they "actively frawn upon" allowing operations of 4-engined jets or wide-bodies into the airport. They believe that the local (highly expensive) communities will have the impression that National Airport would use it as the beginning of the slippery-slope toward allowing 747's to land there! This not only explains why the 146 does not land at National, but also why no 767's or A300/A310's land there. Interestingly enough, there are only two jetliners that can land at National during the night curfew--The Fokker F100 and the 757, but the Pratt & Whitney powered model only. From kls Tue Aug 3 23:06:49 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 03 Aug 93 23:06:49 PDT Ted Rodriguez-Bell submitted an article again mentioning scheduled operations between Chicago's Merrill C. Meigs Field (CGX) and Springfield. To settle it once and for all, I took a peek at a recent OAG. It shows United Express operating 9 flights daily on this route, using the Beechcraft 1900, and TW Express operating 5 flights with the Fairchild-Swearingen Metro. So, there really is scheduled service in and out of Meigs. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue Aug 3 23:06:50 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: lhe@sics.se (Lars-Henrik Eriksson) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 03 Aug 93 23:06:50 PDT In article spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) writes: Along these lines, one might add that the Swedish Aviation Authority has now banned Malmo Aviation from operating their service from Bromma to London City, in what looks very suspiciously like a move to quash competition to SAS. I don't think so. Actually, the CAA has been anti-SAS on the Bromma issue. If you anyone wants the full story, I can mail or post. -- Lars-Henrik Eriksson Internet: lhe@sics.se Swedish Institute of Computer Science Phone (intn'l): +46 8 752 15 09 Box 1263 Telefon (nat'l): 08 - 752 15 09 S-164 28 KISTA, SWEDEN Fax: +46 8 751 72 30 From kls Tue Aug 3 23:06:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: afirmin@ingres.com (Anthony Firmin) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: afirmin@Ingres.COM Organization: Ingres Corporation, A subsidiary of The ASK Group, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 03 Aug 93 23:06:52 PDT : These problems are then compounded by the problems inherent in any : low-volume, slow-production program. (1) you never get very far down : the learning curve (a problem that BAe compounded by opening 2 : production lines); and (2) it takes a while for bugs to be sorted out : (which gives you a rep as an unreliable airplane). Just to add my 0.02 cents.... 1. They now only have one 146 prod line at Woodford (nr Stockport) in the UK. 2. They have just moved the 146 prod line from Woodford to Prestwick and a good proportion of the workforce IS NOT moving with it !! So the bugs will return !! ..Ant ----------- / MMMM GGGG \ | M M M G G | Anthony Firmin afirmin@ingres.com | M M M G | Ingres Technical Support | M M M G GG | 510 814 6855 | M M M G G | / \ M M GGGG / "MGB's and current raves" -8-) ----------- \ From kls Thu Aug 5 14:00:31 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ak336@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (John Dill) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 05 Aug 93 14:00:31 PDT Reply-To: ak336@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (John Dill) Karl Swartz writes: >Ted Rodriguez-Bell submitted an article again >mentioning scheduled operations between Chicago's Merrill C. Meigs >Field (CGX) and Springfield. To settle it once and for all, I took >a peek at a recent OAG. It shows United Express operating 9 flights >daily on this route, using the Beechcraft 1900, and TW Express >operating 5 flights with the Fairchild-Swearingen Metro. The biggest deterent to "scheduled" service into CGX is the lack of a published IFR approach. Most users file a flight plan into MDW, then cancel IFR either prior to or during the approach to MDW, then proceed VFR to CGX. Obviously, if the weather at either is below VFR minimums, a landing at CGX is out of the question. John Dill ATCS -- Dan Quayle was right! It's the family stupid! From kls Fri Aug 6 02:53:40 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: MD-11 slat extension Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 06 Aug 93 02:53:40 PDT The August 1993 Airline Pilot (p. 19) warns pilots to watch the flap/slat handle on MD-11's. This was in reference to the much-publicised incident involving a China Eastern Airlines MD-11 on April 6, which experienced uncommanded slat extension and a series of violent oscillations. The plane lost 5000', and spooked the crew enough that they made a diversion to an air base in Alaska to inspect the airplane. Subsequent commentary in RISKS and elsewhere speculated that the digital cockpit in the airplane might have been responsible for the deployment. Comments on sci.aeronautics.airliners tended to indicate that this aspect of the flight control system was conventional in nature, however. The article notes: "NTSB cautioned, in its safety recommendation issued June 29, that 'The cause of the slat deployment has not been determined However, preliminary evidence strongly suggests that the flap/slat handle became dislodged from the slat-retract position... because of inadvertent contact with the handle by a flightcrew member.' "At least 10 other cases of inadvertent or uncommanded inflight slat deployments have occurred on MD-11's since April 1991 (!!!). NTSB said Douglas Aircraft Company has advised operators of those incidents, "is aware of the continuing nature of the problem, and is... working with FAA and MD-11 operators to redesign the [MD-11] flap/slat actuating system." [ Snide personal note: cargo doors, anyone? ] The article notes that the NTSB urges: 1. That the FAA establsih an interim measure to prevent inadvertent slat extension. 2. MD-11 operators to inform crews of the danger. 3. That the revamped system be installed ASAP. "The Safety Board said the incidents continued to occur 'despite several attempted fixes' by Douglas. The China Eastern Airlines airplane had been modified to meet all Douglas service bulletins and applicable slat system [airworthiness directives]. "The day after the first incident, [Douglas told operators about the problem] "[...] 'Sharply striking the aft side of the handle [it is normally at the furthest-forward position when flaps are retracted] will allow the handle to move upward if a very light vertical force is applied,' Douglas said. 'Normal spring and cable tensions will move the handle aft once disengaged from the FLAP UP/SLAT RET detent and allow the slats to extend.' "In August 1992, Douglas designed a protective cover for the zero-degree detent gate. FAA later mandated that air carriers use the cover." "[...] Douglas will replace the current flap/slat handle and its cable system with an electrically operated system designed to eliminate the cable tension forces that bias the slat system to the extend position. [...] The electrically operated flap/slat handle system should be available in mid- 1994; the interim system, within several months. "Meanwhile, don't bump that flap/slat handle." [And stay away from DC-10's and MD-11's, as a guiding philosophy in life :-). --rdd] --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Fri Aug 6 02:53:45 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: URGENT: Information please! Aviation Safety Reporting System Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 06 Aug 93 02:53:45 PDT INFORMATION REQUIRED ON ASRS ---------------------------- In his book "Normal Accidents", Charles Perrow refers to an autonomous, no-penalty, Air Safety Reporting System managed by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the US. He cites the existence of this database, and its use for early detection of design problems. According to John J. Nance, "Blind Trust" (Quill William Morrow, New York, 1986), p.275, the *Aviation* Safety Reporting System was set up by NASA on behalf of the FAA in 1975. The FAA guaranteed immunity to any pilot who filed a report on the ASRS, but NASA could manage the system independently and additionally guarantee anonymity. Around 1978 the immunity provisions were substantially restricted, as a result of a campaign for "pilot accountability" by Administrator Langhorne Bond. Nance believes that it is precisely the *lack of* an "autonomous, no-penalty" reporting system that is responsible for the lack of safety information in the US, as compared to the UK, where the CHIRP system is available. He specifically cites the fact that, although the tendency of the Boeing 737 to "pitch up/roll off" when taking off under icing conditions was well known since 1971, and was responsible for the crash of Palm 90 into the Potomac on 13th January 1982, in the intervening 10 years not one report of "pitch up/roll off" was filed by US pilots, although many such incidents were reported from Europe. He speculates that the incidents did occur, but went unreported since a report could result in the pilot being disciplined for taking off with the aircraft in an unsafe condition. Are these two authors talking about the same system? If so, which one of them is right? Any other information on ASRS or CHIRP, particularly with authoritative references, would be more than welcome. This is not asked out of idle curiosity. The SHIP project is producing a report which discusses the use of reporting systems for incidents in avionics and industrial control systems, and we have unearthed these contradictory statements. Obviously, we want to get our facts right, and we only have today (and possibly the weekend) to churn out the final draft, hence the urgency. Many thanks. Please reply direct to me (even if you also post to the list). Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Mon Aug 9 10:33:51 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Dr Peter B Ladkin Subject: Re: MD-11 slat extension References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 09 Aug 93 10:33:51 PDT >uncommanded [or, rather, inadvertent] slat extension [causes a] series of >violent oscillations. The [MD11] lost 5000', and spooked the crew enough that >they made a diversion to an air base in Alaska to inspect the airplane. It was not just crew spook. Two passengers were killed, and all passengers were injured, some severely. >Subsequent commentary in RISKS and elsewhere speculated that the digital >cockpit in the airplane might have been responsible for the deployment. I've asked elsewhere if anyone knew if digital systems were involved. One individual responded that the report will eventually cross her desk. I don't recall seeing anything in RISKS. I found the MD-11 that I flew on (Swissair) a year ago very comfortable, but .. > [And stay away from DC-10's and MD-11's, as a guiding philosophy in life :-) why the smiley face? :-) Peter. From kls Wed Aug 11 02:48:29 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: papadopo@cs.utk.edu (Philip Papadopoulos) Subject: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 02:48:29 PDT Organization: CS Department, University of Tennessee, Knoxville I noticed on a recent trip that some MD-80's (MD-88's, too) have "flattened" tailcones (versus conical ones). Could someone give me some history on this development. It looks like it is a retrofit product on older MD-80's. Can you find out why the new design tailcone was adopted (fuel efficiency, stability?) How much does it cost to refit an older plane and what are the monetary benefits? When was the "new" tailcone introduced. BTW, the flattened and elongated tailcone is very apparent on American jets, less so on Delta Jets. I saw about 8 Northwest MD-8x's and none had the flattened cone. All the American Jets I saw did have the new cone (about 15 examples) and most (but not all) of the Delta jets had flattened tailcones. Thanks, Phil From kls Wed Aug 11 02:48:32 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: msb@sq.sq.com (Mark Brader) Subject: Re: URGENT: Information please! Aviation Safety Reporting System References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: SoftQuad Inc., Toronto, Canada Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 02:48:32 PDT > [Nance] specifically cites the fact that, although > the tendency of the Boeing 737 to "pitch up/roll off" when taking off under > icing conditions was well known since 1971, and was responsible for the crash > of Palm 90 into the Potomac on 13th January 1982, in the intervening 10 years > not one report of "pitch up/roll off" was filed by US pilots, although many > such incidents were reported from Europe. I don't know about the Aviation Safety Reporting System, but I thought I did know about that crash. Wasn't it caused by the icing interfering with the *instrumentation*, so that the crew thought the engines were at a higher power level than they really were, and the plane simply stalled? The way I remember it, noise regulations prohibited the technique of just applying full throttle for takeoff. -- Mark Brader "Anyone who can handle a needle convincingly SoftQuad Inc., Toronto can make us see a thread which is not there." utzoo!sq!msb, msb@sq.com -- E. H. Gombrich This article is in the public domain. From kls Wed Aug 11 02:48:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Leon Shieh Subject: Washington National Restrictions References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: University of Virginia Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 02:48:37 PDT In article , Philip M. Chuang wrote: >>There's another market for the BAe 146 (soon to be the BAe RJ). That's >>service to small downtown airports, based on it's short take off and >>landing capability. London City Airport and Stockholm Bromma come to >>mind. I think it's also capable of using Miegs Field (Chicago) and >>Lakefront (Cleveland) but other (non-flight) regulations prohibit this >>at the moment (anyone know the details about this). >> > Washington National would also be ideal for the 146, especially for > the late-night New York Shuttles. Unfortunately, an official at > National told me a month a ago that they "actively frawn upon" > allowing operations of 4-engined jets or wide-bodies into the airport. > They believe that the local (highly expensive) communities will > have the impression that National Airport would use it as the beginning > of the slippery-slope toward allowing 747's to land there! > > This not only explains why the 146 does not land at National, but > also why no 767's or A300/A310's land there. Interestingly enough, > there are only two jetliners that can land at National during > the night curfew--The Fokker F100 and the 757, but the Pratt & Whitney > powered model only. Last April Business Express (Delta's commuter) asked the FAA to allow jets with up to 80 seats to be operated into National using commuter slots so they could use 146's. Currently, commuter slots may be used by jets and turboprops with up to 56 seats. They cited the recently permitted use of 110-seat aircraft into Chicago/O'Hare in a certain number of commuter slots as a precedent. The anti-noise groups opposed it saying that the current allowed 37 jet operations per hour would be exceeded. I believe this indicates that 146's are allowed into National, but would require jet slots. Jet slots are extremely scarce and have been sold for $1 million each and would probably be too costly/difficult for Business Express to obtain. As I understand it, the main runway at National is too short (6800 feet) for 747's to operate there. No wide-body jet is permitted to land there. Eastern tried to get the A-300 allowed into National in the early 80s, but the FAA Administrator ruled that it would not be safe under all conditions due to the short runway and the curved approach when landing from the north. There was another instance where Airbus asked to have the A310 allowed into National, which I suppose was not approved either since I've never heard of one landing at National. As far as I know, no wide-body jet has ever been allowed into National, although I don't think any other airlines asked the FAA for approval for other types of wide-bodies. A couple months ago The Washington Post reported that when the new main terminal is completed that 767s may be allowed to operate into National. The anti-noise groups opposed the proposal, as they opposed earlier proposals for wide-body service. The night curfew is actually a night-time restriction which only allows aircraft operating at 72 db or below on take-off and 85 db or below on landing to operate between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. It was called a jet curfew when it was first enforced in 1981 since no large jets could meet the restriction, but American had the MD-80 recorded as landing at 83.9 db and started the first night-time jet landings under the restriction in 1983. There was a fight in 1988 to have all night-time jets banned but the restriction was not changed. The 757s which are allowed during the restricted hours are ones with Rolls-Royce engines. Those aircraft are quiet enough to both land and take-off during the restricted hours. American in the past has scheduled 6:10 a.m. 757 departures (with Rolls-Royce engines) to Dallas/Ft. Worth along with late-night arrivals from Chicago and Dallas/Ft. Worth. One article I saw in the Post said that the 757s have "special engines and were re-certified with a payload penalty" to be allowed to operate into National. Does anyone else have any more information on that? I haven't heard about any 757s with Pratt and Whitney engines being allowed; United, Delta, and Northwest have those and haven't scheduled any night time operations with them. United doesn't have any night-time operations scheduled at all, the only major airline without any. I suspect that as soon as they get A320s (another aircraft quiet enough to meet the landing restriction and currently used by Northwest for night-time operations) later this year they'll schedule a Chicago-National flight arriving around 11 p.m. to connect with their last large bank of flights from the west coast. Personally, I'm glad there are late-night flights into National. I live under the flight path, but I'm 15 miles or so upriver so it's not too much of a nuisance. The aircraft meeting the noise restriction aren't that loud on landing anyways, although some people obviously are still bothered by them. The flights are convenient, especially when travelling from the west coast. Many airlines have flights originating on the west coast between 1 and 2 p.m. pacific time, connecting somewhere, and arriving National around 11 p.m.-midnight. One exception which sticks out like a sore thumb is United, on which if you want to leave after noon from most west-coast cities, you can only fly into Dulles. For instance, from my timetables from June, the last United flight from Seattle-National left Seattle at about 10 a.m., stopped in Chicago, and arrived into National at about 7 p.m. In contrast, the last American flight left Seattle at about 3:30 p.m., connected in Chicago, and arrived into National at 12:34 a.m. Leon Shieh leon@virginia.edu From kls Wed Aug 11 13:30:59 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: afirmin@ingres.com (Anthony Firmin) Subject: Re: BAe ATP performance References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: afirmin@Ingres.COM Organization: Ingres Corporation, A subsidiary of The ASK Group, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 13:30:59 PDT Anthony Firmin (afirmin@ingres.com) wrote: : 1. They now only have one 146 prod line at Woodford (nr Stockport) in the UK. : 2. They have just moved the 146 prod line from Woodford to Prestwick and a : good proportion of the workforce IS NOT moving with it !! So the bugs : will return !! TYPO TIME It was the ATP line that moved from Woodford to Prestwick. Probably makes more sense now. .Anthony... From kls Wed Aug 11 13:31:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: afirmin@ingres.com (Anthony Firmin) Subject: Re: MD-11 slat extension References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: afirmin@Ingres.COM Organization: Ingres Corporation, A subsidiary of The ASK Group, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 13:31:00 PDT Dr Peter B Ladkin (pbl@compsci.stirling.ac.uk) wrote: : >uncommanded [or, rather, inadvertent] slat extension [causes a] series of : >violent oscillations. The [MD11] lost 5000', and spooked the crew enough that : >they made a diversion to an air base in Alaska to inspect the airplane. : It was not just crew spook. Two passengers were killed, and all passengers : were injured, some severely. From kls Wed Aug 11 13:31:02 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 13:31:02 PDT In article you write: >I noticed on a recent trip that some MD-80's (MD-88's, too) have >"flattened" tailcones (versus conical ones). Could someone give >me some history on this development. It looks like it is >a retrofit product on older MD-80's. They were installed on all new MD-80 series airliners starting in the late 80's, as part of a weight and drag reduction program. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Wed Aug 11 13:31:04 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: URGENT: Information please! Aviation Safety Reporting System References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 13:31:04 PDT In article msb@sq.sq.com (Mark Brader) wrote: > I don't know about the Aviation Safety Reporting System, but I thought I > did know about that crash. Wasn't it caused by the icing interfering with > the *instrumentation*, so that the crew thought the engines were at a > higher power level than they really were, and the plane simply stalled? > The way I remember it, noise regulations prohibited the technique of just > applying full throttle for takeoff. The NTSB found two pages of problems, ranging from Air Florida's training of their flight crews to the "company culture" in-cockpit to personality conflicts (moody, inexperienced captain, submissive F/O) to improper anti- ice procedures to bad de-icing to sloppy ATC conduct. Two notes: 1. That they took off with less than full power. This was caused by the Pt2 engine inlet probe being frozen over: since EPR is the primary power instrument, related by Pt7 (exhaust) divided by Pt2, Pt7 went up while Pt2 stayed ambient--hence they thought they were at a lot more power than they actually were. This isn't really a "cause," though, since the crew (most crews) should have noticed that their N2, N1, and fuel flow were all way too low. But would also not have even had a problem if they had turned their engine anti-on before takeoff like they were supposed to: this diverts high-pressure hot air to the cowling, thus preventing any ice build-up. 2. After lift-off (a long roll), they were very close to stall. What happened at this point is open to speculation, but the NTSB was concerned that leading-edge contamination might contribute to a severe "pitch-up" characteristic in 737's. If this were the case, then they would have been low on airspeed, fighting a pitch-up, which could have pushed them right over the stall limit. Nance went into much more detail on this in his book, citing a number of pilots and airlines (mainly in Europe) which have reported similar all-but-uncontrollable pitch-up characteristics in icy weather. Both parties cite simulator studies, but, well, GIGO. This stuff is hard to model. NTSB cites the low, dirty, low-power situation: the crew had a stickshaker warning almost immediately after takeoff; the crew did succeed in lowering the nose a bit, to pick up airspeed, which caused the plane to descend. Inexplicably, they didn't advance power simultaneously, so the airplane collided with the ground. NTSB concludes that if they had done so, the flight path would have been recoverable. Now, the "inexplicably" is an open question, since IF both pilots were applying 400 pounds of down-pressure to overcome that pitch-up moment, they wouldn't have a limb handy to advance the thrust levers. This is probably an argument in favor of alpha-floor protection (have engines automagically advance to TOGA after a critical AOA is exceeded). Leading edge ice contamination is mentioned in the report and conclusions (Findings, Probable Cause, and Recommendations), but the pitch-up moment isn't listed as a factor that we *know* the crew had to contend with. Like most crashes, it's a loooong string of screw-ups, starting from the moment that everyone got up that morning. But certainly one to learn from: some of the more appalling mistakes single-handedly sold cockpit resource management (CRM) programs to many airlines, and generally triggered a grass- roots re-evaluation of operational philosophies and rescue procedures. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Wed Aug 11 13:41:08 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: afirmin@ingres.com (Anthony Firmin) Subject: Re: MD-11 slat extension References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: afirmin@Ingres.COM Organization: Ingres Corporation, A subsidiary of The ASK Group, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Aug 93 13:41:08 PDT Dr Peter B Ladkin (pbl@compsci.stirling.ac.uk) wrote: : >uncommanded [or, rather, inadvertent] slat extension [causes a] series of : >violent oscillations. The [MD11] lost 5000', and spooked the crew enough that : >they made a diversion to an air base in Alaska to inspect the airplane. : It was not just crew spook. Two passengers were killed, and all passengers : were injured, some severely. >From what I remember when I was at Long Beach in May, McD told me it did at least 5 barrel rolls during its altitude loss, I am sure they said the slats were only extended on one wing !! However the a/c was at Long Beach because there was damage to the fuselage some twisting or something. I've visited Long Beach quite regularly and for the first couple of years I heard lots of stories about problems with the aircrafts software. In Oct '91 they issued a new software update which cured a lot of problems. However I had a flight on an American Airlines MD-11 a year ago from ORD to MAN and I thought it was excellent, very smooth, incredibly quiet. Changed my opinion of them - until the China Eastern incident. ..Anthony Firmin From kls Thu Aug 19 03:03:11 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.aviation.simulators,sci.aeronautics Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: 727 Systems Simulator Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 19 Aug 93 03:03:11 PDT Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx A slide show describing my systems simulator has been installed on sumex-aim.stanford.edu; it's in info-mac/game/727-slide-show.hqx (first item to go off your screen :-)). Basically, it shows the four major operational screens from the simulator, a night view of one of them, and the seven synoptic displays. Plus some text description of general capabilities. You'll need a color machine to see the images properly (grayscale will do in a pinch :-)). Release of the systems simulator is imminent; the flight simulator will come in November. A PC/Windows version of the systems simulator will probably be ready in November as well. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Thu Aug 19 03:03:14 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: plisner@mips.com (Peter Lisner) Subject: Terrain-following radar for airliners? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 19 Aug 93 03:03:14 PDT Organization: Silicon Graphics Inc., Mt. View, California There seem to have been many approach accidents due to the terrain being higher than expected by the pilot. These incidents include running into hills because the wrong VOR was tuned in, or the aircraft descending more quickly than planned due to distraction from other things going on in the cockpit. I was wondering if civil aircraft designers have ever considered using terrain-following radar like some military aircraft do. I understand that these point forward as well as down, thus causing the aircraft to pull-up in time if there is an obstruction. Apparently very high-speed fighters can fly safely at very low altitudes using this radar. Could this technique be applied for airliners as well? Obviously, such a system would have to "cut out" at a certain altitude so that the aircraft could actually land! I'm not a pilot, just an enthusiast, so I'm sure I am ignorant of many important points here. But I would like to hear what others think. P.S. Love this newsgroup, have learnt a lot from it. Thanks everyone. All opinions are mine, not SGI's. -- Peter Lisner e-mail: plisner@mti.sgi.com phone : (415)390-4419 Silicon Graphics Inc. From kls Thu Aug 19 03:03:16 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: cpprg@groper.jcu.edu.au (Peter R Gleeson) Subject: Accident Investigations Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 19 Aug 93 03:03:16 PDT Organization: James Cook University Dear Readers, I was wondering if anyone could tell me where I might look in order to find formal investigation of Aviation/Aerospace accidents. Information I am seeking would be about the causes of accidents and what proposals there were to the elimination of those problems. Thanks. Pete. From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:21 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: barr@ash.mmm.ucar.EDU (Keith Barr) Subject: Re: URGENT: Information please! Aviation Safety Reporting System References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:21 PDT In article Pete Mellor writes: >In his book "Normal Accidents", Charles Perrow refers to an autonomous, >no-penalty, Air Safety Reporting System managed by the National Transportation >Safety Board (NTSB) in the US. He cites the existence of this database, and >its use for early detection of design problems. > >According to John J. Nance, "Blind Trust" (Quill William Morrow, New York, >1986), p.275, the *Aviation* Safety Reporting System was set up by NASA on >behalf of the FAA in 1975. The FAA guaranteed immunity to any pilot >who filed a report on the ASRS, but NASA could manage the system independently >and additionally guarantee anonymity. Around 1978 the immunity provisions were >substantially restricted, as a result of a campaign for "pilot accountability" >by Administrator Langhorne Bond. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is administered by NASA for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). ASRS was set up so a database could be created that would contain data pertinent to safety in the U.S. Airspace System. Pilots, Controllers, and Mechanics are allowed to file ASRS reports on anything they see/participate in that, in their opinion, affects safety. I will explain the way the system works from a pilot perspective, because that is the one I am familiar with. Lets say during a flight an aircrew for an airline is on an IFR flight from point A to point B and is given a clearance to climb from 5000 to FL230. Passing through FL180 they forget to reset their altimeter setting to 29.92, and when they level off at FL230, they are actually at FL235 (FL stands for flight level, by the way, and FL230 is roughly 23,000 feet above sea level), so they are 500 feet off their assigned altitude, which is a violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations. The controller immediately notices the altitude problem and tells the pilots that he is showing them 500 feet high. At that point they realize the altimeter is set wrong, so they reset it and descend back to FL230. Once on the ground the crew files ASRS reports, with their names, and a complete explanation of the occurance. They send these reports to NASA, who reads the report, and if more information is required, NASA will attempt to call the pilots involved. After NASA is satisfied that they have all the information they need, the portion of the form that identifies the pilots is removed and mailed back to the pilots. It is important to note that the report will not be de-identified if it is reporting an accident, a willfull violation of the regs, or a transgression of civil law. In these cases, the report is immediately forwarded to the FAA. Since there was a violation of the regs in our little story, and lets just say the controller was having a bad day, and he decided to report the occurance to the FAA, who then immediately opens an enforcement investigation. If the FAA decides that there was indeed a violation, and they determine that certificate action is required (suspension or revocation), the pilots can hand in their identification strip to the FAA as a "get out of jail free card." This dis-allows the FAA from taking any certificate enforcement action, on the basis that the pilot knows he made a mistake, and had a safety conscious attitude toward the occurance, or he wouldn't have reported the mistake to ASRS. Pilots are limited to using the ASRS escape once every five years, although they are allowed to file as many reports as they want. Periodically, NASA compiles reports from the ASRS and reports to the FAA, making specific comments about the safety of the aviation system. The FAA is then allowed to use the information in any way they see fit. Hope this helps. _____________________________ _____ | Keith Barr \ \ \__ _____ | barr@ncar.ucar.edu \___________\ \/_______\___\_____________ | COMM/AS&MEL/IA/A&IGI / { /_/ ....................... `-. |_____________________________/ `-----------,----,--------------' _/____/O From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:25 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: geoff@peck.com (Geoff Peck) Subject: Re: URGENT: Information please! Aviation Safety Reporting System References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Geoffrey G. Peck, Consultant, San Jose CA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:25 PDT In article Pete Mellor asks about anonymity and penalties associated with reports to the ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System). US Federal Aviation Regulations include the following section: 91.25 Aviation Safety Reporting Program: Prohibition against use of reports for enforcement purposes. The Administrator of the FAA will not use reports submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Aviation Safety Reporting Program (or information derived therefrom) in any enforcement action except information concerning accidents or criminal offenses which are wholly excluded from the Program. The way ASRS works is that a pilot fills in a form which includes an "identification strip" at the top. The identification strip contains the name of the pilot or other reporter, their address, and information identifying the specific incident. When NASA ASRS receives a report, it is examined by an intake person who may call the reporter to ask for additional information. If no additional information is required, this strip is cut from the form, marked, and returned to the sender. Then, the rest of the report (now anonymous) is passed to the rest of the system. If the FAA decides to take administrative action against a pilot for the incident which was properly reported to ASRS, the pilot may use that little strip as a sort of "get out of jail free" card. Only one such "get out of jail free" card may be used by a pilot every five years. The result is that any certificate action (i.e., suspension) and/or civil penalty will be waived, but the record of violation will still be on the pilot's record. Certain actions are specifically excluded from the ASRS "immunity" program -- in particular, actions for which a criminal suit may be filed, accidents, and intentional acts. Geoff From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:29 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Dr Peter B Ladkin Subject: URGENT: Information please! Aviation Safety Reporting System References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:29 PDT I have nothing substantial to add to Robert's comment on ASRS, but I do have a query. I used to get their reports on a regular basis (they do a monthly newsletter), since I filed an incident report with them once. I used to carry the forms around in my flight case as a cheap form of insurance. Certainly, private pilots are under the impression that immunity from enforcement is granted if an ASRS report is filed. On the other hand, if an airline pilot files with ASRS, that doesn't prevent his employer from taking action. For example, you can believe that the pilot of the USAir flight which ran off the end of the runway at [was it?] La Guardia filed an ASRS form. That didn't stop him losing his job. That's a tricky business here. Suppose a pilot turns up to work with less than the minimum 8 hours between bottle and throttle. If he posts NASA a ASRS form saying `Captain violated 8 hour rule. Crew did not query and allowed him to perform normal duties.', would this grant him immunity from FAA enforcement if someone discovers that he's been wilfully violating the rules? In any case, one doubts that he could be granted immunity from law enforcement, and therefore could be arrested for negligence and endangering lives, or whatever. This presumably is true of private pilots also. Peter. From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:31 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press) Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Followup-To: Reply-To: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press) Organization: Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:31 PDT In article papadopo@cs.utk.edu (Philip Papadopoulos) writes: >I noticed on a recent trip that some MD-80's (MD-88's, too) have >"flattened" tailcones (versus conical ones). Could someone give >me some history on this development. The "flattened" tailcones were designed as a replacement/design change on all MD-80 series aircraft since at least 1986. It was done to decrease fuel comsumption by both decreasing drag at the tail and by the change to the use of more composite material. As far as I know, no airline is actively retrofiting their tailcones but they may replace them with the newer designed one when and if a replacement is needed. >BTW, the flattened and elongated tailcone is very apparent on >American jets, less so on Delta Jets. I saw about 8 Northwest >MD-8x's and none had the flattened cone. All the American Jets >I saw did have the new cone (about 15 examples) and most >(but not all) of the Delta jets had flattened tailcones. The main reason for your observation probably has a lot to do with fleet age and mix. American Airlines has the largest fleet of MD-80's with over 200, and at one time this was the record for the industry of one airline have such a large fleet of one type aircraft. The Northwest aircraft you observed were probably all DC-9 series aircraft and these older models gennerally have not been changed. To the best of my knowledge NW has no MD-80's in its fleet. And Delta falls right in the middle. Speaking only for myself and all standard disclaimers apply. Hayes From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:32 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: spagiola@leland.Stanford.EDU Organization: Stanford University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:32 PDT Robert Dorsett writes > > I noticed on a recent trip that some MD-80's (MD-88's, too) have > >"flattened" tailcones (versus conical ones). (...) > > They were installed on all new MD-80 series airliners starting > in the late 80's, as part of a weight and drag reduction program. The "flattened" tailcones are usually referred to as `screwdrivers.' Their design is essentially the same as that of the MD-11's tailcone. I'm not sure which came first; certainly the MD-80s had them first, but I vaguely remember a Douglas employee telling me that they were a result of design work for the MD-11. I believe their advantage is primarily lower drag. All new MD-80s have them (I have somewhere the info on when the switch was made, if anyone is interested). In addition, some airlines have retro-fitted them to older MD-80s. Alaska is one that comes to mind. I wonder if Air Canada's updated DC-9-30s will have them? -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@leland.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:34 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: maclure@eos.arc.nasa.gov (IanMaclure) Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: NASA Ames Research Center Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:34 PDT The flattened tailcone came out around 1987(?). The reason was I believe a 1 or 2% increase in fuel efficieny. Retrofitting ought to be relatively easy as the tailcone is merely an aerodynamic fairing which can be ejected if it is desired to use the rear bulkhead emergency exit. Hope this helps. IBM -- ################ No Times Like The Maritimes, Eh! ###################### # IBM # ian_maclure.mvsrf@QMGATE.arc.nasa.gov (desk) # # aka # maclure@toulouse.arc.nasa.gov (currently) # # Ian B MacLure # maclure@eos.arc.nasa.gov (internet port) # From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Mark.Brown@dcs.qmw.ac.uk Subject: Re: Accident Investigations Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:37 PDT Hi,` This info may or may not be of use to you. In the UK, air accident reports by the AAIB are published by the HMSO (Her Majesty's Stationary Office) and include such reports as Lockerbie, Manchester (exploding JT-8D, a/c burned on runway -- sparked off renewed interest in floor level lighting, non-flammable non-toxic seat covers and air mist systems) and Kegworth (B737 CFM-56 fan blade fatigue not previously identified due to gaps in testing requirements -- pilots closed down wrong engine) which may be of interest to the American reader, as well as smaller largely "domestic" incidents. Where you'd get the reports from in the US I don't know, but it might be worth approaching a library as a starting point to get a list of publications and outlets. At worse, you could send off to the UK. Hope this helps. -- Mark A. Brown Department of Computer Science, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS email: eeyore@uk.ac.qmw.dcs, Tel: +44 71 975 5220 -- Mark A. Brown Department of Computer Science, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS email: eeyore@uk.ac.qmw.dcs, Tel: +44 71 975 5220 From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: miller@lamar.ColoState.EDU (Allen Miller) Subject: Re: Accident Investigations References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Colorado State University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:37 PDT In article , cpprg@groper.jcu.edu.au (Peter R Gleeson) asks where to find information about aircraft accidents. What you want to find is your local government documents depository. Many major university libraries have one. Once you get there, look up the NTSB Aircraft Accident Reports. Those are the reports which the NTSB publishes after concluding their investigation. For major airline accidents this report will be quite detailed, and gives tons of information about the accident, as well as the Boards recommendations to the FAA, airlines, and other parties. General Aviation accidents are covered in less detail, if at all. The NTSB also publishes special reports occasionally, if a certain subject warrants a special investigation. While sometimes a little bit morbid, these accident reports can be fascinating. -- Allen Miller miller@lamar.colostate.edu Department of Physics Colorado State University From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:40 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Terrain-following radar for airliners? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:40 PDT In article you write: >There seem to have been many approach accidents due to the terrain >being higher than expected by the pilot. These incidents include >running into hills because the wrong VOR was tuned in, or the aircraft >descending more quickly than planned due to distraction from other >things going on in the cockpit. > >I was wondering if civil aircraft designers have ever considered >using terrain-following radar like some military aircraft do. >I understand that these point forward as well as down, thus causing >the aircraft to pull-up in time if there is an obstruction. Apparently >very high-speed fighters can fly safely at very low altitudes using >this radar. Airliners can use their weather radar for terrain mapping near ocean bound- aries, as cross-checks to navigation. However, flying into hills is just one aspect of the ground proximity problem. The crash which inspired the mandating of ground proximity warning systems in the United States involved an L-1011 which simply flew into a very level swamp in Florida, as the crew was distracted by a burnt-out lightbulb. GPWS's tend to have five operational modes, called, intuitively, Modes 1-5. These tend to have associated aural alerts, ranging from (in older airplanes) "Whoop whoop, pull up!" to (in modern avionics suites) distinct configuration and terrain call-outs for every mode. Mode 1 is a simple function of radio altimeter altitude and vertical climb rate. If you're closing too fast, an alert goes off. Mode 2 is "excessive closure." This is integrated over time: for instance, suppose you're at zero ROC and the GPWS computer shows a rapidly deteriorat- ing radio altitude: you get an alert. Mode 3 is "altitude loss after takeoff." Mode 4 is a complex combination of configuration warnings: if, for instance, your gear is up, and you're under a threshold altitude, you'll get a warning. Mode 5 is designed for use with an ILS: if you drop beneath glide slope, it'll tell you. This is a pretty comprehensive suite, but unfortunately, what happens is that the crew tends to get these signals in a high-workload environment. And the signals aren't always accurate: excess spurious signals was apparently the rationale of Air Inter's decision to remove the systems from its air- planes: due to their operations over mountainous terrain, they were getting more spurious warnings than real warnings. Some pundits claim that the lack of a GPWS "killed" the Air Inter A320 which crashed near Strasbourg a few years ago; I don't think it would have made any difference. Even loud, obnoxious warnings get filtered out if you hear them often enough. At any rate, if a crew is CERTAIN that it is where it should be, it might just choose to disregard the warning. This is their prerogative. They might be wrong, though. Would a terrain-tracking interface help? I tend to doubt it: it'd have to be part of the overall user interface. And if we were to go to that degree of trouble, it would certainly be possible to improve other aspects of the interface, to ensure that "180 degree" reversals (a more common type of CFIT problem) don't happen. A terrain-following interface would need to be a monitoring interface, which would add a great deal to its complexity. GPWS is just a warning system (aural and lights). In the modern operational context, terrain-following would also need to be a warning system, and I'm not convinced it would neces- sarily be any more accurate than GPWS. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:42 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: K.R.Wallace@massey.ac.nz (K.R. Wallace) Subject: Re: Terrain-following radar for airliners? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:42 PDT There must be some problems in trying to bolt an old Terrain Following Radar system into an airliner otherwise... Aviation Week +ST had an article about a "ground collision avoidance" radar. This was slghtly different from previous TFR's and GPWS. Testing involved flying the F-16 around, parking it in different attitudes and letting it figure itself out. The system is supposed to recover from the ensuing dive just after a real pilot would normally. Some of the dives were pretty steep. Figs like 60-70 deg. nose down. Wish I had the mag now! Pilot reports said that watching this happen was interesting. Sounds like a great thing for airliners. -- Keir Wallace_c/o School of Aviation_Massey Univ_Palmerston Nth_New Zealand From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:45 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: davels@lsid.hp.com (Dave L_Sherrer) Subject: Was there a 717 ... Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Hewlett-Packard Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:45 PDT Hello - A friend of mine who is an airplane buff asked me if there ever was a Boeing 717. I use to work for Boeing years ago (747/767), but am embarrassed to say I don't recall there ever being a 717. So for those of you on the net, did this plane ever exist? Did it appear just on the drawing board and never made it to production? Thanks for your help ... From kls Wed Aug 25 02:53:46 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: quagga@trystero.com (Quagga) Subject: Grim bit of TFR Trivia =) Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: The Trystero System (617) 623-7155 v.32/v.42bis Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Aug 93 02:53:46 PDT I remember reading that while the terrain-following-radar system was being developed for the F-111, they had a few accidents resulting in "unauthorized terrain incursions" =) Hey what can I say, they call problems with your parachute "malfunctions". equus quagga. quagga@trystero.com "But you can call me Cheryl.." \o/ "Ich habe festgestellt, das es N I C H T S gibt, was Deine (( Aufmerksamkeit schneller und vollstaendiger fesselt, als ein \\ sich nicht oeffender Fallschirm!" -moi. =) From kls Thu Sep 2 04:12:59 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jkkuchar@athena.mit.edu (James K. Kuchar) Subject: Re: Terrain-following radar for airliners? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:12:59 PDT In article , plisner@mips.com (Peter Lisner) writes: |> There seem to have been many approach accidents due to the terrain |> being higher than expected by the pilot. These incidents include |> running into hills because the wrong VOR was tuned in, or the aircraft |> descending more quickly than planned due to distraction from other |> things going on in the cockpit. Controlled Flight Into Terrain is the single largest cause of fatalities worldwide. Overreliance on ATC to provide terrain separation & a lack of intuitive terrain information on the flight deck are 2 principle problems. |> |> I was wondering if civil aircraft designers have ever considered |> using terrain-following radar like some military aircraft do. |> I understand that these point forward as well as down, thus causing |> the aircraft to pull-up in time if there is an obstruction. Apparently |> very high-speed fighters can fly safely at very low altitudes using |> this radar. |> |> Could this technique be applied for airliners as well? Obviously, such |> a system would have to "cut out" at a certain altitude so that the |> aircraft could actually land! I'm not a pilot, just an enthusiast, so |> I'm sure I am ignorant of many important points here. But I would like |> to hear what others think. We've been doing quite a bit of work in this area at MIT. Sundstrand makes the current Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) for jets, and are also interested in new technology as are Boeing and several airlines. Current GPWS looks straight down using the radar altimeter & extrapolates terrain closure rate to determine if there's a hazard. The latest GPWS versions are very effective. We think, though, that there could be some benefit to a more advanced system that uses knowledge of the 3D topography around the aircraft. Whether it's from an onboard database or a look-ahead sensor is still an issue. Such a system, though, would have to be different than military systems since the idea is to stay away from terrain, not follow it. Impacting short of the runway & flight into precipitous terrain are 2 areas that need improvement. Of course, things get very complicated quickly & you don't want to be giving the pilot nuisance alerts, yet you still want to provide enough time to maneuver & avoid the terrain. Just a brief overview of what's going on out there. I'd be happy to elaborate if someone's interested. Jim Kuchar jkkuchar@athena.mit.edu From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ami@cac.washington.edu (Analytical Methods {NWNet}) Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: UW Networks and Distributed Computing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:00 PDT Actually, the "screwdriver" tailcones are not retrofitable onto older MD-80s and DC-9s. A friend of mine at Douglas tells me that they went through hell certifying the new tailcone. This was because the tailcone is jettisonable in an emergency and counts as an emergency exit. The old tailcone would fall free reliably and not foul the exit, but the new tailcone wouldn't. Hence modifications were necessary to allow it to be certified. The screwdriver (we call it a beavertail) show a 1% improvement in cruise and I once had the idea of selling a retrofit program for putting them on older aircraft, but this certification problem killed my idea. However, I would guess that the MD-11 tailcone is retrofitable on the DC-10. -Dave Lednicer Analytical Methods, Inc. From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:01 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Geoff.Miller@corp.sun.com (Geoff Miller) Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Reply-To: Geoff.Miller@corp.sun.com Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:01 PDT maclure@eos.arc.nasa.gov (IanMaclure) writes: >Retrofitting ought to be relatively easy as the tailcone is >merely an aerodynamic fairing which can be ejected if it >is desired to use the rear bulkhead emergency exit. Speaking of emergency exits, were some DC-9s and MD-80s built without the tail stairway? I don't remember which airline it was on, but I seem to recall seeing an emergency information card that either made no mention of the tail stairway or had separate evacuation instructions for airplanes with and without it. (The ejectable tailcone seems to be present on all versions, however.) Geoff -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Geoff Miller + + + + + + + + Sun Microsystems geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM + + + + + + + + Menlo Park, California -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:03 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ditka!sgiblab!uunet.UU.NET!ucsd!frosty.rational.com!pete (Pete Coe) Subject: How is the 777 doing? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Rational Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:03 PDT A friend just over from England says that British Airways are unhappy with the progress of the 777. In particular, it is not expected to meet the performance guarantees (such as London to West coast USA). Can anyone add anything more substancial than that. -- -- Pete Coe -- Rational -- Object-Oriented Products From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:05 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: Was there a 717 ... References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:05 PDT In article davels@lsid.hp.com (Dave L_Sherrer) writes: >Hello - > >A friend of mine who is an airplane buff asked me if there ever was a >Boeing 717. I use to work for Boeing years ago (747/767), but am >embarrassed to say I don't recall there ever being a 717. So for those of >you on the net, did this plane ever exist? Did it appear just on the >drawing board and never made it to production? I don't think so. What was to have been the 717 was named the 720 instead to please the UAL CEO who was purchasing them (UAL was the launch customer on the 720 I think - am I right Karl?). He hated too many sevens in the model number, apparently he felt they were unlucky. :-) The 720 was the single aisle version of the 747SP. I.e., a chopped body with extra long range performance. As I understand it, the 720 is quite different from the 707 structurally. -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:07 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Was there a 717 ... References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:07 PDT Terry Drinkard writes: >What was to have been the 717 was named the 720 instead to please the >UAL CEO who was purchasing them (UAL was the launch customer on the >720 I think - am I right Karl?). Yes, United was first to sign up for the 720; they and Eastern were the launch customers, just as they were later on for the 727. But I can't locate any reference to a name change on the 720 -- as far as I know the 717 is just Boeing's name for the KC-135. (See also the next aritcle in this thread, which suggests what could be a 717-to- 720 metamorphosis.) >The 720 was the single aisle version of the 747SP. I.e., a chopped body >with extra long range performance. As I understand it, the 720 is quite >different from the 707 structurally. I had always understood the 720 to be a medium-range derivative of the 707, which wasn't a blazing success because it didn't go far enough in reducing costs. However, I looked up the 720 in Legend and Legacy and it talks about the 720B (the turbofan version) in the context of a sale to Northwest in a manner that sounds more like your description. They note, though, that load factors pushed Northwest to switch from the 720B to the 707-320 Intercontinental on the same routes, so it does not seem that the 720 had a significantly longer-range. You aren't by any chance thinking of the five QANTAS 707-138s are you? These were 10 feet shorter than a normal -120, to reduce weight and thus give QANTAS the range they needed. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:08 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: megazone@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone) Subject: Re: Was there a 717 ... References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: WPI Discordian Society, Undocumented Cabal Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:08 PDT davels@lsid.hp.com (Dave L_Sherrer) shaped the electrons to say: >embarrassed to say I don't recall there ever being a 717. So for those of >you on the net, did this plane ever exist? Did it appear just on the >drawing board and never made it to production? 717 was originally applied to a 'short' 707, but this was renamed 707-??? It was then applied to the USAF KC/C-135 series. As it has a different build than the 707. As far as I've read, the KC-135 remains the Boeing Model 717 -- megazone@wpi.wpi.edu megazone@world.std.com megazone@hotblack.schunix.dmc.com "I have one prejudice, and that is against stupidity. Use your mind, think!" Moderator: WPI anime FTP site, 130.215.24.1 /anime, the anime FanFic archive; rec.arts.anime.stories, questions to anime-dojinshi-request@wpi.wpi.edu GTW d-- -p+ c++(++++) l u+ e+ m+(*)@ s++/+ !n h- f+ !g w+ t+@ r+@ y+(*) From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:10 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: libove@jerry.alf.dec.com (Jay Vassos-Libove) Subject: new SST work? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Atlanta Customer Support Center Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:10 PDT I was watching a PBS broadcast of (some title dealing with airplanes and speed) last night in Atlanta, and they mentioned that the Soviets, Boeing, and the European consortium are ALL working on new Supersonic Transports... Could someone please dig up and post some details of what they're working on? I had (evidently mistakenly) believed that the civilian aerospace sector had pretty much given up on SST for passenger use because of cost/efficiency problems, relative to sub-sonic speed craft. Thanks! -- Jay Vassos-Libove libove@alf.dec.com Digital Equipment Corporation decwrl!alf.dec.com!libove Atlanta Customer Support Center Opinions? They're mine, mine, all mine! Alpharetta, Georgia and D.E.C. Can't have 'em! From kls Thu Sep 2 04:13:12 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: new SST work? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Sep 93 04:13:12 PDT >... a PBS broadcast ... mentioned that the Soviets, Boeing, and the >European consortium are ALL working on new Supersonic Transports... Douglas is in there too. The project(s) is (are) generally referred to as the HSCT (High Speed Civil Transport). The Pacific rim is the primary driving market for such a transport, because there is such an explosive growth in business and hence traffic, and because the distances are so great. One key feature of any such plane is sufficient range to fly Tokyo- New York non-stop, keeping in mind that the distance may be greater than for a sub-sonic aircraft because of the need to avoid flying over land areas. One variable is just what this means -- gaining authority for supersonic overflight of remote, largely uninhabited areas of Siberia would significantly shorten the range needed, for instance. Another consideration is capacity. What I've seen is roughly 300 seats, I believe in a more-or-less standard three-class mix. This and the range could potentially make such an aircraft financially feasible to operate. There undoubtedly are some substantial tech- nical hurdles to clear first, however. It's worth noting that the Pacific Rim market is also the turf of the 650-seat aircraft proposals floating around. Assuming one (or, Gods forbid, several) of these projects is actually built, it will probably fly around the turn of the century. Technical problems make it unlikely an HSCT could be flying that soon, but it's not unreasonable to expect an HSCT within twenty years. That appears to put a rather quick cap on the life of the 650-seat behemoth(s), though the rapidly growly airfreight business may offer a continued market for these beasts while passenger traffic migrates to HSCT. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Sat Sep 11 13:45:48 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis) Subject: What's old is new again (the HSCT/"superjumbo") References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Sep 93 13:45:48 PDT KS> == Karl Swartz KS> [I]t's not unreasonable to expect an HSCT within twenty years. That KS> appears to put a rather quick cap on the life of the 650-seat KS> behemoth(s), though the rapidly growly airfreight business may offer a KS> continued market for these beasts while passenger traffic migrates to KS> HSCT. This is, of course, the exact same scenario envisioned for the 747, in the days when the American SST was still a going project. Both _Legend and Legacy_ and Clive Irving's _Wide Body_ point out that the upper-deck cockpit was designed to allow easy freight loading through the nose, and that freighter conversion was explicitly planned into the 747 design. I'm less sure that this scenario will happen between the superjumbo and the HSCT. Deregulation has passed, and the goal for many airlines is now to cut seat-mile costs as low as possible and pack 'em in. The HSCT will have to be noticably more economical than the Concorde, which is of course one of the many claims made for the HSCT, but the Concorde's original claims were also for somewhat better monetary gain than it has shown. (Note that I'm unconvinced about the need for the superjumbo, as well, but did want to note the interesting historical parallel involved.) -- Christopher Davis # People on the net are always telling other people to "get # a life." It would be so much simpler if there were one # available under the GPL. "If you use this life, you must [CKD1] MIME RIPEM # tell other people where to get a life of their own." From kls Sat Sep 11 13:45:51 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: "David S. Wise" Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Computer Science, Indiana University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Sep 93 13:45:51 PDT Geoff.Miller@corp.sun.com (Geoff Miller) writes: >Speaking of emergency exits, were some DC-9s and MD-80s built >without the tail stairway? I don't remember which airline it >was on, but I seem to recall seeing an emergency information >card that either made no mention of the tail stairway or had >separate evacuation instructions for airplanes with and without What is worse, I listened to cabin attendants on one airline (hint: it flew shiny, shiny MD-80s) read instructions verbatim that said "This plane may [sic] be equipped with a rear exit door; in that case..." Having heard this quote two or three times, I pointed out that it would be rather late to check whether there were actually a rear door, should it ever come time to my needing it. I suggested that he (SDBCF) toddle on back and look, and then read only the instructions for the stairs or for the slide---as appropriate. Apparently, attendants are told to read *exactly* these instructions. So the victims' estates are free to sue management? Or the FAA? Sheesh! One would think that the emergency instructions would be type-specific on "minor" things like the existence of exits! :-| -- David S. Wise +1(812)855-4866; fax: +1(812)855-4829 dswise@cs.indiana.edu Computer Science Dept., Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-4101, USA From kls Sat Sep 11 13:45:53 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press) Subject: Re: New MD-80, MD-88 tailcones? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Reply-To: Hayes_Press@qmgate.larc.nasa.gov (Hayes N. Press) Organization: Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Sep 93 13:45:53 PDT Reply-To: Geoff.Miller@corp.sun.com >Geoff.Miller@corp.sun.com (Geoff Miller) writes: >Speaking of emergency exits, were some DC-9s and MD-80s built >without the tail stairway? I don't remember which airline it >was on, but I seem to recall seeing an emergency information >card that either made no mention of the tail stairway or had >separate evacuation instructions for airplanes with and without >it. (The ejectable tailcone seems to be present on all versions, >however.) The tail emergency exit is present on all but the DC-9-10 series. All MD-80's have the emergency exit in the tail, as well as, larger DC-9's since the extra door is needed to meet the FAA regulation for evacuation within 90 seconds. The DC-9-10 does not need the tail exit since the exit rule can be meet without it due to the passenger capacity being so small. And on Ian's comment (just prior to Geoff's): >Retrofitting ought to be !!!!! relatively easy !!!!! as the tailcone is >merely ....... This shows that Ian obviously has never worked on the retrofit of a piece of hardware (applies to software,too) that is use by scores of airlines in hundreds of configurations. Nothing is easy when it comes to retrofits in the commercial airline transport business. Not only do lots of federal regulations and company guidelines need to be met, but also foriegn regulations, airline operating procedures, and most of all crew training changes. Speaking only for myself and all standard disclaimers apply. Hayes From kls Sat Sep 11 13:45:55 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ami@cac.washington.edu (Analytical Methods {NWNet}) Subject: Re: Was there a 717 ... References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: UW Networks and Distributed Computing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Sep 93 13:45:55 PDT After reading all of the news postings attempting to make sense of the early Boeing model numbering system, let me set the record straight. Model 367-80 (the prototype) begat the Model 717 (USAF KC-135) quite directly, though the upper lobe on the -80 is 132 inches wide and the 717 has a 144 inch upper lobe. All model of the 707 and 720 have a 148 inch upper lobe. The extra 4 inches was added to make it competitive with the DC-8. The 707 was produced in several models. The 707-120 and -220 had a 1666 inch long fuselage, while the one-off -138 and the Model 720 had a 1566 inch long fuselage. The Model 720 has a glove on the inboard wing which helps it cruise approximately .02 Mach faster to make it competitive with the Convair 880 and 990. The Model 707-320 and -420 had a longer fuselage (1746 inches) and a revised wing. The -120 had JT3C turbojets, the -220 JT4A turbojets, the Model 720 had JT4As, the -300 had JT4As and later JT3Ds and the -420 had Rolls Royce Conways. Lastly the Model 717 had J-57 turbojets (JT3Cs), though they have since been reengined with JT3Ds and CFM-56s. By the way C-137s and E-3s are basically 707-300s with JT3ds, while E-6s are 707-300s with CFM-56s. Got all that? -David Lednicer Analytical Methods, Inc. From kls Sat Sep 11 13:45:58 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: shafer@ferhino.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) Subject: KC-135/707 relationship Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Sep 93 13:45:58 PDT Several people have posted remarks implying that the KC-135 is a 707 derivative. This is absolutely incorrect. The KC-135 was the original aircraft and the 707 is its civil derivative. In fact, the KC-135 was already being flown when the Air Force gave Boeing permission to develop the 707. This permission was required because technology paid for by USAF was being used in the 707. In addition, there were questions about Boeing's ability to sustain the required quality with two similar but not identical production lines running parallel. For what it's worth, the 747 started life as a rival proposal to the C-5. Fortunately for Boeing, they lost that competition. There's a story, perhaps apocryphal, that for many years the Air Force had standing orders never to have both 747s and C-5s on the same airfields. -- Mary Shafer DoD #362 KotFR NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA shafer@ferhino.dfrf.nasa.gov Of course I don't speak for NASA "A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all." Unknown US fighter pilot From kls Sat Sep 11 13:46:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,comp.ai Path: bounce-back From: sidney@cs.concordia.ca (SVORCSEK) Subject: Adavanced Engine Diagnostics Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Computer Science, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 11 Sep 93 13:46:00 PDT Hi, We are doing a study into ways of predicting aircraft engine failures in advance. I would like to find out if anybody knows of research or existing systems that do advanced diagnosis of aircraft power plants (engines), either through inference from available data (sensors, engine history), oil spectrography, gas path analysis, vibration analysis,... I am also interested in failure diagnostic systems (what to do in the event of a failure). We are concentration on aircraft engines, however, anything from other areas, such as locomotive, would be of help. sid. -- =============================================================================== Sid Svorcsek Email: sidney@cs.concordia.ca Concordia University Tel: (514) 422-4837 Montreal, Quebec Fax: (514) 422-4899 From kls Tue Sep 21 22:47:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ctillier@phoenix.princeton.edu (Clemens Emmanuel Tillier) Subject: Cabin pressure profile? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Sep 93 22:47:37 PDT Organization: Princeton University This is a somewhat vague question, but here goes: How does the cabin pressure in a 'typical' airliner vary with altitude? Of course it decreases, but how? Is there a proportional decrease as you go up or does it follow atmospheric pressure to a certain altitude and stay at this final pressure as you go higher? Even more basic: what is a 'typical' cabin pressure at say 35,000 feet, and to what real altitude does it correspond? adTHANKSvance, Clem Tillier From kls Tue Sep 21 22:47:40 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: new SST work? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Sep 93 22:47:40 PDT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >>... a PBS broadcast ... mentioned that the Soviets, Boeing, and the >>European consortium are ALL working on new Supersonic Transports... > >Douglas is in there too. The project(s) is (are) generally referred >to as the HSCT (High Speed Civil Transport). The Pacific rim is the >primary driving market for such a transport, because there is such >an explosive growth in business and hence traffic, and because the >distances are so great. I don't think I'm giving away the store when if I tell you that Douglas and Boeing are working together on the HSCT even as we speak. It was all over the local papers, and I know the fellow who is doing the coordination. Heck, I even know the guy doing the digital inboard profile. :-) I agree with Karl's analysis of the market forces for this airplane. I would also add that the business traveler is usually willing to pay more for reduced flight time because time really can be money for that class of passenger. Hence ticket price can creep up just a bit to cover what are obviously higher operating costs. >One key feature of any such plane is sufficient range to fly Tokyo- >New York non-stop, keeping in mind that the distance may be greater >than for a sub-sonic aircraft because of the need to avoid flying >over land areas. One variable is just what this means -- gaining >authority for supersonic overflight of remote, largely uninhabited >areas of Siberia would significantly shorten the range needed, for >instance. The other big scenario (and my information is a couple of years old here) is to start with a West Coast US to Tokyo range, and grow into the New York to Tokyo market after a couple of years, ala 'B' Market 777. Another variable here is sonic boom reduction technology. With some advances that don't require weird configuration compromises we could conceivably see overland SST flight, and not just in Siberia. >Another consideration is capacity. What I've seen is roughly 300 >seats, I believe in a more-or-less standard three-class mix. This >and the range could potentially make such an aircraft financially >feasible to operate. There undoubtedly are some substantial tech- >nical hurdles to clear first, however. It has been awhile, but I think the Boeing HSCT has a 325 seat count. In a three class layout, of course. :-) The technical hurdles for this class of airplane, and not just the Boeing version are materials and engines. The current class of materials certified for aerospace structural application tend to creep under the high temperatures associated with Mach 2+ flight. This is not good. :-) Engines need to be very quiet on takeoff and approach, yet be very efficient at 50,000+ ft and Mach 2 or faster. Not to mention they need to be utterly reliable, and if one *does* have the poor manners to fail en route, the other engines must have the efficiency to get to a suitable airport while flying off-design. Pretty stiff set of requirements at the moment. >It's worth noting that the Pacific Rim market is also the turf of >the 650-seat aircraft proposals floating around. Assuming one (or, >Gods forbid, several) of these projects is actually built, it will >probably fly around the turn of the century. Technical problems >make it unlikely an HSCT could be flying that soon, but it's not >unreasonable to expect an HSCT within twenty years. That appears >to put a rather quick cap on the life of the 650-seat behemoth(s), >though the rapidly growly airfreight business may offer a continued >market for these beasts while passenger traffic migrates to HSCT. Hey, don't be knocking my airplane! It pays the bills around here. :-) I would also like to point out that even if the HSCT comes on line as predicted, it will have nowhere near the economics of the NLA (600 seats). And if you are going on vacation, you aren't nearly so concerned with flight time as price. And the NLA will have it all over the HSCT in terms of operating cost. I would guess that one could purchase a ticket to Tokyo from San Francisco on an NLA for only 2/3 of what you would pay for that ticket on an HSCT - and that is assuming that everyone meets their economic targets. Not that I'm against the HSCT. I think it is an obvious area for growth. The Next Great Step, if you will. -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Tue Sep 21 22:47:43 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ditka!sgiblab!uunet.UU.NET!ucsd!frosty.rational.com!pete (Pete Coe) Subject: Differences between A320's Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Rational Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Sep 93 22:47:43 PDT Taxi-ing around Heathrow yesterday I noticed a minor difference the British Airways and Air France A320's. The Air France ones (and the Lufthansa ones for that matter), all had small winglets on the wings. The British Airways planes did not. My first thought was that I had misidentified the BA planes, and they were really 737-400's, but no another look confirmed they were A320's. Any thoughts? -- -- Pete Coe -- Rational -- Object-Oriented Products From kls Tue Sep 21 22:47:45 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Differences between A320's References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Sep 93 22:47:45 PDT Pete Coe asks: >Taxi-ing around Heathrow yesterday I noticed a minor difference the >British Airways and Air France A320's. The Air France ones (and the >Lufthansa ones for that matter), all had small winglets on the wings. >The British Airways planes did not. As far as I knew all A320s came with winglets, but I tracked down a picture of a British Airways A320 and sure enough, no winglets. A bit of research revealed that this identifies the aircraft as an A320-111, as opposed to a -211 or -231. The first 21 aircraft were the only -100 models. Besides the lack of winglets, the major difference is a lower MGTOW (150,000 lbs vs. 162,000 lbs) and reduced fuel capacity. The only operators of the -111, besides BA, are Air France and Air Inter. All three also operate -200 models. BTW, the difference between the -211 and the -231 is the engines -- the -211 has CFM56-5 engines while the -231 has V2500 engines. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue Sep 21 22:47:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: A320 Warsaw crash: 2 dead Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Sep 93 22:47:52 PDT [ This was posted the day after the crash, but I waited, hoping there would be more complete information and also trying to discourage a frenzy of speculation in the group based on misinformation. This is still about the best report I've seen, however, so here's Peter's report on the crash. The most noteworthy update is that the flight recorders have been recovered intact, and, strangely, sent to the *French* authorities for analysis. -- Karl ] The following is the best information that I could glean from reports on last night's late evening TV news, and in The Guardian and The Independent newspapers this morning. (The Independent carried a front-page picture and a fairly long report on p12. The Guardian carried a picture and short report on p8. The Times also carried a very short front page report. No other papers carried it on the front page and I did not check their inside coverage.) Date and time: Tuesday 14th Sep. 1993, 17.30 local time approx. Place: Okecie airport, Warsaw Carrier: Lufthansa Flight: Scheduled flight LH2904 Frankfurt to Warsaw Aircraft type: Airbus A-320 Weather conditions: Violent storm. Heavy rain (described as an "incredible downpour") and strong winds. Complement: 64 passengers, 6 crew Casualties: 2 dead (1 flight crew, 1 passenger), 54 injured (taken to hospital). Note that reports are confused. Some early reports gave 40 or 70 dead. The TV news bulletin stated no dead, but many injured. The Independent gives 2 dead and 54 injured. The Guardian gives 2 dead and 68 injured but states that some had already been discharged from hospital (citing Maciej Kalita, airport director, as their source). Material damage: Aircraft totally destroyed. Course of events: The aircraft made an apparently normal touch-down. Instead of braking, it accelerated, rolled to the end of the runway and struck some kind of barrier (variously stated to be a "buffer" or "embankment"). It surmounted the barrier, struck the ground with a nose-down attitude, and broke up. An engine caught fire. The fire spread, and destroyed the entire aircraft apart from the tail section and the pilots' cabin. Passengers escaped through the emergency exits. (One report states that the rear exits were used, since the middle section was damaged.) Fire crews and ambulances reached the scene from the centre of Warsaw in 20 minutes. The emergency services were described in The Independent as responding quickly. (Presumably these were services located at the airport, which was described as "recently modernised".) Pictorial evidence: The picture in The Independent is taken from the left of the fuselage, and shows the front section. The pilot's cabin is structurally intact, and the windscreen is unbroken, although it appears to be blackened by smoke. The front door is open, and one fireman is standing inside the fuselage, training a hose towards the flight deck. From a point immediately behind the door, the roof and walls of the passenger cabin are totally destroyed, and the jagged remains of the walls and some of the window apertures can be seen. The interior of the passenger cabin is shrouded in white smoke. Onlookers can be seen standing on a high embankment on the right of the fuselage, looking down at the wreckage. The nose-cone is not in shot. The picture in The Guardian is taken from the front of the fuselage, looking at the pilots' cabin. Again, it is clear that this is intact, and no windscreens are broken. The cabin roof is partly blackened. The right windscreen wiper is in a near-vertical position, and the left is slightly raised, indicating that these were in use on impact. The belly of the fusalage is on the ground. The fuselage is tilted slightly to the left. The right wing and engine are still attached and appear undamaged, with no evidence of being affected by fire. (It would therefore appear to be the left engine that caught fire, but this is not in shot, and in any case the right of the picture is blocked by the figures of the firemen.) One spoiler (no. 2?) is raised on the wing. The nose-cone appears to be missing. An embankment slightly higher than the cabin roof is visible to the right and slightly to the rear of the fuselage, with firemen scrambling on it. The fuselage to the rear of the pilots' cabin is obscured by white smoke. Witnesses' reports: One passenger, Marcin Bronowski, stated: "It happened in a fraction of a second after landing. There was even hand-clapping after the landing. Then the 'plane started accelerating again. Rather than braking, it tried to take off, but it ran out of runway and the 'plane broke into pieces." The Independent cites Lufthansa's manager in Warsaw, Hans Blum, as saying there was an "explosion". The Guardian cites Lufthansa's regional director for Eastern Europe, Hans-Willy Blum, as saying "As far as we know, there was no explosion.") Miscellaneous information: The last accident to a Lufthansa aircraft was in 1979, when a cargo 'plane crashed near Rio de Janeiro, killing 3 crew. Franz Bertele, the German ambassador to Warsaw, was on board, but survived. David Learmount was interviewed for the TV news bulletin, and stated that the accident could not be attributed to the aircraft systems. He also stated that, according to witnesses, the aircraft appeared to "aqua-plane" after touch-down. (This does not explain the *acceleration*, however, since the ground spoilers and thrust reversers should have had a braking effect.) When I telephoned the BBC news desk last night to see if they required any information, I was told that, since latest reports indicated no deaths, the accident would receive little coverage. As the woman on the desk said: "No bodies, no story!". :-) Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Thu Sep 23 00:11:21 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Stephen L Nicoud Subject: 777 on TV: documentary showing next month Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 00:11:21 PDT On October 28, 9 p.m., channel 9 in Seattle will show a documentary on the building of the 777. According to the director of 777 Public Relations, Donna Mikov, the program will show the whole process, "warts and all." Boeing is cooperating extensively in the making of the program but it's not a Boeing production. It's part of a series of 5 documentaries on the creation and production of the 777 being put together by a British video company for the BBC (I'd guess the British interest is related to the fact that British Airways is one of the major launch customers for 777). PBS has picked up rights to show the series in this country [USA]. It will also be shown in other European countries, and possibly in Japan. From kls Thu Sep 23 00:11:23 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,comp.ai Path: bounce-back From: lou@cs.rutgers.edu (Lou Steinberg) Subject: Re: Adavanced Engine Diagnostics References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Reply-To: lou@cs.rutgers.edu Organization: Computer Science Dept., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 00:11:23 PDT In article sidney@cs.concordia.ca (SVORCSEK) writes: We are doing a study into ways of predicting aircraft engine failures in advance. [...] I am also interested in failure diagnostic systems You might contact Kathy Abbott at NASA in Langley, Virginia (USA). Her PhD thesis, for which I was the advisor, was on this latter area. 1990: Kathy Abbott: Robust Knowledge-based Diagnosis of Physical Systems in Operation, PhD Thesis, Department of Computer Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 I believe she has done further work in the area as well. Her thesis should be available from University Microfilms or from the Rutgers CS Department. -- Lou Steinberg uucp: {pretty much any major site}!rutgers!aramis.rutgers.edu!lou internet: lou@cs.rutgers.edu From kls Thu Sep 23 00:11:25 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Cabin pressure profile? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 00:11:25 PDT In article ctillier@phoenix.princeton.edu (Clemens Emmanuel Tillier) writes: >This is a somewhat vague question, but here goes: > >How does the cabin pressure in a 'typical' airliner vary with >altitude? Of course it decreases, but how? Is there a proportional >decrease as you go up or does it follow atmospheric pressure to a >certain altitude and stay at this final pressure as you go higher? > >Even more basic: what is a 'typical' cabin pressure at say 35,000 >feet, and to what real altitude does it correspond? Since the 727-200 is representative, and since I know a great deal about it: :-) The 727-200 pressurization system is all-electronic. It is comprised of an outflow valve, located in the right aft fuselage, under the exit. The airflow entering the cabin from the engines is offset by the air leaving the airplane through this valve. The valve rotates to maintain an appropriate pressurization schedule. The valve is normally AC controlled, but there is a standby and manual mode, which use alternate AC paths, and even a DC path, to actuate it. The system is normally programmed with the anticipated flight altitude and ground altitude, prior to takeoff (auto mode). A switch is flipped prior to takeoff (and after landing) to switch between the in-flight and on-ground modes of the system. After this (auto mode), it's hands-off. The optimal cabin differential is 8.65 psi. IF this maintained, then the airplane can maintain sea level pressure up to 22,500 feet. At 40,000 feet, the differential yields a cabin altitude of 7,000 feet. The system attempts to maintain the anticipated landing field altitude. Therefore, after takeoff, it will initiate a rate of climb of up to 500 feet per minute, but in actuality, the rate of climb is proportional to the final cruising altitude. The system will accept a rate of descent of up to 350 feet per minute. Underpressure relief (outside air at higher pressure than the internal air) is provided when the differential exceeds 1.0 psi. Overpressure relief is set at a differential of 9.42 psi, via two independent relief valves. The cabin itself can withstand a pressure differential of 1.5 x 8.6 psi, or about 12.9 psi. Standard instrumentation includes the auto, standby, and manual mode select- ors, a cabin altimeter, a cabin rate of climb indicator, and a cabin/ambient differential indicator. A "differential" is the difference (in psi) of the internal pressure, com- pared to the ambient (flight altitude) pressure. Therefore, an airplane sitting on the ground at sea level has a differential of 0; one cruising at 40,000' with a cabin altitude of 7000' has one of 8.6. Standard atmosphere. There are many other fun quirks; it's a complex system to model. Boeing aircraft all use the same basic principles; more modern airplanes have greater degrees of automation. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Thu Sep 23 00:11:30 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme) Subject: Re: Cabin pressure profile? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center, Mpls. MN, USA. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 00:11:30 PDT In article ctillier@phoenix.princeton.edu (Clemens Emmanuel Tillier) writes: > This is a somewhat vague question, but here goes: Well, I will give you a sonewhat vague answer.... :-) > How does the cabin pressure in a 'typical' airliner vary with > altitude? Of course it decreases, but how? Is there a proportional > decrease as you go up or does it follow atmospheric pressure to a > certain altitude and stay at this final pressure as you go higher? It is proportional, in my experience. I have jumped several airplanes and the most clear in this regard was the A320. They have an environmental systems graphic on one of the CRTs during ascent that shows the internal cabin 'altitude' and the relative internal ascent/descent rate. During climb the internal rate was equivalent to 500 feet per minute and at cruise the internal 'altitude' was typically 7500' above sea level. > Even more basic: what is a 'typical' cabin pressure at say 35,000 > feet, and to what real altitude does it correspond? Answered above. Ken Ken Hoyme Honeywell Technology Center (612)951-7354 3660 Technology Dr., Minneapolis, MN 55418 Internet: hoyme@src.honeywell.com From kls Thu Sep 23 00:11:31 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: pypbf@csv.warwick.ac.uk (Mr D M Procida) Subject: Huge capacity aircraft and accidents Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Computing Services, University of Warwick, UK Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 00:11:31 PDT Would an airline be able to survive a crash that killed 600 of its customers? What sort of insurance prospects would an airline with such aircraft face? It seems that the sheer quantities involved (of everything- lives, money etc) would greatly transform the nature of the risks. However, since I must admit that I don't know a whole lot about the matter, perhaps people said exactly the same sort of thing during the development of the current large jets (747, DC10)... I'm quite curious to know about this side of things. Daniele Procida. From kls Thu Sep 23 00:11:33 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: babu@bigwpi.WPI.EDU (V. Gopalakrishnan) Subject: Re: Differences between A320's References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Worcester Polytechnic Institute Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 00:11:33 PDT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >Pete Coe asks: >>Taxi-ing around Heathrow yesterday I noticed a minor difference the >>British Airways and Air France A320's. The Air France ones (and the >>Lufthansa ones for that matter), all had small winglets on the wings. >>The British Airways planes did not. >Karl Replies: > > >BTW, the difference between the -211 and the -231 is the engines -- >the -211 has CFM56-5 engines while the -231 has V2500 engines. And then there are the A320s that Indian Airlines has (sorry, don't know the official -2xx extension) which have four tyres on each of the main landing gear, (supposedly in order to allow the plane to operate from rough airfields) while all other versions of the plane I've seen only have two tyres on each of the main gear. -VG From kls Thu Sep 23 00:11:34 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Differences between A320's References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 00:11:34 PDT V. Gopalakrishnan notes: >And then there are the A320s that Indian Airlines has (sorry, don't know the >official -2xx extension) which have four tyres on each of the main landing >gear, (supposedly in order to allow the plane to operate from rough airfields) >while all other versions of the plane I've seen only have two tyres on >each of the main gear. The four-tire main gear is unique to the Indian Airlines A320s, though they're still called an A320-231 like most other V2500-equipped A320s. This special modification caused Airbus some consternation after Bangalore, when IA was talking about not accepting any more A320s and returning the ones they already had, since the oddball main gear would have made them somewhat difficult to sell to anyone else. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Sep 23 10:10:08 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,comp.ai Path: bounce-back From: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) Subject: Re: Adavanced Engine Diagnostics References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: NASA Langley Research Center Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 10:10:08 PDT In article lou@cs.rutgers.edu (Lou Steinberg) writes: >In article sidney@cs.concordia.ca (SVORCSEK) writes: > We are doing a study into ways of predicting aircraft engine > failures in advance. [...] I am also interested in failure > diagnostic systems >You might contact Kathy Abbott at NASA in Langley, Virginia (USA). >Her PhD thesis, for which I was the advisor, was on this latter area. > 1990: Kathy Abbott: Robust Knowledge-based Diagnosis of Physical > Systems in Operation, PhD Thesis, Department of Computer Science, > Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 >I believe she has done further work in the area as well. Her thesis >should be available from University Microfilms or from the Rutgers >CS Department. Yes, further work in this area is continuing. Although Kathy is now our Branch Head and has been very busy lately with the High Speed Research program planning activities, our team leader, Paul Schutte, is about to begin running subjects in a simulation evaluation of many of the concepts that had their genesis in our Faultfinder program. Although he's on travel this week, he checks his email periodically so you can probably get a message through to him. Otherwise, he'll be back here at Langley next week. His email address is p.c.schutte@larc.nasa.gov. If you are beginning a research effort in this area, I highly recommend that you read Kathy's dissertation and some of the reports on other aspects of the Faultfinder project. Also, Kim Vicente at the University of Toronto has done some recent work in diagnosis/prediction, although it wasn't for aircraft engines (but it should still prove useful). I can't find his email address right now, but if you're interested just let me know and I'll dig it up. By the way, although we're called NASA Langley Research Center, we're really in Hampton, Virginia (instead of Langley, Virginia, where the CIA resides!). If you need more info (or pointers to info), please don't hesitate to contact me or Paul. --Mike Michael T. Palmer Human/Automation Integration Branch, Flight Management Division M/S 152, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681-0001 (804) 864-2044 Michael T. Palmer | "Freedom suppressed and then regained bites with m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov | keener fangs than freedom never endangered." RIPEM key on server | Cicero, 106-43 B.C. From kls Thu Sep 23 10:10:11 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Tobias Henry Lutterodt Subject: Indian Airlines A320s Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 23 Sep 93 10:10:11 PDT Does anyone know how extensive the structural modifications were which allowed the installation of the 4 wheel main landing gear? I know that wheel well size is a critical parameter at the beginning of an aircraft's development because it determines how much the aircraft can grow (in weight, length, etc.). Is Airbus paying a penalty on the majority of its A320's to allow Indian Airlines to fly with a special landing gear? Speaking of the A320, I flew on a number of A320's this summer and I found it to be a very smooth aircraft compared to the DC-9. Any comments? I talked to one captain and asked him about the joystick flight controls. Specifically I wondered if flying left-handed posed any problems, but he said no sweat. Any comments? Tobias Lutterodt '94 From kls Sat Sep 25 12:50:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: Differences between A320's References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 25 Sep 93 12:50:37 PDT In article babu@bigwpi.WPI.EDU (V. Gopalakrishnan) writes: >And then there are the A320s that Indian Airlines has (sorry, don't know the >official -2xx extension) which have four tyres on each of the main landing >gear, (supposedly in order to allow the plane to operate from rough airfields) >while all other versions of the plane I've seen only have two tyres on >each of the main gear. Actually, the double bogie gear are used to reduce the pavement loading. This is useful if one is operating out of older airports which were designed for propeller driven aircraft. The A320 (like nearly all commercial jetliners) has no rough field capability that I'm aware of. Double bogie gear are an option on the A320, and rarely ordered because of the weight penalty (I forget how much it is - something over a thousand pounds I think). -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense."