From kls Wed Apr 14 00:55:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: megazone@realsoon.WPI.EDU (MegaZone) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: WPI Discordian Society, Undocumented Cabal Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 00:55:52 PDT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >fact that similar? (Buran and the U.S. Space Shuttle are remarkably >similar in appearance but seem to be just as remarkably *different* in >detail.) I don't know, though it doesn't seem obvious to me. Even On this matter.... I talked to lecturer 2 years ago who had been to the major aerospace university near Moscow. They have the NASA wind-tunnel models of the shuttle there. They bought them off of NASA when NASA was finished with them. The basic design of the Buran is similar to the STS because the Russians used the data, and the models, NASA used. They let NASA do all of the basic research. ############################################################################### # I have one prejudice, and that is against stupidity. Use your mind, think! # #Email megazone@wpi.wpi.edu Moderator, WPI anime FTP site 130.215.24.1 /anime# ############################################################################### From kls Wed Apr 14 00:55:54 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 00:55:54 PDT In article Michael Weiss writes: > >I can't see too many pros, aside from the one that led designers to put the >engines on the tail in the first place, namely noise. While noise is *a* consideration, placing the engines in the tail area also simplifies airflow in and around the wings and the airplane aft of the wing; provides near-centerline thrust, which makes engine-out procedures simpler; permits a lower ground clearance, which can lead to savings in gear design and lessens the possibility of foreign object damage; and offers the possibility of larger nacelle/engine combinations to be used on a base design. I would suspect that cabin noise is more a secondary byproduct than a primary consideration, and, more importantly, I would also suspect that the external noise cone would be more bothersome with a higher-mounted engine than with a low-mounted engine. In the current political climate, the comfort of the neighborhoods surrounding airports are probably rated higher than the comfort of the passengers, when making such decisions. As a personal note, as a passenger, I find the "average" noise of wing- mounted engines to be much less irritating than the roar one gets sitting at the back of a DC-9 or, to a lesser degree, a 727. But it's all music to my ears. :-) --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Wed Apr 14 00:55:55 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 00:55:55 PDT Michael Weiss writes > >What are the pros and cons of putting engines in pairs like > >this on the tail, versus putting them under the wing (as on > >the 747)? > I see two major cons: > (...) > 2) Lack of double-redundancy in the engine pylons > > Let me elaborate on #2 ... > On the 747, if an engine pylon fails, you lose one engine. > If the pylon attaching an engine to the fuselage fails on the > Il-62, you lose TWO engines. True. But the mounts can be made to be quite resilient. I remember seeing a photograph of a VC-10 which had an uncontained engine failure on one of its _inboard_ engines. Yet the mounts held and the outboard engine kept going. -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Wed Apr 14 00:55:56 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jonathan@hermes.chpc.utexas.edu (Jonathan Thornburg) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: U of Texas at Austin / Physics Dept / Center for Relativity Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 00:55:56 PDT The previous articles in this thread have discussed various aspects of Soviet airliner design, and the relationships between contemporaneous western and soviet designs. I'd like to point out a fascinating book on the history of the Soviet Tupolev-144 supersonic transport: Howard Moon "Soviet SST: The Technopolitics of the Tupolev-144" Orion Books, New York, 1989 ISBN 0-517-56601-X - Jonathan Thornburg or [until 31/Aug/93] U of Texas at Austin / Physics Dept / Center for Relativity and [until ~Apr/93] U of British Columbia / {Astronomy,Physics} From kls Wed Apr 14 00:55:58 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: h andrew chuang Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 00:55:58 PDT Stefano Pagiola wrote: >If you had claimed that the L-1011 was Lockheed's version of the >DC-10, I would probably have chided you by E-Mail for sloppy I'm confused. I thought the L-1011 was designed before the DC-10. The L-1011 program was delayed only because Rolls Royce went bankrupt. >Swartz> The second point is that >Swartz> manufacturers are often working on the same set of requirements >Swartz> from the same set of airlines. This latter point is perhaps >Swartz> nowhere clearer than in the DC-10 and L-1011. > >To the extent that these points (different technology for fundamental >components such as engines and different requirements) are correct, >then it becomes all the more evident that any resemblance of soviet >designs to western designs is purely coincidental, since by the first >point they _could not_ have copied western designs, and by the second >would not have _wanted_ to. > I simply won't believe that there wasn't any "plagiarism" in the Soviet designs. I don't have any documented evidence, but the law of statistics tells me that there are way too many occurances to be coincidental. Having similar set of requirements does not mean the designs will be visually similar. For example, When the SST effort first started, the US airframers came out with different designs based on similar requirements. Other than being a bigger plane with the canards, the Tu-144 looked too much like the Concorde. (Shahid Siddiqi pointed out the Tu-144 flew before the Concorde, but that was only because the Soviet rushed through the process. Obviously, the rush resulted in the crash at the Paris Air Show. Does anyone know if Rolls' bankruptcy delayed the Concorde program, too?) Also, when the Air Force gave the aircraft manufacturers a same set of requirements for the ATF (Advanced Tactical Fighters), the two teams came up with two distinctive designs, the (Y)F22 and YF23; even the engines, (Y)F119 and YF120, were distinctively different. Throughout the cold war, there was no single Soviet-designed fighter that showed significant resemblance to a Western fighter. Do the Soviet and NATO nations have different combat requirements? Clearly not. Then, why does the resemblance only occurs in the commercial transport? Much of the information on the US and European commercial airplanes are readily available even at the preliminary stage (thanks to publications like Aviation Week, Flight International, etc., haven't most of you reading this newsgroup learned a lot about programs like the 7X7 and 7J7 from those magazines?), while preliminary information on military designs is harder to find unless espionage is involved. I do believe the Soviet designers did their own mechanical and aero designs, but "initial creativity" had to be very limited. Moreover, there is a very good reason (other than the national pride like flying the first commerical SST flight with the Tu-144) why the Soviet wanted to build airplanes that had similar specs as the Western planes: they wanted to make sure that the airlines in the Soviet-bloc nations would not buy Western planes. Correct me if I am wrong, JAT of Yugoslavia was the only Soviet-bloc airline that had bought American jets in the 70's. Unless you can show me hard evidences that there was no significant Western influence on many of the Soviet designs, I have as much right to say that the Soviet "plagiarized" as your right to say otherwise. Don't we all make our conclusions based on our perception? P.S. How about Dassult's Mercure 100C and the 737? -- --------------------------------------------------------------- | H. Andrew Chuang || Tel: (513) 774-5267 | | LEA || Fax: (513) 774-5171 | | GE Aircraft Engines || Email: chuang@hp659.crd.ge.com | --------------------------------------------------------------- personal opinions... not speaking for GE Aircraft Engines From kls Wed Apr 14 00:55:59 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jac@mentor.cc.purdue.edu (John Clear) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Purdue Daemons Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 00:55:59 PDT In article weiss@turing.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: > >I can't see too many pros, aside from the one that led designers to put the >engines on the tail in the first place, namely noise. You can keep the rest of >the airplane quieter by concentrating the noise to the rear. Nonetheless, the >advantage was not sufficient to keep the design for the 737, so I'm inclined to >believe that switching to turbofans (especially high-bypass turbofans) reduces >noise to the point that it's just not a big deal to have the engines on the >wings. Soviet aircraft arent designed with a high priority on passenger comfort, so cabin noise as the reason for engines on the tail is not that good a reason. I have had the oppertunity(misfortune?) of flying on the Soviet versions of the 727 and DC-9. I was warned before hand, and brought ear plugs, but even with ear plugs, the cabin noise was very painful. The quality of the aircraft was poor, but worse than expected. On boarding the 727 style plane, I looked down at the gear. The 2 main gear each contained 6 tires, but four of each six were balding, and a few had spots with no rubber left at all. On the side of the plane were outlines of cut-away areas, similiar to seen on military aircraft. The interior could have been that of an old tour bus. The over head bins were just open shelves. The seats were flimsy, and fell forward with just a slight touch. There was a loose piece of carpet, so I pulled it back. The floor of the plane was PLYWOOD. There also were no saftey features that are standard on most planes. There were no oxygen masks in case of cabin depressurization, and there didnt appear to be saftey slides. Needless to say, I slept for most of both flights so that if we did crash, it would be a quick and painless death. John -- John `SpaceCadet` Clear - jac@mentor.cc.purdue.edu, jac@panix.com Purdue Daemons Purdue Pilots, Inc. PP-ASEL C/LTC, CAP-NYW "Aviation is proof, that given the will, we have the capacity to achieve the impossible." -- Eddie Rickenbacker From kls Wed Apr 14 14:31:11 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM (Geoff Miller) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Reply-To: geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 14:31:11 PDT h andrew chuang writes: >I'm confused. I thought the L-1011 was designed before the DC-10. The >L-1011 program was delayed only because Rolls Royce went bankrupt. They were designed at about the same time; I remember following the development of both planes in Aviation Week when I was a kid. Interestingly, this class of airplane was generically known as the "airbus" originally due to its intended use primarily on short, high-density routes. I never see this mentioned in the enthusiast press, so it seems to have been largely forgotten now that the European consortium has long since co-opted the name. >Shahid Siddiqi pointed out the Tu-144 flew before the Concorde, but that >was only because the Soviet rushed through the process. Obviously, the >rush resulted in the crash at the Paris Air Show. Actually, it didn't. The development of the prototype may have been rushed, but the airplane that crashed at Paris was a very different, more highly evolved machine than the original Tu-144. According to what I've read, the most likely reason for the 1973 Paris crash was that the copilot, who was assisting with filming in the cockpit, lost his balance and fell onto the controls. >Does anyone know if Rolls' bankruptcy delayed the Concorde program, too? The Concorde's Olympus engine was developed by Bristol Siddely, not Rolls Royce; it's an evolution of the earlier Olympus version used on the Vulcan bomber. Bristol Siddely was later absorbed into Rolls Royce, but I believe that was after the engine's development was complete. Geoff -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Geoff Miller + + + + + + + + Sun Microsystems geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM + + + + + + + + Menlo Park, California -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- From kls Wed Apr 14 14:31:14 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 14:31:14 PDT h andrew chuang writes > I simply won't believe that there wasn't any > "plagiarism" in the Soviet designs. I don't have any > documented evidence, but the law of statistics tells me > that there are way too many occurances to be > coincidental. OK, lets list them. The Tu-134 looks like the BAC 111, DC-9, and Caravelle; the Tu-154 looks like the 727 and HS-121 Trident; the Il-62 looks like the VC-10, and the Tu-144 looks like the Concorde. I suppose one could add that the An-24/26 look like the F27. Of course, the Tu-134 and Tu-154 both have negative dihedral on the wings, which none of their Western counterparts have (can any of the engineers out there tell us why this feature might have been adopted?). The Tu-144 has a cranked delta wing compared to Concorde's ogival delta; the initial Tu-144 designs also had their engines grouped together under the fuselage rather than out on the wings as on Concorde. Details, details. I was chided by one person for saying that the 767 was similar to the A300 because of, among other things, the difference in fuselage width. Has anybody compared the widths of the Tu-134 and the DC-9? (Hint: you can only seat four abreast, even at Aeroflot comfort levels, in the Tu-134). You'll notice that saying that the Tu-134 looks like the BAC 111, DC-9, and Caravelle also means that the BAC 111, DC-9, and Caravelle look like each other (we should probably add the F28 to this list, too). Were the 111 and DC-9 `plagiarized versions' of the Caravelle? Some people thought so (or found it useful to argue so): in the early 1960s, when BAC started producing the 111 and Douglas the DC-9, Sud-Est, manufacturers of the Caravelle, ran a series of ads showing two astonished kids reading an aviation magazine and saying "Look! They've copied Caravelle!" Knowing what we know of BAC and Douglas, do we think this statement is correct? > Having similar set of requirements does > not mean the designs will be visually similar. For > example, When the SST effort first started, the US > airframers came out with different designs based on > similar requirements. True. But Lockheed's design, for one, looked a heck of a lot like Concorde and Tu-144. And in fact all SST designs looked extremely similar in profile view. In plan view, they do not, because of different choices on wing geometry. But that is equally true of the Tu-144 (the only cranked delta in the set, if memory serves). > Other than being a bigger plane > with the canards, the Tu-144 looked too much like the > Concorde. As pointed out above, this is simply not true except for very general appearance. The wing planform is different. The engine placement is different. > (Shahid Siddiqi pointed out the Tu-144 flew > before the Concorde, but that was only because the Soviet > rushed through the process. ... Does anyone > know if Rolls' bankruptcy delayed the Concorde program, > too?) Rolls' bankruptcy didn't help, but the main reason Concorde was delayed was continual bickering between France and England, including several attempted cancellations of the whole thing. > Also, when the Air Force gave the aircraft manufacturers > a same set of requirements for the ATF (Advanced Tactical > Fighters), the two teams came up with two distinctive > designs, the (Y)F22 and YF23; even the engines, (Y)F119 > and YF120, were distinctively different. The point is not that identical requirements lead to identical designs, but that they CAN do so. Compare the DC-10 and L-1011. Compare the A330 and 777. Given similar requirements and a finite set of possible configurations that will meet those requirements, why are we surprised that designs look similar? Short-haul jets need at least two engines. These can be placed in pods on the wing (under or over it), embedded in the wing roots, or on the aft fuselage. Boeing, Dassault, and Airbus chose the pod-under-the-wing configuration for the 737, Mercure, and A320 (as did Douglas and Fokker for various design studies). VFW placed them in pods over the wing on the VFW-614. De Havilland had them in the wing roots on the Comet, as did Tupolev on its Tu-104 and Tu-124. Sud-Est, BAC, Douglas, Fokker, and Tupolev chose the aft-fuselage position. Both the pod-under-the-wing and the aft-fuselage arrangement have been spectacular failures (Mercure: 11 built) and great sucesses (737: going on 2,500; DC-9/MD-80: over 2,000). So neither is obviously `wrong'. Why are we surprised that some Soviet designs can be found in some of these groups? Considering that Soviet designs often put a premium on rough-field performance, are we surprised they didn't adopt pod-under-the-wing designs? Why is the Tupolev the only one of 5 manufacturers of airliners with engines on the aft fuselage accused of plagiarism? > Then, why does the resemblance only occurs in > the commercial transport? I've heard many people describe the MiG-29 as a `virtual copy' of the F/A-18. Tom Clancy, for example, uses those very words. I would disagree with him on the same grounds that I'm advancing here for commercial aircraft, though, unless evidence other than external similarity is presented. > Moreover, there is a very good reason (other than the national > pride like flying the first commerical SST flight with the > Tu-144) why the Soviet wanted to build airplanes that had > similar specs as the Western planes: they wanted to make sure > that the airlines in the Soviet-bloc nations would not buy > Western planes. First I fail to see how a cosmetic similarity to Western designs have this desired effect in the face of substantial performance differences. Second, compared to Aeroflot, the Eastern Bloc countries were a negligible market for Soviet-produced airliners anyway. Poland's LOT had, what, 10 Tu-134s? Compared to several hundred in Aeroflot service. > Correct me if I am wrong, JAT of Yugoslavia was the > only Soviet-bloc airline that had bought American jets in the 70's. Actually, you are wrong. Romania's TAROM had 707s (as well as BAC 111s). Earlier, LOT flew Viscounts and CV-240s. If you count China, they've used Viscounts and Tridents for a long time, and 707s and then 747s since the early '70s, alongside their Tupolevs and Ilyuschins. In any case, I would submit that soviet bloc airline purchasing decisions were more likely driven by politics than marketing considerations. Witness the rush by ex-Soviet bloc airlines to buy Western aircraft once the Soviet-bloc collapsed. > Unless you can show me hard evidences that there was no significant > Western influence on many of the Soviet designs, I have as much > right to say that the Soviet "plagiarized" as your right to say > otherwise. Don't we all make our conclusions based on our > perception? Was there influence in the sense that Western designs showed that this or that configuration `worked?' Sure. But then, one can equally say that Airbus showed that the large twin worked (there was a LOT of skepticism about that configuration when it first came out), which probably influenced Boeing in pursuing that approach for the 757 and 777. Ditto with the Caravelle and other aft-fuselage designs. I would submit that the best evidence that there was in fact little copying is provided by the Tu-134 and Tu-154. Take the Tu-134, blow it up by about 30% in all dimensions, add a third engine in the tail, and you have a Tu-154. General appearance (that distinctive Tupolev nose and those downturned wings), wing geometry, etc, are all the same. That Tupolev took an existing design and expanded it to make a new, larger one (and had to add a third engine to get the necessary thrust) is much easier for me to believe than that they first copied the DC-9, and then sat down and decided to copy the 727 for their next project. Sure, the Trident and 727 would have told them that an S-duct for the third engine could be designed. Heck, maybe they even copied the technology for that particular piece of the aircraft (although I doubt that simply lifting a 727's S-duct and pasting it onto a Tu-134 would have worked). But that doesn't make the Tu-154 a copy of either. -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Wed Apr 14 14:31:19 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft (and administrative note on followups) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 14:31:19 PDT Stefano Pagiola writes: >OK, lets list them. The Tu-134 looks like the BAC 111, DC-9, and >Caravelle; the Tu-154 looks like the 727 and HS-121 Trident; the >Il-62 looks like the VC-10, and the Tu-144 looks like the Concorde. >I suppose one could add that the An-24/26 look like the F27. Stefano, I believe you're blowing this rather far out of proportion. I've not seen anyone claim that a Tu-134 is a copy of a BAC 111 or a DC-9, except you. This started off with a discussion of the Il-62 and VC-10, which *are* remarkably similar aircraft in many regards. This may or may not mean that one is a copy of the other, but there is some evidence that the Soviets have borrowed heavily from the west (the article on Buran being based on purchased NASA models, for example) and it is plausible in the Il-62/VC-10 case. >The Tu-144 has a cranked delta wing compared to Concorde's ogival >delta; the initial Tu-144 designs also had their engines grouped >together under the fuselage rather than out on the wings as on >Concorde. Details, details. These are interesting and useful comments to support your view that the Soviets aren't simply quick copy artists. However, introducing an absurd case (as I view the Tu-134) is not a valid argument. Arg- umentum ad absurdum, if I recall my philosophy classes rightly. [ Further comments on this thread will be rejected unless they are predominantly technical in content with substantial evidence. I've let this go on as I think there are some interesting questions, but it's degenerating quite rapidly and I'd like to get the discussion on a more informative track. ] -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed Apr 14 14:31:22 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: United A320s cancelled? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 14 Apr 93 14:31:22 PDT I just heard a rumor of a rumor that the United A320 deal has gone by the wayside. Seems reasonable, given all of the recent cancellations and deferrals of Boeing planes by United, but this was the first I'd heard of even talks with Airbus. Anybody have any details before I break out the champagne? :-) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Fri Apr 16 00:31:42 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 16 Apr 93 00:31:42 PDT > First of all, I have to reiterate that I do believe the > Soviet designed their own planes but there was a lack of > initial creativity. True, there aren't that many > configurations available, but WHY DID THEIR DESIGNS > ALWAYS APPEARED AROUND OR AFTER THE SAME TIME FRAME AS > THIER WESTERN COUNTERPARTS FIRST CAME OUT? Therefore, I > think that they borrowed some Western ideas and designed > their own planes that's why theirs differ in many ways > from the Western counterpart if you look into the > details; I have never implied that they "copied" > everything. I admit that "plagiarize" is a strong word, > but I strongly believe that their designs had > significant Western influence. At this point, it sounds like we disagree only in emphasis. I certainly wouldn't disagree that Soviet designers have been influenced by Western designs, just as Western manufacturers have been influenced by other Western manufacturers. We can disagree on exactly how much `influence' there was. Ciao, Stefano --- Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Fri Apr 16 00:38:34 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,sci.aeronautics Path: bounce-back From: "Hayes Press" Subject: Engine Displays Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 16 Apr 93 00:38:34 PDT I am conducting research into the use of vertical tape engine displays in commercial aviation. I would appreciate some help in identifying all aircraft that use such displays and any possible sources of photographs for these cockpits. Displays based on CRT, LCD, LED or analog technologies are all of interest. I would appreciate knowing the orientation of the displays in the instrument panel (side-by-side or top-to-bottom), as well. An example of one case that I do know about is the 747-400 that has its tape displays in the top-to-bottom configuration. From kls Tue Apr 20 15:28:57 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Robert Dorsett Subject: Re: 727 lineage (Re: Soviet Aircraft) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 Apr 93 15:28:57 PDT > They needed an airplane which [among other things] would have >> a higher dispatch reliability in the (then) regulatory environment >> .... Three engines were used to ensure the dispatch requirement. > >Please explain further! If you lose an engine on a twin, you have to land back at the original airport immediately. Minima at that time were fairly restrictive: no Cat II approaches or anything like that. So all twins were stuck when weather went down to 500'/1 mile. In a trijet, though, an engine failure is more of an inconvenience than an emergency. So the rules had more lenient minima (200'/1 mile); the airplane could turn back and land when it got that bad, or even comfor- tably proceed to an alternate. In real terms, trijets would have been about three times more reliable, an important factor for an airline trying to keep its own schedules straight. The rules were changed: twins got more reliable (A320 has Cat IIIA capability out of the box), etc., so it's pretty much an obsolete argument. But a real one in the late 50's/early 60's. -- Robert Dorsett Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd From kls Tue Apr 20 15:29:01 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Soviet Aircraft (FINAL note) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 Apr 93 15:29:01 PDT Karl is right that without additional evidence, there is little more to be said on this topic, but since I was accused of `blowing things out of proportion' by making a comparison between the Tu-134 and the DC-9, perhaps I may be permitted a final piece of evidence. Here's a quote from _Flight International_'s Commercial Aircraft Survey (21 Nov. 1968): "The Tu-134 is the Soviet Union's short-range, medium-capacity jet. It is copied from the BAC One-Eleven and the Douglas DC-9." The survey also describes the Tu-144 as "Tupolev's copy of the Anglo-French Concorde." It is this broader perception of plagiarism that I was writing about, rather than just to specific comments made in this group, although the same perception was implicit in several of the posts (including the original one that started the thread). For example, one poster spoke of > ... flying on the Soviet versions of the 727 and DC-9 ... While the discussion has not been conclusive, I believe it has been interesting. Many nuances of the process whereby airline designs evolve were brought out, and I for one have an increased understanding of that process. Since all manufacturers draw from similar technological `cookbooks' and often need to meet similar requirements, it is not surprising that similar designs may emerge. But clearly, the choices made as to what particular `recipes' to use may well be influenced by the choices made by other manufacturers. In the case of Soviet designs and in cases such as the Trident/727 controversy, the distinction between `influence' and `copying' may ultimately be more a semantic than a real difference. I would only urge that the same standards be applied in making that judgement whoever the manufacturers involved might be. Ciao, Stefano --- Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Tue Apr 20 15:29:03 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: A300 still in production Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 Apr 93 15:29:03 PDT A few days ago, there was some discussion as to whether the Airbus A300-600 was still in production. Airbus has just announced the sale of 12 A300-600Rs (6 to China Northern and 6 to China Northwest) so it would appear that the answer is yes. And of course, lets not forget FedEx's outstanding order for (I believe) 30 -600Fs. Ciao, Stefano --- Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Tue Apr 20 15:29:07 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: h andrew chuang Subject: 737-X Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 Apr 93 15:29:07 PDT Boeing is currently holding talks with SAS and Finnair for possible replacement of their MD fleet with mostly the 737-X (4/14, Wall Street Journal). This is an important sales for Boeing because it will affect future purchases by Swissair, Austrian, and KLM which are talking about merging into one operation. This will help Boeing to gain a respectable share of the European regional market, unfortunately, at the expense of another American manufacturer. SAS, Finnair, and Swissair probably have been the most loyal MD operators outside the US. On the engine side, GE and Snecma are currently developing an advanced CFM56-3, originally designated as -6, for the 737-X. Does anyone know if Boeing and IAE are seriously considering offer a V2500-powered 737? If so, are there any airlines interested in one? (I doubt if there is any major one.) -- --------------------------------------------------------------- | H. Andrew Chuang || Tel: (513) 774-5267 | | LEA || Fax: (513) 774-5171 | | GE Aircraft Engines || Email: chuang@hp659.crd.ge.com | --------------------------------------------------------------- Personal opinions... not speaking for GE Aircraft Engines From kls Tue Apr 20 15:29:09 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: h andrew chuang Subject: A330-400X Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 Apr 93 15:29:09 PDT I heard a rumor that Airbus has scratched the A330-400X program, and A330 will now be targeting the A300 market (does that mean the A300 will soon be history?). I am a little skeptical about the rumor because it is from within GE, and GE does not want to see Airbus stretching the A330 because GE does not have an engine for the growth version. The plan for a higher thrust CF6-80E was cancelled last year (because it would have almost the same thrust as the derated GE90), and GE90 is, to the best of my knowledge, physically too big for the A330. If the rumor is true that means no one will be really competing with the 777. Maybe Boeing should return the favor by getting out of the 767-300 market. :-) I was also told that this year's Paris Air Show, there will a -80E-powered A330. -- --------------------------------------------------------------- | H. Andrew Chuang || Tel: (513) 774-5267 | | LEA || Fax: (513) 774-5171 | | GE Aircraft Engines || Email: chuang@hp659.crd.ge.com | --------------------------------------------------------------- Personal opinions... not speaking for GE Aircraft Engines From kls Tue Apr 20 15:29:10 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: sharpes@c-17igp.wpafb.af.mil (Civ Daniel G. Sharpes) Subject: Stall Warning Systems on Commercial Aircraft Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 Apr 93 15:29:10 PDT I'd like to get some info on how the stall warning systems on various commercial big airplanes (and the biz-jets, too) work. What sort of anticipation is included? How often do nuisance warnings occur? How were nuisance warnings eliminated? Do the systems key on velocity and aircraft configuration or do they track alpha? Thanks! Dan Sharpes From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:41 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: geoff@hawkesbury.uws.edu.au (Geoff Russell) Subject: Re: Soviet Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:41 PDT In article spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) writes: stuff deleted.... >> configurations available, but WHY DID THEIR DESIGNS >> ALWAYS APPEARED AROUND OR AFTER THE SAME TIME FRAME AS >> THIER WESTERN COUNTERPARTS FIRST CAME OUT? Therefore, I >> think that they borrowed some Western ideas and designed >> their own planes that's why theirs differ in many ways >> from the Western counterpart if you look into the >> details; I have never implied that they "copied" >> everything. I admit that "plagiarize" is a strong word, >> but I strongly believe that their designs had >> significant Western influence. I have read of the case of the Soviet designers obtaining three B-29's during World War 2 and,presto, they appeared in large numbers as a Tupolev something-or-other (I must look up the article - it was in Flypast magazine, I think). The copy was so good that the Tupolev's even had a patch each which was identical to a repair made on one of the B29's. Now before you flame me, I know these are not airliners. I believe these details are relevant to the current thread, though. From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:42 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright) Subject: Re: Stall Warning Systems on Commercial Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:42 PDT In article sharpes@c-17igp.wpafb.af.mil (Civ Daniel G. Sharpes) writes: > I'd like to get some info on how the stall warning systems on various >commercial big airplanes (and the biz-jets, too) work. What sort of >anticipation is included? How often do nuisance warnings occur? How >were nuisance warnings eliminated? Do the systems key on velocity and >aircraft configuration or do they track alpha? Alpha vane and configuration are the main trips for the stick shaker. For each configuration the plane could be in there is an assorciated trip vane angle that the stall warning computer uses to activate the stick shaker. On the newer stall warning computers, mach effect on CL is taken into account to help reduce the needed built in conservatism. There are several smaller issues having to do with stick shaker such as taking into account pitch rate effects on the vane angle but Alpha vane and the current plane configuration are the two biggies. -- ________Greg Wright____________ High Lift Development | gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com | 747/767 Aerodynamics | gregory@halcyon.com | |____uunet!bcstec!gregory_______| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON. From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:44 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: mmr47784@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Mark Rogers ) Subject: Re: 727 lineage (Re: Soviet Aircraft) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:44 PDT Robert Dorsett writes: >If you lose an engine on a twin, you have to land back at the original >airport immediately. Minima at that time were fairly restrictive: no >Cat II approaches or anything like that. So all twins were stuck when >weather went down to 500'/1 mile. >In a trijet, though, an engine failure is more of an inconvenience than >an emergency. So the rules had more lenient minima (200'/1 mile); the >airplane could turn back and land when it got that bad, or even comfor- >tably proceed to an alternate. >The rules were changed: twins got more reliable (A320 has Cat IIIA capability >out of the box), etc., so it's pretty much an obsolete argument. But >a real one in the late 50's/early 60's. I find this very interesting- Unfortunately I don't have any references for what the rules used to be.... but FAR 121.617 says: "...no person may dispatch or release an aircraft from that airport unless the dispatch... specifies an alternate airport located within the following distances from the airport of takeoff: (1) Aircraft having two engines: Not more than one hour from the departure airport at normal cruising speed.... (2) Aircraft having three engines: not more than two hours from the departure airport....." You do say that the rules were changed... but from how I understood your posting, it was because twins had to immediately land at their departure airport, so the weather had to be better-- but now that we have Cat III, they can land at the departure airport.... I was just wondering if this is truly the reason the rules got changed (?) Also, I don't really understand the logic behind the different minima for twin vs. trijet operations. Why should trijet minima be 200/1, when they don't have any more of a chance to sucessfully complete the approach than a twin (or single, etc.)? What would make sense is that they would be allowed to cruise longer in order to find a suitable alternate- which is what current regulations allow. Even a twin on one engine can go a long way in an hour. I also haven't heard of any different minima for an alternate than 600/2 (precision approach)... I thought even if you have Cat II (or III), you have to have an alternate if the weather is below (2000/3 +- 1 hour rule). I guess my questions are: Does it really make sense for different minima for twin vs. trijet? and Have the rules changed because of better weather capability of twins (ie. Cat III), or have they changed because a twin can now cruise to a new destination much more reliably? --Thanks for your help :) Mark From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:46 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ngupta@mtl.mit.edu (Nitin Gupta) Subject: Costs of operating an airliner/Mileage Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Massachvsetts Institvte of Technology Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:46 PDT My advisor and I were talking about aviation because he flies a lot and I wish I did :-), and he gave a stat Lufthansa published that the optimal "mileage" that a fully loaded 747 can attain is 80 miles/gallon/person. Is this a reasonable number? Also, take a 767 BOS-SFO flight. Assuming a packed flight, how much does it cost to operate, including fuel, cost of the plane, pilots, staff, landing fees, peanuts, etc. Therefore, how much does the company need in total airfare to break even. How much does this come out to per person. Is 80 miles/gallon/person a reasonable "mileage". We were basically wondering how the airlines make money. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Nitin Gupta MIT Submicron Structures Laboratory ngupta@mtl.mit.edu NeXT Mail Encouraged 617 253 0721 --------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:48 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) Subject: Need info on the MD-11 pitch incident over Aleutians Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:48 PDT Hi. I'm looking for more information on the MD-11 that apparently underwent an uncommanded pitch which resulted in a passenger being killed (got this from the ata-watchers mailing list). I somehow missed this in the news, but I'd like to get the airline and flight number, date, altitude, etc. and references to articles in aviation magazines that I can look up. Also, any information on whether this was a simple hardware problem (short, malfunction), a goof on the part of the flight crew (grabbed slat handle by mistake while getting out of the seat), or a human/machine interface type of problem (FMS/MCP interaction or autoflight mode misunderstanding). Any info appreciated... either posted or emailed. Michael T. Palmer | "A man is crazy who writes a secret in any m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov | other way than one which will conceal it RIPEM key on server | from the vulgar." - Roger Bacon, 1220-1292 From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:49 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: eeyore@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Mark Anthony Brown;E200) Subject: Re: Stall Warning Systems on Commercial Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Computer Science Dept, QMW, University of London Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:49 PDT In sharpes@c-17igp.wpafb.af.mil (Civ Daniel G. Sharpes) writes: > I'd like to get some info on how the stall warning systems on various >commercial big airplanes (and the biz-jets, too) work. What sort of >anticipation is included? How often do nuisance warnings occur? How >were nuisance warnings eliminated? Do the systems key on velocity and >aircraft configuration or do they track alpha? Don't claim to be an expert, but I think some at least use angle of attack sensing vanes (some made by Rosemount, probably, if you want data from a manufacturer), usually times two (one mounted each side of fuselage). A recent crash (TriStar?) was attributed to a stuck angle of attack vane causing premature stick shaker at rotate - the a/c landed back on almost immediately grossly over max. landing weight and cracked the main spar. All survived, fortunately. You also get some stall warning through airframe buffet; its designed that way. The alpha at which the stall warning is tripped would almost certainly be modified by configuration sensing (flap & u/c settings). The Panavia Tornado spin prevention and incidence limiting system has dual alpha sensing vanes; this is supposed to prevent departure (inc. stalls) by limiting control authority of the command/stability augmentation system. This has caused some fun and games with pilots running out of control authority in manoeuvres if they didn't predict what the system would do, but you can disengage the SPILS. On an early Avro Jetsteam I had stick-pusher operation demonstrated to me. There were two audible warnings from separate sensors, (port & starboard), followed by stick shake & finally stick push. I don't know if both sensors have to show high alpha before stick shake. The Jetstream has a stick pusher due to the tailplane configuration; it may cause deep-stall with the elevators in the turbulent flow off the stalled wings (so no pitch control and you follow it all the way down). Stick pusher was I believe removed from the F-104G which spent a lot of time at low levels (F-104 is a T-tail and hence also prone to deep stall). If you're hacking along on the deck, the last thing you want is for the stick pusher to operate ruining your day. Hope this is of some use, and not too apocraphal (or at least wildly inaccurate).. Mark. From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:49 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: eeyore@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Mark Anthony Brown;E200) Subject: Re: Stall Warning Systems on Commercial Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Computer Science Dept, QMW, University of London Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:49 PDT Oops, forgot a reference. There's a description of the stall warning system of a VC-10 in a book called (I think) "Handling [Flying?] the Big Jets" - I believe its a UK CAA publication, but may enjoy wider circulation, if you can get hold of it. Can't remember the author offhand. Mark. From kls Sat Apr 24 09:28:51 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: spare engine under wing Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 24 Apr 93 09:28:51 PDT A while back there was a discussion of hanging a spare engine under the wing on the 747, amongst other types. Apparently they still do this, on regular flights -- last night I was at SFO and watched as a United 747-122 (N4728U) was pushed back from gate 84. Something looked a bit odd about the #2 engine so I walked down a bit to get a better vantage. I was quite surprised to see that #2 was just fine, but that what I had seen was a spare mounted inboard of #2, about midway between the #2 pylon and fuselage. It appeared to have a small plug in the front, with a fairing on the back of the central exhaust -- the fan seemed to be open. The engine, a JT9D, was mounted on a partial pylon with the front of the nacelle roughly equal with that of #2. I'm not sure where the aircraft had come *from* other than that it had been a domestic flight. Most likely would be Hawaii though it might have been from Miami/South America via Chicago. (United has other domestic 747 arrivals at SFO, but not near the right time.) Destination was clear -- it was promptly towed around to one of the maitenance areas where scaffolding was quickly erected around the spare. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Fri Apr 30 02:23:22 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: United A320s References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:23:22 PDT Last week Karl asked if anyone knew anything about United cancelling their A320 order. Well, the news just came over the wires that the order has been deferred. According to the wire, delivery on 14 of 29 A320s on order will be delayed from 1995-96 to 1997-98. I's not clear from the wire whether this represents a deferment of the entire order or a stretching out of deliveries (ie, what about the other 15 aircraft?). United will also accelerate retirement of other planes in its fleet. At least five McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10s, four Boeing 747SPs, and 10 Boeing 727-200 Advanced jets will be retired by the end of next year -- in addition to 44 planes United previously said it will retire this year (mostly 737-200s). Earlier this month, United reached agreement with Boeing to convert orders for 49 planes scheduled for delivery between 1993 to 1996 into options, with possible delivery in the 1996-1999 period. Ciao, Stefano --- Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Fri Apr 30 02:23:23 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Costs of operating an airliner/Mileage References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:23:23 PDT In article you write: >My advisor and I were talking about aviation because he flies a lot and I >wish I did :-), and he gave a stat Lufthansa published that the optimal >"mileage" that a fully loaded 747 can attain is 80 miles/gallon/person. Is >this a reasonable number? > >Also, take a 767 BOS-SFO flight. Assuming a packed flight, how much does >it cost to operate, including fuel, cost of the plane, pilots, staff, >landing fees, peanuts, etc. Therefore, how much does the company need in >total airfare to break even. How much does this come out to per person. Is >80 miles/gallon/person a reasonable "mileage". Rather than speculate, Aviation Week & Space Technology carries a regular column totalling various airline direct operating costs. The World Aviation Directory also has a similar section. Both of these should be more than adequate for you to form your own conclusions. There is, however, no easy answer: the total is a function of fuel burn, other tangibles (oil, hydraulic fluid, etc), passenger-service items, and crew costs. The two major hidden costs are the quality of maintenance the airline has access to, and the type of financing the airplane was purchased under. A heavily leveraged airline may make an airplane profitable, whereas a poorer one might not--and a government-sponsored or supported airline can often just wipe the books clear and proceed on a direct-operating and maintenance costs basis. (ala Concorde) Even having access to case-instance data may not help: AvLeak listed the per-hour operating costs for Pan Am 747 at about $6K a few years ago, whereas the next runner-up was about $3.5K. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Fri Apr 30 02:23:25 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Stall Warning Systems on Commercial Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:23:25 PDT In article you write: > Alpha vane and configuration are the main trips for the stick >shaker. I brought this up with a 727 maintenance-type two nights ago: he indicated that the system in use relied on both an angle of attack sensor and an input from the air data computer. I'm not clear on how the two inputs are handled. The AOA sensor is normally heated to avoid icing problems. Mark Anthony Brown wrote: >You also get some stall warning through airframe buffet; its designed that >way. Possibly. The relevant regulation is 25.207; it suggests that airframe buffet may be used to satisfy the requirement, but on many airplanes, there is insufficient buffet; hence the use of stick shakers. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Fri Apr 30 02:23:26 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: 727 lineage (Re: Soviet Aircraft) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:23:26 PDT In article you write: > I find this very interesting- Unfortunately I don't have any references >for what the rules used to be.... but FAR 121.617 says: Just keep in mind that we're talking about rules that were formed over thirty years ago. Higher minima in the case of a twin sounds to me like the rules were designed for two-man cockpits, which might be expected to have higher workload (especially in a prop); in addition, jet engines of the time weren't terribly widely propagated or well-understood, and they did tend to break or need to be shut down, during the early learning curve. No doubt the airlines and the regulatory authorities got over this, and, by the late 60's/early 70's, viewed twins as capable airplanes. > Also, I don't really understand the logic behind the different minima >for twin vs. trijet operations. Why should trijet minima be 200/1, when they >don't have any more of a chance to sucessfully complete the approach than a >twin (or single, etc.)? What would make sense is that they would be allowed >to cruise longer in order to find a suitable alternate- which is what current >regulations allow. Even a twin on one engine can go a long way in an hour. On my first take, I read the comments as a "diversion to minima" requirement as well, but I think in both cases, it's a "what if" contingency: what if the airplane has to land at the departure airport? If it is simply verboten to land a twin in low minima, then that should be the center of debate... > I guess my questions are: Does it really make sense for different minima >for twin vs. trijet? and Have the rules changed because of better weather >capability of twins (ie. Cat III), or have they changed because a twin can >now cruise to a new destination much more reliably? I would speculate that it was a workload requirement, that the rules were designed for both props and jets, and that the reliability of jet engines was still a question mark. I know there's at least one Olde Farte reading the group; perhaps he'd care to comment. :-) --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Fri Apr 30 02:23:28 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: newburry@chaph.usc.edu (Keith Newburry) Subject: MD-11 incident over Alaska References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:23:28 PDT A previous post had inquired about the MD-11 turbulence incident over alaska. The following is pure rumor and is not from any official agency. I heard the account from a friend who works with a big aerospace company: 1. The pilot was sleeping, possibly without his seatbelt fastened. 2. The plane was on auto-pilot 3. The copilot, who was supposed to be minding the store, fell asleep. 4. The plane hit some turbulence, and the auto pilot disengaged. 5. With both pilots asleep, the plane went into a roll/dive 6. By the time the pilots had discontinued their slumber and brought the plane under control, several passengers had been bounced around the cabin.......causing seats to come loose and severe injuries. Disclaimer: this is rumor! We wont know the official (real) story until the FAA report is released. I dont know if the above account is an accurate description of what really happened! From kls Fri Apr 30 02:23:32 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.arts.books,rec.aviation.products Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Non-review: _The Boeing 747_ Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:23:32 PDT Title: The Boeing 747 Author: David H. Minton Publisher: TAB, 1991 Cost: $10.95 Length: 114 pp, illustrated (B/W). Impression: Overview of the historical development of the 747. Nothing particularly profound. Technical stuff is Janes-ey, nothing detailed. The fleet listings are thorough. Contents: In the beginning Bigger and Better First Orders First Flight In Development Two basic versions Big Top and Megatop Putting th Custom in Customer Milestones in Boeing 747 Development In Detail Engines Landing Features Electronics Production Problems The Future In Uniform United States Air Force Iranian Air Force NASA Air Force One Other Uniforms In the News Setting Records Crashes and Smashes Tenerife Terrorism Lockerbie Rocket Attack Tokyo Aging Aircraft The Future In Scale 1/200 Scale 1/144 Scale 1/156 Scale 1/125 Scale 1/100 Scale Conversions Decals Appendix: Boeing 747 Fleet Listing Index From kls Fri Apr 30 02:23:34 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Non-review: _How to Fly a 747_ Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:23:34 PDT Title: How to Fly a 747 Author: Tim Paulson Publisher: John Muir Publications, 1992 Length: 45 pp, illustrated (color). Cost: $9.95 Impression: Children's book. Covers various major systems, operational philosophies, design and construction issues, etc. Surprisingly good; with the dearth of good children's aviation books on the market, this is a good buy. Only a few errors (semantic arising from over-simplification). Concentrates on 747-400. Attractive graphics. Targeted at 8-year- olds and older, but it would be a good introduction to the technology for adults as well. No table of contents, but the index covers: accelerometer ailerons angle of attack attitude autopilot barometric altitude cockpit controls Cockpit Voice Recorder control surfaces dead dog switch drag Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) elevators flaps flight simulator fuselage glide path glide slope hydraulics Inertial Reference System (IRS) jet engine knot landing lift Mach number nautical mile pitch pitot tube Primary Flight Display principles of flight redundancy relative wind roll rudder size of a 747 speed of sound spoilers statute mile taking off thrust reversers transponder turning a 747 yaw From kls Fri Apr 30 02:37:37 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: reb@ingres.com (Phydeaux) Subject: 747 Autpilot problem Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 02:37:37 PDT Reply-To: reb@Ingres.COM Organization: E 4th St Home For The Overeducated Underemployed - New Jersey Div. Today's Wall Street Journal (4/26/93) has a front page article on a problem with 747 autopilots. The problem has to do with the autopilot banking the plane to one side. Apparantly last year an Evergreen International 747 on a cargo flight with its autopilot set on slowly banked to the right 90 degrees. It dropped from 31000ft to 19000 feet and then made an emergency landing. This is the 30th such roll incident according to the FAA. The incidents included both fast and slow rolls. Engineers apparantly can't agree on where the problem lies. Boeing sayspilots should pay closer attention to their job, while It's an interesting article. I'd be happy to fax it off or send a .GIF file of it to someone with OCR software so it can be posted. reb PS: This is a problem with the autopilots on all but the -400 series 747s. The -400s use a different autopilot. From kls Fri Apr 30 10:23:38 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Special Conditions for A340 released Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 30 Apr 93 10:23:38 PDT The FAA finally got around to releasing its final set of certification requirements for the A340. They are published in the Federal Register, 56:71, of April 15, 1993, pp. 19553-19571. These are an official addendum to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Aviation Regulations Parts 21 and 25. The A340 has to pass through these hoops before it can be certificated in the United States, despite the fact that the European joint airworthiness authority certified it last December. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Sun May 2 12:24:24 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Don Webster <71352.340@CompuServe.COM> Subject: Re: spare engine under wing Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 02 May 93 12:24:24 PDT >I was quite surprised to see that #2 was just >fine, but that what I had seen was a spare mounted inboard of #2, >about midway between the #2 pylon and fuselage. Fifth Pod ferrying of 747 engines is still the most efficient way of getting them moved from place to place. I can give you a few constraints involved. Max speed: 290 KIAS Max altitude: 35,200 Max takeoff gross: reduced approximately 30,000 depending on model of 747. Land speeds are increased about six knots. I can't give you the fuel burn penalty, but would guess it to be around 15-20%. The cover in the engine cowl is described as an ice deflector. A tail plug, probably for streamlining, is installed. Don Webster 71352.340@compuserve.com From kls Sun May 2 12:24:27 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson) Subject: Re: Special Conditions for A340 released References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: John Fluke Mfg. Co., Inc., Everett, WA Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 02 May 93 12:24:27 PDT In article rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes: >The FAA finally got around to releasing its final set of certification >requirements for the A340. They are published in the Federal Register, >56:71, of April 15, 1993, pp. 19553-19571. > >These are an official addendum to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, >Federal Aviation Regulations Parts 21 and 25. The A340 has to pass through >these hoops before it can be certificated in the United States, despite the >fact that the European joint airworthiness authority certified it last >December. > >Robert Dorsett >rdd@cactus.org >...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd This sounds to me like an excellent argument in favor of an international certification board. All participating countries would agree that certification by this body would be acceptable within their borders. The US could have a team maybe 1/10 the size of the one the FAA uses, and the whole job could be done MUCH more efficiently. To certify a new plane, all the members would convene in the country the plane is being produced in, and if something was seriously awry making the plane unworthy in any given country, the nit would not be certified. 100% agreement shouldn't be too large a margin of safety, should it? Only after all countries agree that the plane can fly, can it fly. This has the benefit that it pressures the FAA to do it's job rather than the old paper shuffle. -- Gary Benson -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-inc@sisu.fluke.com_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- Meta-disclaimer: Any society that needs disclaimers has too many lawyers. -Eric Pepke From kls Sun May 2 12:24:28 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jhendric@bu.edu (James Hendrickson) Subject: request for 777 specs Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 02 May 93 12:24:28 PDT Does anybody know any specs for the Boeing 777? Please post or email. Jim From kls Mon May 3 11:00:05 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ak336@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (John Dill) Subject: Len Morgan Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:05 PDT Reply-To: ak336@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (John Dill) Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA) I've been reading this newsgroup for about 8 months and enjoy it almost as much as I enjoy reading Len Morgan's column in Flying. (wink) So, is there any way we can get Mr. Morgan to contribute to this newsgroup? With his vast flying experience and knack for writing it would be a treat! Anyone know where he lives? Or if he's able to access the usenet? John -- Dan Quayle was right! It's the family stupid! ****** ****** All Hail Chief WAHOO!! * 31 * * 52 * From kls Mon May 3 11:00:10 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: "John (J.F.) Hawkins" Subject: 707 engine nacels Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:10 PDT I've gotta question about the venerable 707 jet. I've taken a liking to the old bird, and have started collecting pictures, postcards, whatever I can get ahold of containing images of the noble jetliner. In these images I notice something peculiar about the outboard engine nacels (sp?) namely, they are different from one another (No. 1 nacel != No. 4 nacel). I'm just an airliner fan, no aeronautical engineer mind you, but why would the engine attachements to the wings not be identical i.e. symmetrical. My public library is silent on the subject despite having a good "wire-frame" diagram of the jet. The number one engine (on captain`s side?) seems to have a shorter nacel which tappers off into the engine cowling itself in a smooth fashion about mid-way between intake and exhaust. The number four engine (co-pilots side?) terminates in a large bulge above the engine intake in what appears to be another, though smaller intake. Is this some sort of auxiliary powerframe for when the jet is sitting around on the ground? Just curious. I knew if anybody knew, you guys would. thanks *John Hawkins --- Bell Northern Research, Research Triangle Park, NC USA * *MaBell: (919)9918579 email:jhawkins@bnr.ca USnail:35 Davis Drive RTP,NC * From kls Mon May 3 11:00:12 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: greg@saltydog.dpsi.com (Gregory R. Travis) Subject: Overgross landing damage (was Re: Stall Warning Systems on Commercial Aircraft) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Data Parallel Systems, Inc Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:12 PDT In eeyore@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Mark Anthony Brown;E200) writes: >A recent crash (TriStar?) was attributed to a stuck angle of attack vane >causing premature stick shaker at rotate - the a/c landed back on almost >immediately grossly over max. landing weight and cracked the main spar. >All survived, fortunately. Do you have any references for this? I am particularly interested in where the spar cracked - L-1011s are fairly beefy birds. I would be particularly dismayed to learn that the spar cracked in the wing box area! Max landing weights are usually set by critera other than spar strength; such as tire capacity and landing gear (and attachment) strength. I would think that a landing that cracked the main spar would have had to have been pretty damn hard and it must have wiped out a lot of other stuff as well. (Ob hysterical comment: Was on a United DC-10 out of SFO late last Thursday evening. Bad omen #1. Had a premonition about DC-10 reliability as I boarded the flight. Bad omen #2. Captain announced, shortly after takeoff, that there was a "slight problem" but that the aircraft was well under control. Bad omen #3. I heard a lot of flap movement subsequent - assume they had a false flaps extended indication. They decided not to return to SFO, but rather continue onto Chicago. I could think of nothing but a hydraulic fluid streaked belly the whole flight) greg -- Gregory Reed Travis D P S I Data Parallel Systems Incorporated greg@dpsi.com (For MX mailers only!) Bloomington, IN greg@indiana.edu (For the others) From kls Mon May 3 11:00:13 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: zari@math.ethz.ch (Alain Zarinelli) Subject: Re: Costs of operating an airliner/Mileage References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:13 PDT ngupta@mtl.mit.edu (Nitin Gupta) writes: > ... , and he gave a stat Lufthansa published that the optimal >"mileage" that a fully loaded 747 can attain is 80 miles/gallon/person. Is >this a reasonable number? >From the "official notes" of Airbus Industries, I got the following figures (dating back to ~1983): the A320 comes to about 40kg fuel per ton aircraft and (flying) hour. Per PAX and route this gives a consumption of 21.4 g/PAX/km = 0.03 l/PAX/km = 0.0147 gal/PAX/NM, assuming a cruising speed of ~900km/h = 486KTS. Restating this as a mileage, one gets to 68.13 NM/PAX/gal = 78.4 statute miles/PAX/gal. So yes, I think ~80 stat.mi./PAX/gal is a reasonable number -- at least for the A310. Alain. -- Alain Zarinelli ... ___ ___ _. _ ___ _... . _._. .__. ._../.. .._. ._. zari@math.ethz.ch zari@astro.phys.ethz.ch "If God had meant man to fly --- zari@czheth5a.bitnet He would have given him more money" From kls Mon May 3 11:00:15 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: altus@leland.Stanford.EDU (Steve Altus) Subject: Re: Stall Warning Systems on Commercial Aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:15 PDT In article eeyore@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Mark Anthony Brown;E200) writes: >Oops, forgot a reference. There's a description of the stall warning system >of a VC-10 in a book called (I think) "Handling [Flying?] the Big Jets" - >I believe its a UK CAA publication, but may enjoy wider circulation, if you >can get hold of it. Can't remember the author offhand. i don't know anything about the reference being made, but the book is probably: Davies, D.P. Handling the Big Jets Civil Aviation Authority, London, 1973 i never read it but i know it's available at the Univ. of Michigan Undergraduate Library (a friend read it...) --steve altus From kls Mon May 3 11:00:16 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: mperlman@nyx.cs.du.edu (Marshal "Airborne" Perlman) Subject: Re: request for 777 specs References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: University of Denver, Dept. of Math & Comp. Sci. Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:16 PDT jhendric@bu.edu (James Hendrickson) writes: >Does anybody know any specs for the Boeing 777? >Please post or email. >Jim I have a report/info package on the 777.... from a pal at boeing. if you want a copy get in touch with me... (see sig), it is a pretty nice thing. real simple but yet not 'dumb'... lots of good general info and a bunch of specifics too.. -- |o| Marshal Perlman Internet: perlman@cs.fit.edu |o| |o| Florida Institute of Technology IRC: Squawk |o| |o| Melbourne, Florida Private Pilot, ASEL |o| |o| 407/768-8000 x8435 Goodyear Blimp Club Member |o| From kls Mon May 3 11:00:19 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) Subject: Re: Special Conditions for A340 released References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:19 PDT In article inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson) writes: >This sounds to me like an excellent argument in favor of an international >certification board. All participating countries would agree that >certification by this body would be acceptable within their borders. The US >could have a team maybe 1/10 the size of the one the FAA uses, and the whole >job could be done MUCH more efficiently. To certify a new plane, all the >members would convene in the country the plane is being produced in, and if >something was seriously awry making the plane unworthy in any given country, >the nit would not be certified. 100% agreement shouldn't be too large a >margin of safety, should it? Only after all countries agree that the plane >can fly, can it fly. This has the benefit that it pressures the FAA to do >it's job rather than the old paper shuffle. But what if the French and German delegates decide to delay certification of a Russian or U.S. design until Airbus can finish their competing model? What if the U.S. delegate delays their certification of an Airbus until Douglas can finish their MD-whatever? There's already enough politics involved... although I agree with you that there is a lot of wasted and duplicated effort, it doesn't seem likely that any aerospace companies in ANY country will want foreigners dictating whether or not their products can be used *in the country of manufacture.* Perhaps if 100% agreement wasn't required, the idea could still work. That way, no one country would have "veto" power, and even if that one country doesn't want to give its blessing it'd still be required to accept the certification of the international body. But do you think this is realistic? Will the FAA agree that planes it doesn't think should be flying in the United States can legally do so, just because some majority of other countries think it is okay? Do you think other countries will do this either? I guess I'm a bit too cynical... Michael T. Palmer | "A man is crazy who writes a secret in any m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov | other way than one which will conceal it RIPEM key on server | from the vulgar." - Roger Bacon, 1220-1292 From kls Mon May 3 11:00:21 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: glover@titan.tsd.arlut.utexas.edu (Dennis Glover) Subject: Inertial Guidance Systems Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Applied Research Laboratories, University of Texas at Austin. Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 03 May 93 11:00:21 PDT I am interested in finding some introductory text on inertial guidance systems. I understand the concepts but I would like something at the entry level and somewhat comprehensive. Also, any leads on current technologies, applications, and/or point me in the right direction. Dennis (512) 835-3109 w (512) 267-7701 h From kls Tue May 4 01:44:10 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: reb@ingres.com (Phydeaux) Subject: Re: spare engine under wing References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Reply-To: reb@Ingres.COM Organization: E 4th St Home For The Overeducated Underemployed - New Jersey Div. Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 01:44:10 PDT In article Don Webster <71352.340@CompuServe.COM> writes: >>I was quite surprised to see that #2 was just >>fine, but that what I had seen was a spare mounted inboard of #2, >>about midway between the #2 pylon and fuselage. > >Fifth Pod ferrying of 747 engines is still the most efficient way of getting >them moved from place to place. I can give you a few constraints involved. Why can't they just crate the engine up and put it inside? Would it not fit through the door, or just take up too much space? Hanging it off of the wing seems a bit extreme, considering extra fuel burned, etc. reb From kls Tue May 4 01:44:13 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: davelett@athena.mit.edu (Richard Sun) Subject: UA/SFO Reliability? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 01:44:13 PDT I'm just interested, since someone else posted something about DC-10 problems on UA out of SFO, if this is a frequent problem with UA? I flew out of SFO heading for JFK on a DC-10 during Summer 1991, and we had an engine failure a couple of minutes after takeoff. We had to turn back to SFO and fire engines were waiting. We even dumped fuel to lighten the load to normal landing weight, and for "safety" reasons. Safe landing, though. Strangely enough, I said to my mother as we entered the plane: "DC-10, I hate these planes! I'd rather fly on a 767 or 747--they're safer." I guess if we have bad feelings about DC-10's out of SFO on UA, we should change flight plans! Anyone else have a bad experience on DC-10's out of SFO on UA? Maybe we'll have enough people for a club! :) From kls Tue May 4 01:44:15 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: spare engine under wing References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 01:44:15 PDT >>Fifth Pod ferrying of 747 engines is still the most efficient way of getting >>them moved from place to place. I can give you a few constraints involved. >Why can't they just crate the engine up and put it inside? I wondered that myself, guessing that it wouldn't fit. To confirm this I looked up a few numbers. Recent United schedules happen to list cargo specs. For non-SP 747 models they list "bulk cargo door dimensions" as 44"w x 47"h, though they also say an even larger LD-7/IATA Type 5 "container" (looks more like a pallet from their sketch) can be handled -- 125" x 88" x 63". This is still smaller, by a large margin, than the 95.6" or greater fan size (never mind the nacelle) of a JT9D. The CF6 and RB.211 are a bit smaller but not enough to make a difference in this case. Obviously one *would* fit in a freighter, either via the nose on a 747F or a side cargo door on a variety of types, but for an airline such as United which doesn't operate freighters it's probable more cost-effective to sling the engine under the wing of one of their own planes on a regular flight. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue May 4 01:44:16 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: UA/SFO Reliability? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 01:44:16 PDT >I'm just interested, since someone else posted something about DC-10 >problems on UA out of SFO, if this is a frequent problem with UA? I've flown on United DC-10s more times than I care to remember, often to or from SFO, and the only problem more spectacular than the usual weather or ATC delays was a flat tire. That was at the gate at DEN. (UA 232 to ORD, less than a year before another DC-10 operating 232 made a far more spectacular unscheduled stop in Sioux City, Iowa.) Of all United's stations, one might consider SFO marginally safer since SFO is United's only maintenance base and a number of planes spend the night at SFO (or longer) for maintenance checks. (Other airports, such as ORD, do handle relatively minor work.) Overall, it seems the United does a fairly clean and conservative job of maintaining their fleet. American and Delta, amongst others, have gotten smacked with some hefty penalties for improper maintenance over the past few years, but I can't recall United being hit with any major maintenance penalties. Looking back a bit, after the 1972 DC-10 cargo door incident over Windsor, Ontario, United was the first to complete implementation of the modifications called for by MD's service bulletin on their entire fleet. In fact, despite having the largest DC-10 fleet at the time (15 of the 39 in service), United was nearly done before anyone else started -- a single National DC-10 was completed just one week before the last of United's. >we had an engine failure a couple of minutes after takeoff. We had to >turn back to SFO and fire engines were waiting. We even dumped fuel >to lighten the load to normal landing weight, and for "safety" reasons. As long as it wasn't a catastrophic failure of the #2 engine (a la UA 232) this doesn't seem all that, um, extraordinary. The fire engines would be a common precaution I would guess, and dumping fuel would be perfectly normal as a load of fuel sufficient for SFO-JFK would almost certainly put the aircraft over maximum landing weight. They'd have to dump fuel if they went back for any reason. >I guess if we have bad feelings about DC-10's out of SFO on UA, we >should change flight plans! United thoughtfully offers three 747 non-stops from SFO to ORD every day for those of us who like the comfort of widebodes but despise the DC-10. I fly these fairly often. They also have at least one 747 each to JFK and IAD from SFO, and even listed one to LAX, though it never actually operated that way that I know of. (Followups on this aspect of this thread should probably be directed to rec.travel.air.) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue May 4 11:22:51 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: libove@libove.alf.dec.com (Jay Vassos-Libove) Subject: Re: Special Conditions for A340 released References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Atlanta Customer Support Center Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 11:22:51 PDT |But what if the French and German delegates decide to delay certification |of a Russian or U.S. design until Airbus can finish their competing model? |What if the U.S. delegate delays their certification of an Airbus until |Douglas can finish their MD-whatever? Certainly this is a possibility, but retaliation in kind os probable. In the same way that the US congress works on politically motivated bill-killing, and still gets some things done, it seems that a highly technical board (as this one must be) would operate smoothly, despite some countries' industries' likelihood to _try_ to apply pressure to delay a competitor's certification. Besides, with multiple boards around the planet, we already have the situation where one board can prevent foreign competition's planes from being locally certified. -- Jay Vassos-Libove libove@alf.dec.com Digital Equipment Corporation decwrl!alf.dec.com!libove Atlanta Customer Support Center Opinions? They're mine, mine, all mine! Alpharetta, Georgia and D.E.C. Can't have 'em! From kls Tue May 4 11:22:53 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jim@specialix.com (Jim Maurer) Subject: Re: 707 engine nacels References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Specialix Inc. Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 11:22:53 PDT "John (J.F.) Hawkins" writes: >I've gotta question about the venerable 707 jet. I've taken a liking >to the old bird, and have started collecting pictures, postcards, whatever >I can get ahold of containing images of the noble jetliner. In these images >I notice something peculiar about the outboard engine nacels (sp?) namely, >they are different from one another (No. 1 nacel != No. 4 nacel). ... >The number one engine (on captain`s side?) seems to have a shorter nacel >which tappers off into the engine cowling itself in a smooth fashion about >mid-way between intake and exhaust. The number four engine (co-pilots >side?) terminates in a large bulge above the engine intake in what appears >to be another, though smaller intake. Is this some sort of auxiliary >powerframe for when the jet is sitting around on the ground? The bumps on engines 2, 3, and 4 are turbo compressors for cabin pressurization. The number 1 engine doesn't have the bump. I guess they only needed 3 of them. The 720 only had 2 engines (numbers 2 & 3?) with turbo compressors. That was the main spotting feature to tell the difference. Another clue (but it didn't always work) was that the 707s have a "spike" antenna coming out the top of the vertical stablizer for high frequency communications, most 720s didn't have that. Ah, I miss the good old days watching 707s, 720s, DC-8s, and the occasional DC-7 and Constellation at SFO! From kls Tue May 4 11:22:56 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: libove@jerry.alf.dec.com (Jay Vassos-Libove) Subject: How do I get close-up looks at commercial aircraft? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Digital Equipment Corporation, Atlanta Customer Support Center Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 11:22:56 PDT [ I know this isn't exactly technical discussion, suited for sci.aeronautics, but it seems like good meta-discussion for those of us who desire to get more involved with the technical details, but don't have direct access to the industry. -Jay ] I'm interested in learning more about big aircraft (passenger jets, the cargo versions used by e.g. Federal Express and UPS)... How does one go about finding written and/or videotaped information, without reading through thousands of pages of technical journals, and without spending too much money? Would it be possible to get close-up looks at the craft, be able to walk around them, inside the non-passenger areas? Talk to maintenance people, pilots, etc etc. Thanks for your suggestions! -- Jay Vassos-Libove libove@alf.dec.com Digital Equipment Corporation decwrl!alf.dec.com!libove Atlanta Customer Support Center Opinions? They're mine, mine, all mine! Alpharetta, Georgia and D.E.C. Can't have 'em! From kls Tue May 4 11:22:58 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: gary@sackbut.mitre.org (Gary Bisaga) Subject: Re: Special Conditions for A340 released References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Reply-To: gbisaga@mitre.org Organization: The Mitre Corporation, McLean Virginia Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 11:22:58 PDT In article , rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes: |> The FAA finally got around to releasing its final set of certification |> requirements for the A340. They are published in the Federal Register, |> 56:71, of April 15, 1993, pp. 19553-19571. |> |> These are an official addendum to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, |> Federal Aviation Regulations Parts 21 and 25. The A340 has to pass through |> these hoops before it can be certificated in the United States, despite the |> fact that the European joint airworthiness authority certified it last |> December. Two weekends ago (April 17?) I was working in my front yard and looked up to see a four-engined airplane lining up for the 1R approach to Dulles airport. Hmmm .. I thought. Looks a little big for a 707/DC8 ... it's got those big hi-bypass fans too ... got winglets ... no bump on top though. As I watched it for a little while I realized I was seeing an A340 in person for the first time! It was in the colors of Air France. I suppose I'm not positive it was a 340 but it sure looked like the pictures I saw in Airline Pilot a couple months ago. I'm guessing it was flying in on a non-revenue testing flight. Comments? Any other sightings? Gary From kls Tue May 4 11:23:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Special Conditions for A340 released References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 04 May 93 11:23:00 PDT >I suppose I'm not positive it was a 340 but it sure looked like the >pictures I saw in Airline Pilot a couple months ago. It certainly sounds like one. Air France does have 747-400s but it sounds like you saw enough to know it wasn't one of those. At least one A340-300 has been delivered to Air France (in February) and they were scheduled to have three by now. >I'm guessing it was flying in on a non-revenue testing flight. Air France and Lufthansa operated a number of route proving flights, with an A340-300 and A340-200, respectively, during the later parts of the flight test program. Lufthansa was scheduled to begin trans- Atlantic A340 service on March 15 (Frankfurt to Newark) so I'd guess that the Air France flight would be a revenue one. I'd assume that a foreign carrier doesn't need an FAA certification to operate a flight which either originates or terminates outside the U.S. (I've seen an Il-62 at O'Hare and another one on approach to SFO and I'd think it a good bet that the Il-62 isn't FAA-certified.) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed May 5 14:14:51 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Stephen L Nicoud Subject: UA/SFO Reliability? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 05 May 93 14:14:51 PDT Of all United's stations, one might consider SFO marginally safer since SFO is United's only maintenance base and a number of planes spend the night at SFO (or longer) for maintenance checks. With general aviation aircraft it seems to be the case that the first flight after maintenance (100 hr, annual, etc) is the most prone to have problems. I'm very leary of a plane that just got out of maintenance. I do full runups and a couple of circuits in the pattern before I take one out any further from the airport. From kls Wed May 5 14:14:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: inc@tc.fluke.COM (Gary Benson) Subject: Re: UA/SFO Reliability? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: John Fluke Mfg. Co., Inc., Everett, WA Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 05 May 93 14:14:52 PDT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: . . . after the 1972 DC-10 cargo >door incident over Windsor, Ontario, United was the first to complete >implementation of the modifications called for by MD's service bulletin >on their entire fleet. In fact, despite having the largest DC-10 fleet >at the time (15 of the 39 in service), United was nearly done before >anyone else started -- a single National DC-10 was completed just one >week before the last of United's. It seems that many factors could account for this. Perhaps as the larger airline, United has more direct access to mods, update packages, parts. Maybe in fact, they were automatically sent them in accord with a prior agreement, while little National had to first learn of it, order the parts, (go get them?) or whatnot. Just stating the facts makes United sound like an eager-beaver go-getter and National like a foot-dragging sloth; in fact, for United the whole thing might have been SOP while National, try as they might, could have been simply unable to get the parts. Does anyone have any particulars? Or is United really swell and National just so-so when it comes to these matters? -- Gary Benson -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-inc@sisu.fluke.com_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- I'm not a lawyer, but I'm pedantic and that's just as good. -D. Gary Grady From kls Wed May 5 14:14:55 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: UA/SFO Reliability? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 05 May 93 14:14:55 PDT Gary Benson writes: >>despite having the largest DC-10 fleet at the time (15 of the 39 in >>service), United was nearly done before anyone else started -- a >>single National DC-10 was completed just one week before the last of >>United's. >It seems that many factors could account for this. Perhaps as the larger >airline, United has more direct access to mods, update packages, parts. >Maybe in fact, they were automatically sent them in accord with a prior >agreement, while little National had to first learn of it, order the parts, Actually I omitted a few details -- American and Continental, both large airlines (and American was the DC-10 launch customer) also were operating the DC-10 at the time, and National got started before either of them. McDonnell Douglas issued S.B. 52-37 on July 3, 1972, "which called for the addition of the addition of a support plate for the lock mechanism." (Attribution below.) Perhaps someone more in the know would like to confirm this but I believe Service Bulletins are sent promptly to all operators of a specific type, and it is the responsibility of the manufacturer (perhaps mandated by regulations) to make sure that it gets out to every operator. By the end of 1972, United had completed modifications to all 15 of the DC-10s, National had completed 4 of 5, American only 1 of 14, and Continental hadn't started on their 5. I'd expect at least American to be on the same grounds as United, even if the smaller carriers did have some excuse. (My personal feeling, only loosly substantiated, is that I don't quite trust American. Improper, short-cut maintenance procedures started the chain of events that took AA 191 down in Chicago. The loss of the #3 engine somewhere over the AZ/NM border by an AA 727 -- which safely completed its DFW-SAN flight -- was found to be the result of inadequate maintenance. A few other minor incidents, I believe. No real stinkers in the grand scheme of things, but with Crandall in charge I wouldn't quite put anything past them if it made 'em a buck, considering *all* of the various factors involved.) >Does anyone have any particulars? My numbers came from an internal memo of the U.S. House of Representa- tives Special Subcommittee on Investigations, reproduced in a book entitled "The DC-10 Case," edited by John H. Fielder and Douglas Birsch. The quotation a few lines up is from the same source. Robert Dorsett posted a review of this book a while back, which can be found in the group archives, and I'd really encourage anyone interested in the DC-10 to get ahold of this book and study it before debating the issues. >Or is United really swell and National just so-so when it comes to >these matters? Considering the gravity of the consequences of *not* making this modification (346 people died near Paris on another DC-10 that for other reasons had not had this modification applied) I'd consider even United's response only so-so. Only one-third of their fleet had been modified within 90 days. Whether the blame should go to McDonnell Douglas, for not adequately conveying the potential severity of the problem, or to the FAA for not issuing an AD, or to the airlines, for not promptly complying, is another matter for debate. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed May 5 14:14:57 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM (Geoff Miller) Subject: Re: 707 engine nacels References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Reply-To: geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 05 May 93 14:14:57 PDT >The 720 only had 2 engines (numbers 2 & 3?) with turbo compressors. >That was the main spotting feature to tell the difference. Another >clue (but it didn't always work) was that the 707s have a "spike" >antenna coming out the top of the vertical stablizer for high >frequency communications, most 720s didn't have that. The easiest way to distinguish the 720 from the 707, when you're not able to see both sides, is that the 720 has a single overwing emergency exit on each side (like the Convair 880 and 990), while the 707 has two. Back when 707s were commonplace, quite a few of them in this country didn't have the distinctive HF "spike" at the top of the tail -- American and TWA, particularly, had a lot of -120Bs that were used domestically, where HF communication wasn't needed. A few 720s did have the antenna, but they were mostly foreign-owned. Geoff -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Geoff Miller + + + + + + + + Sun Microsystems geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM + + + + + + + + Menlo Park, California -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- From kls Wed May 5 14:15:01 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Tobias Henry Lutterodt Subject: A340 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 05 May 93 14:15:01 PDT I went to Newark last Friday to do some plane spotting as I got there I saw Lufthansa's first A340 (a -200) on finals. The aircraft is beautiful! Here are a few observations I made: - The main landing gear is huge. (Largest in operation today, I've read somewhere.) The two-wheeled body gear has a small panel on the back side which may indicate that its doors cannot cover the entire area when the gear is stowed. Anyway, this remains a mystery to me. - The dihedral on the wing is very noticeable, even at the gate. - The outboard engine seems _really_ far outboard. I understand that the location of the inboard engine was dictated by a common location for the A330 and the A340, which in turn probably dictated this far outboard location. In contrast, the engines on a 747 seem much closer and those on the IL-96 seem closer still. - As has been reported in the press, the aircraft has a pronounced nose- down appearance. - The wingspan is enormous. The A340 dwarfs the DC-10 in this respect. - The takeoff performance was unimpressive considering that EWR-FRA should be just a hop skip and a jump for the aircraft. The Turkish Airlines A310 I saw did almost as well! Just a few thoughts. I'd like to read more observations of the A340 in service if anyone else has seen it around. Any comparisons with the MD-11? Toby (The Commerical Aviation Nut) From kls Thu May 6 00:13:41 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Don Webster <71352.340@CompuServe.COM> Subject: Re: UA/SFO reliability References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 06 May 93 00:13:41 PDT >From the pilot ranks, I think I can reliably say that there is no stigma against the DC10. In fact, there are devotees who will bid it even though they can hold the better paying 747. In relation to what it pays, the DC10 goes quite senior. Don Webster 71352.340@compuserve.com From kls Thu May 6 00:13:42 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Don Webster <71352.340@CompuServe.COM> Subject: Re: looks at a commercial aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 06 May 93 00:13:42 PDT At United and probably most airlines, we are receptive to visits to the cockpit while boarding and deplaning the airplane. Just tell the flight attendant that you would like to visit the cockpit. As long as you aren't the last person boarding the plane before the door is shut, you will probably find the crew most accomodating. It is actually harder to get down onto the ramp to walk around the airplane. Security has made this difficult to accomplish without clearance and an escort. I would call the local airport and ask for a tour. They can probably direct you from there. Another source would be a local fear of flying class. See if you can get in on one of their tours. They reduce fear through education, which often includes a first hand contact with airplanes. Try a cargo airline, such as UPS or Federal Express. They often have more dead time between flights and one of their employees may be able to escort you. Good luck. Don Webster 71352.340@compuserve.com From kls Thu May 6 03:21:44 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ditka!sgiblab!uunet.UU.NET!portal!shell.portal.com!stevep (Steven H Philipson) Subject: Re: Need info on the MD-11 pitch incident over Aleutians References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Mountain View Flight Service Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 06 May 93 03:21:44 PDT In article m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) writes: >Hi. I'm looking for more information on the MD-11 that apparently >underwent an uncommanded pitch which resulted in a passenger being >killed (got this from the ata-watchers mailing list). Aviation Week has reported on this twice. Initially, CAT (clear air turbulence) was suspected, but the more recent report mentioned the possibility that there was an uncommanded extension of the wing slats. That's about the full extent of the published reports so far. It will take at least 6 months for an NTSB report to be issued. So stya tuned, but don't hold your breath. Steve From kls Thu May 6 03:21:46 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: mch@cs.anu.edu.au (Mick Cardew-Hall) Subject: Boeing 777 partners Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Reply-To: mch@cs.anu.edu.au Organization: Interdisciplinary Engineering Program, ANU, Australia Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 06 May 93 03:21:46 PDT Can anybody tell me who the risk/revenue partners for the Boeing 777 are and what the design/manufacture split is? I seem to think that KHI in Japan are and possibly Australian aerospace but there must be others. Thanks Mick Cardew-Hall Eng Dept Australian National University Canberra Australia email: mch@faceng.anu.edu.au From kls Tue May 11 01:50:43 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kawai@CSLI.Stanford.EDU (goh kawai - n6uok) Subject: Re: looks at a commercial aircraft References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: speech research program, sri international Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 11 May 93 01:50:43 PDT Don Webster (71352.340@compuserve.com) invites: | At United and probably most airlines, we are receptive to visits to the | cockpit while boarding and deplaning the airplane. Just tell the flight | attendant that you would like to visit the cockpit. As long as you | aren't the last person boarding the plane before the door is shut, you | will probably find the crew most accomodating. Don, I assume from your message that you are a United employee. I would like to mention that I have, in fact, been warmly welcomed by the cockpit crew on one of your flights. The crew was probably bored of visitors, but they certainly don't seem to mind! The flight engineer let me in the cockpit, and I took pictures with my camcorder, and he and I chatted for a while. I told him I am a student pilot flying out of Palo Alto; the flight was bound for San Francisco (out of Honolulu) and we were flying over Palo Alto. The FE's comment was "Stay low!" (Guess some general aviation pilots bust the floor of the terminal control area airspace.) That was one very special and memorable cockpit visit. Thank you for your article, and for your colleagues' hospitality. ----------------- Speech Research Program, SRI, Menlo Park, CA 94025-3493 USA --- Goh Kawai --- work:(415)859-2231 fax:(415)859-5984 home:(415)323-7214 ----------------- internet: kawai@speech.sri.com radio: n6uok and 7l1fqe From kls Tue May 11 01:50:47 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Duane F Marble Subject: 3D Computer Graphics in Cockpit Avionics Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 11 May 93 01:50:47 PDT The current (May 1993) issue of Computer Graphics and Applications (published by the IEEE Computer Society) contains an interesting article by Peter W. Pruyn and Donald P. Greenberg of Cornell Univeristy entitled "Exploring 3D Computer Graphics in Cockpit Avionics." The short abstract notes: Three-dimensional symbolic represntations visualize and integrate flight -information for tasks such as navigation, collision avoidance, and the instrument approach. - Duane F. Marble E-mail: dmarble@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu Dept. of Geography The Ohio State University Telephone: (614) 292-2250 Columbus, OH 43220 Fax: (614) 292-6213 From kls Tue May 11 01:50:49 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Robert Dorsett Subject: Re: 707 engine nacels References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Reply-To: rdd@cactus.org Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 11 May 93 01:50:49 PDT Better late than never... --------------- In article you write: >I've gotta question about the venerable 707 jet. I've taken a liking > >I'm just an airliner fan, no aeronautical engineer mind you, but why would >the engine attachements to the wings not be identical i.e. symmetrical. The inlets on top of the engines are ram scoops, for the pneumatics system. They're connected to turbocompressors which are driven from 16th stage bleed air. Only low-pressure air is available from the #1 engine. Why don't all four have these gizmos? Guess three was enough! Why do any have them? I would suspect that it was considered desirable to reroute the air conditioning supply from outside the engine, to preserve mass flow within the engine and thus eliminate thrust loss--the original engines on the 707 were rather weak, by today's standards (or even 60's standards). In more modern airplanes, bleed air is taken directly from the engine; the air conditioning packs have their own, built-in compressors. My mind may be playing tricks on me, but I seem to recall some 707 variants with a completely integrated pneumatics system as well, within the original production run (not just the CFM-56 re-engined variants). Perhaps the KC-135? --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Mon May 17 15:01:07 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: gregpen@crash.cts.com Subject: MD80 VS. MD90? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 17 May 93 15:01:07 PDT Organization: CTS Network Services (crash, ctsnet), El Cajon, CA I know the MD90 has just been through its introductions barely two weeks ago. I (amd I am sure several other people) am interested in the updates to the MD80 design? What are the differences between the MD80 and MD90? Size, engine com- plement, crew and avionics package? Replies would be greatly appreciated! Thanks ----------- gregpen@crash.cts.com ----------- From kls Mon May 17 15:01:08 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: bernard@monolith.cc.bellcore.com (Bernard Spanger) Subject: DHL Plane at Newark Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 17 May 93 15:01:08 PDT Organization: Bell Communications Research Every time I drive past Newark AIrport on the NJ turnpike, I can't help noticing a DHL airplane, which looks something like a 727 or an L1011. It has been there for at least a year or 2, and occasionally I see people milling around it while the doors are open. I can't help wondering if this plane is just being used as a warehouse or if it ever actually moves. Does anyone have any idea? Bernard Spanger bernard@monolith.bellcore.com (908) 699-3924 From kls Mon May 17 15:01:10 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Tony Heatwole Subject: Mouse Grounds 767 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 17 May 93 15:01:10 PDT I knew that since the 767 isn't fly-by-wire, it couldn't be flown *using* a mouse (or sidestick, in aeronautical terms), but I was surprised to learn that it can't be flown *with* a mouse, either. From the latest Airliners magazine (Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1993, p64): "A Manchester to Chicago flight was recently delayed for 24 hours when security personnel reported a mouse in the business-class section of the American Airlines 767." Two questions come to mind: 1. Is a mouse a threat to the airworthiness of an airliner, or is the concern purely aesthetic? 2. Would the flight have been delayed if the mouse had been sighted in the *coach* section of the plane? Tony Heatwole Gaithersburg, MD heatwole@hns.com From kls Mon May 17 15:01:12 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: MD80 VS. MD90? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 17 May 93 15:01:12 PDT >I know the MD90 has just been through its introductions barely two weeks ago. >I (amd I am sure several other people) am interested in the updates to the MD80 >design? What are the differences between the MD80 and MD90? Size, engine com- >plement, crew and avionics package? There was some discussion in the group about this a while back, with some answers to your questions, but the March 22, 1993 AW&ST has the whole story. Here's some info from that article: The MD-90 program, launched in 1989, currently has a total of 77 firm orders, according to Douglas officials, Customers include Delta Air Lines, Alaska Airlines, Japan Air System, GATX, Scan- dinavian Airlines System and the Trunkliner program in China. Douglas plans to develop a series of MD-90 models as it had during the MD-80 program, and the first model of that planned series is the MD-90-30. The Dash-30 has a fuselage 4.75 ft longer than the standard-length MD-80 and can carry 153 passengers in a typical two-class seating configuration. Maximum seating capacity is 172 passengers. ... The longest range MD-80 series aircraft is the MD-82, which is capable of carrying a typical load of 143 passengers over a distance of 2,080 naut. mi. The MD-90-30 with 153 passengers is expected to be able to fly about 2,200 naut. mi. The MD-80 is in the $30-million price range, and the MD-90 will run about $5-7 million more, Douglas officials said. Initial deliveries of MD-90s are scheduled for October, 1994. A number of differences between the MD-80 and MD-90 are noted. In summary: * Engines: IAE V2500 instead of the P&W JT8D-200 family used on the MD-80, starting at 25,000 lbs. thrust vs. around 21,000 lbs. which allows both higher gross weights and a better thrust-to-weight ratio. (These things are huge -- to me the aircraft almost looks like it's wearing Mickey Mouse ears when viewed from the front!) * APU: AlliedSignal's Garrett 131-9(D) is derived from the APU used on the B-2 bomber, and according to AW&ST provides 36% more horse- power with less weight and 23% lower fuel consumption as compared to the APU of the MD-80 family. The main reason for the new APU was cited as the higher startup requirements for the larger V2500 engines. * Cockpit: Similar in appearance to the MD-88, which unlike earlier MD-80 family members has a glass cockpit, with improvements. * Electrical Generating System: A new design intended to eliminate power surges. * Carbon Brakes: The new brakes proide an overall 400 lb. reduction in aircraft weight, and with a new digital anti-skid system should be more reliable. * Wing Icing: The MD-90 incorporates a number of design changes to eliminate the wing icing problems of the MD-80 family, which has resulted from cold fuel in the wing tanks cooling the upper wing surace. * Vacuum Lavatories: Along with the elimintion of the MD-80's forward service port, this system is supposed to eliminate the possibility of blue ice being ingested by the engines while also improving reliability. * New Interior: Based on the design from the stillborn UHB propfan project, this has the usual more light and bigger baggage bins features of every new design. :-) * Cabin Airflow: A new environmental control system will increase airflow in the cabin, incidently reducing the time needed to cool a heat-soaked cabin. MD-90 Technical Specifications (MD-90-30 from March 22, 1993 AW&ST with MD-82 specs added from March 16, 1992 AW&ST) MD-90-30 MD-82 CAPACITY Pasengers Typical Mixed Class 153 Maximum 172 155 Cargo Holds (Cu. Ft.) 1,300 DIMENSIONS Span (Ft.) 107.8 107.8 Length Overall (Ft.) 152.6 135.6 Height Overall (Ft.) 30.6 29.8 Wing Area (Sq. Ft.) 1,209 1,209 Sweep Back at 25% Chord (Deg.) 24.5 WEIGHTS Max Ramp (Lb.) 157,000 Max Takeoff (Lb.) 156,000 149,500 Max Landing (Lb.) 142,000 130,000 Max Zero Fuel (Lb.) 130,000 OEW (Lb.) 88,200 78,528 Fuel Capacity (Gal. @ 6.7 Lb./Gal.) 5,840 Cruise Speed (35,000 Ft. ISA Standard Day) M 0.76 .76-.80 Range (Naut. Mi./International Reserves) 2,268 2,176 * FAA Takeoff Field (Ft. @ MTOGW SL Std Day) 7,000 7,594 FAA Landing Field (Ft. @ MLW SL Std Day) 5,130 4,800 Note: I'm not sure than the MD-82 range figure is for the same conditions, though it seems about right. The same AW&ST with the MD-82 specs lists several other MD-90 models: MD-90 model -10 -30 -40 Passengers 139 172 208 Length 130.4 152.7 171.7 MGTOW (1000 lbs.) 139 156 163.5 There's also the MD-95, otherwise known as the Trunkliner project for the Chinese. From everything I've seen it appears to be more closely related to the MD-80 family (which remains in production) than to the MD-90. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Mon May 17 15:01:14 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: DHL Plane at Newark References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 17 May 93 15:01:14 PDT >Every time I drive past Newark AIrport on the NJ turnpike, I can't >help noticing a DHL airplane, which looks something like a 727 or an >L1011. It has been there for at least a year or 2, and occasionally I >see people milling around it while the doors are open. Probably a 727 since DHL doesn't have any L-1011s. Anyway, try driving past late at night. Package carriers, such as DHL and Federal Express, have nocturnal schedules, exactly the opposite of most of the regular passenger carriers' operations. Chances are your plane will have flown off to DHL's hub, with another plane returning early the next morning. I don't know about DHL, but Fed Ex has their primary hub at Memphis and schedules most flights so as to converge there around midnight, with about four hours for unloading, sorting all the packages, and reloading. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Mon May 17 15:01:16 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Mouse Grounds 767 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 17 May 93 15:01:16 PDT >Is a mouse a threat to the airworthiness of an >airliner, or is the concern purely aesthetic? Given the mention of "security personnel" perhaps it didn't have a passport. Or perhaps Crandall was worried about the added fuel burn required to transport a few extra ounces across the Atlantic. (I've gotten the distinct impression that American cuts their fuel reserves to the absolute minimum.) I don't really see how it could be an airworthiness problem unless the little guy managed to chew on things he shouldn't. I believe most of the control cables and wiring on a 767 are above the ceiling, however, so this doesn't seem likely. >From what I've heard, United has or had cockroach problems with some of their second-hand 747s, the seven ex-QANTAS 747-238Bs as well as the unique (to United) 747SP-27 that came from Braniff via Pan Am. They kept on flying them though I'd imagine exterminators would be called in as soon as possible. >Would the flight have been delayed if the mouse >had been sighted in the *coach* section of the >plane? I think I'll not comment on the possiblity of improvement over the usual economy-class cuisine. ;-) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed May 19 02:15:11 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jacobs@charly.taclog.af.mil (SSgt Scott Jacobson;93D APS/TROS;981-7441) Subject: Re: Mouse grounds 767 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 19 May 93 02:15:11 PDT The US Department of Agriculture (and probably its British equivalent) frown on stowaway mice arriving aboard airliners from foreign lands. As I recall the fines are pretty stiff and there is also the possibility that the aircraft could be impounded... Better to exterminate the vermin on discovery then to take a chance of having the Feds impound your 70 million dollar airplane for a couple of days! Scott From kls Wed May 19 02:15:13 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Tobias Henry Lutterodt Subject: MD-80/MD-90 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 19 May 93 02:15:13 PDT I think the numbers given for the MD-80 in article 605 are somewhat deceiving. The heaviest MD-80s (i.e. longest range) are MD-83s which have a MTOW near the wing's structural limit. The first MD-90s have a significantly lower MTOW (near that of the MD-82) which makes their range improvement more impressive. Obviously there is room for growth in the MD-90 which Douglas is taking care of with the MD-90-50 and -55. A further catch: the longest range MD-80 is really an MD-87 at the optional high gross weight. Austrian used to use these aircraft to fly nonstop to its Persian Gulf destinations. Toby (The Commercial Aviation Nut) From kls Thu May 20 02:59:44 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jb3051@csc.albany.edu Subject: 747s and American Airlines Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 May 93 02:59:44 PDT I have noticed that American Airlines does not have any 747s. This is surprising for one of the largest airlines in the world. Do they know something that the rest of the airlines do not know? I am flying on of AA DC-10's next month and after reading this group for some time, well, I am not so sure any more... Jorge Bela Center for Legislative Development jb3051@thor.albany.edu From kls Thu May 20 02:59:49 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Mouse grounds 767 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 May 93 02:59:49 PDT In article jacobs@charly.taclog.af.mil writes: >The US Department of Agriculture (and probably its British equivalent) >frown on stowaway mice arriving aboard airliners from foreign >lands. As I recall the fines are pretty stiff and there is also >the possibility that the aircraft could be impounded... > >Better to exterminate the vermin on discovery then to take a chance >of having the Feds impound your 70 million dollar airplane for >a couple of days! True, but airplanes can contain a lot of unpleasant critters, especially roaches, flies, etc--trying to get rid of all of them is sort of like trying to get rid of rats on ships--can't be done, but the magnitude of the problem can probably be controlled somewhat. They tend to board via food containers. USDA got pretty aggressive about all this around ten years ago; I have clear memories of coming in from overseas and, fifteen minutes prior to landing, the cabin crew walking through the cabin *gassing* us, emptying cans of insecticide into the air. No, they didn't drop the oxygen masks. :-) --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Thu May 20 02:59:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: newburry@chaph.usc.edu (Keith Newburry) Subject: MD80 Vs. MD90 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 May 93 02:59:52 PDT One new MD90 feature which has not been discussed so far is the "barrel" section means of assembly. The MD80's main fuselage was assembled like a clam shell. the upper and lower fuselage were joined in an assembly tool and riveted together. (I was a supervisor on MD80 major assembly in Long Beach.) The clam shell approach was always berated because of the quality problems due to the complex assembly. While I was never in QA, I felt that dimensional assembly errors were compounded by the clam approach. The MD90 is assembled by the joining of cylindrical, non circular cross section barrels. The barrels are much easier to assemble and ,in general, have higher quality than the old approach. I believe MDC, if successful, will improve quality and cut assembly costs on the MD90 program as compared to the MD80. Keith Newburry - ex "Dougloid"!!!! From kls Thu May 20 02:59:53 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: MD80 Vs. MD90 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 May 93 02:59:53 PDT >The MD80's main fuselage was assembled like a clam shell. ... >The MD90 is assembled by the joining of ... barrels. ... >I believe MDC, if successful, will improve quality and cut >assembly costs on the MD90 program as compared to the MD80. I don't have a reference right at hand but I recall reading that MD had switched to the barrel method for the MD-80 as well, with the first such MD-80 delivered fairly recently. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu May 20 02:59:57 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: 747s and American Airlines References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohareChicago.COM Date: 20 May 93 02:59:57 PDT >I have noticed that American Airlines does not have any 747s. This >is surprising for one of the largest airlines in the world. Do they >know something that the rest of the airlines do not know? Difficult as it may be to believe now, the 747 had some fairly rocky beginnings. Besides early technical problems, it was simply too big, especially for U.S. domestic-only carriers. In the early 1970s the market was not sufficient to profitably operate such a large aircraft on most routes, though many carriers bought them to keep up with the competition. (The airline industry has often put image ahead of any rationality, as last year's fare wars clearly exhibit.) If anything, American was slower to recognize this than several other airlines. Eastern ordered four 747s very early on but quickly sold the delivery positions to TWA, believing the L-1011 would be better suited to Eastern's routes. Eastern did end up operating three leased Pan Am 747s in the 1970-1972 timeframe due to delivery delays with the L-1011, but that was it. Delta was only a little slower, accepting five in 1970 and 1971 but selling them all off by 1977. American had a sizeable fleet of 747s with a total of 16 -100 models delivered in 1970 and 1971. American quickly realized, as had Eastern and Delta, that the 747 was simply too big and expensive for domestic operations, though of course American focussed on the DC-10 instead of the L-1011 as the backbone of their fleet. Several were sold in 1974 after less than four years of service, including one sold to NASA as the first Space Shuttle transporter; the last ones left American in 1984. Today, in addition to the one NASA has, one of these aircraft belongs to Virgin Atlantic, five fly for United, and the remaining nine all haul cargo for UPS. In 1986, American rejoined the ranks of 747 operators, though this time with a solid reason -- two 747SP-31s were acquired from TWA to operate the new Dallas-Tokyo non-stops. With the arrival of the MD-11 these aircraft moved to the U.S.-London routes before being sold off last year. American had one other near-fling with the 747. Several years ago they and United were battling for the right to join Northwest on the Chicago-Tokyo non-stop route. American was willing to spend whatever it took to get two early 747-400 delivery positions, ending up with a deal to buy Canadian's first two for $330 million. ("List" price was roughly $125 million each.) The deal was conditional on American receiving the route authority, which ended up going to United. United was unique amongst the U.S. carriers with no overseas service in maintaining a 747 fleet. Along with their competitors, United got their first 747-100 in 1970, amassing a fleet of 18 by 1973. These were mostly operated from the U.S. mainland to Hawaii, including some transcontinental continuations. Perhaps United's dominance of this market was sufficient to make the 747 profitable prior to 1983, when United obtained a route that really made effective use of the 747: Seattle/Portland-Tokyo. Whatever the reason United kept their 747 fleet intact until 1985, when the oldest five were sold to Pan Am. The remaining 13 still fly for United today. United's 1986 acquisition of Pan Am's Pacific Division included 11 747SPs, which were supplemented in 1987 by the five ex-American 747-100s and two new 747-200s for New York-Tokyo service. Another seven 747-200s (ex-QANTAS) arrived in 1991 for the new U.S.-London service, and 747-400s began arriving in 1989. I believe United now has the third largest 747 fleet, after Japan Air Lines and British Airways. American and Delta were expanding into international carriers at the same time as United, of course. The major difference was that their primary emphasis was across the Atlantic rather than the Pacific at first. By this time the ETOPS 767 (and other twins) had made the 747 unnecessary for most trans-Atlantic service; heavier routes could be handled by the DC-10-30 or L-1011-500. Only recently has either of these airlines gained much of a beachhead across the Pacific, and the smaller MD-11 now offers them a more appealing aircraft than the 747 for this service considering their niche markets. (American also got a good deal and early delivery when one of the initial MD-11 buyers backed out.) No, American has no special knowledge with regard to the 747 that other airlines are unaware of. They simply don't have a route structure that justifies operating the 747. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Fri May 21 03:43:47 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme) Subject: Re: Mouse grounds 767 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center, Mpls. MN, USA. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 May 93 03:43:47 PDT In article rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes: > Approved: kls@ohareChicago.COM > In article jacobs@charly.taclog.af.mil writes: >>The US Department of Agriculture (and probably its British equivalent) >>frown on stowaway mice arriving aboard airliners from foreign >>lands. As I recall the fines are pretty stiff and there is also >>the possibility that the aircraft could be impounded... > USDA got pretty aggressive about all this around ten years ago; I have > clear memories of coming in from overseas and, fifteen minutes prior > to landing, the cabin crew walking through the cabin *gassing* us, emptying > cans of insecticide into the air. No, they didn't drop the oxygen > masks. :-) We got the 'gas treatment' last Fall as we were on approach to Sydney, Australia. No gas on the return flight, though. Of course, Australia has some pretty graphic experiences with non-native plants and animals overtaking ones native to OZ. While I wasn't too concerned about our breif exposure, I wondered about the crew, who might get a shot of insecticide several times per month. I suppose it would be bad for the image if the flight attendants wore gas masks while spraying the passangers. :-) Ken From kls Fri May 21 03:43:51 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: brianm@boar.tansu.com.au (Brian Martin) Subject: Re: Mouse grounds 767 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: brianm@boar.tansu.com.au Organization: AOTC - CSSC Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 May 93 03:43:51 PDT In article 417@ohareChicago.COM, rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes: >In article jacobs@charly.taclog.af.mil writes: >>The US Department of Agriculture (and probably its British equivalent) >>frown on stowaway mice arriving aboard airliners from foreign >>lands. As I recall the fines are pretty stiff and there is also >>the possibility that the aircraft could be impounded... >>Better to exterminate the vermin on discovery then to take a chance >>of having the Feds impound your 70 million dollar airplane for >>a couple of days! > >True, but airplanes can contain a lot of unpleasant critters, especially >roaches, flies, etc--trying to get rid of all of them is sort of like >trying to get rid of rats on ships--can't be done, but the magnitude of >the problem can probably be controlled somewhat. They tend to board >via food containers. >USDA got pretty aggressive about all this around ten years ago; I have >clear memories of coming in from overseas and, fifteen minutes prior >to landing, the cabin crew walking through the cabin *gassing* us, emptying >cans of insecticide into the air. No, they didn't drop the oxygen >masks. :-) Department of Civial Aviation does this insecticide routine on EVERY arriving international flight here in Australia. How effective it is I don't know, but it is important to slow down the spread of vermin carried diseases to countries which may not have a particular disease yet. It's not the mouse or cockroach they are worried about as such, it's what disease they could be carrying, & the affects it would have on human & stock populations if it started an epidemic. Brian Martin brianm@cssc-syd.tansu.com.au From kls Fri May 21 03:43:57 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: h andrew chuang Subject: Re: 747s and American Airlines References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 May 93 03:43:57 PDT >> I have noticed that American Airlines does not have any 747s. This >> is surprising for one of the largest airlines in the world. Do they >> know something that the rest of the airlines do not know? > > Difficult as it may be to believe now, the 747 had some fairly rocky > beginnings. Besides early technical problems, it was simply too big, > especially for U.S. domestic-only carriers. In the U.S. domestic market, flight frequency is very important, and there is no market large enough to support high-frequency 747 services like Japan's Tokyo-Osaka and many other short domestic routes which are served by JAL and All Nippon with their 747SR's. Other than the Japanese services, the Far East is the only market where 747 is regularly and extensively used for regional services, because the airports there are very congested. On those extra long-hual services (e.g., U.S.-Asia and Europe-Asia- Australia), in order to have "sensible" departure and arrival time and to meet curfews of different airports, it's almost impossible to offer multi-frequency services, thus, a high-capacity aircraft is desirable. For example, most of the Tokyo-bound flights from the West Coast depart around noon so that people from around the country can take a morning flight to the West Coast, make the connection, and arrive in Tokyo in the late afternoon, and, if necessary, take another flight to other parts of Asia. That's why the two major US airlines in the Trans-Pacific market, UA and Northwest, are also the two largest 747 operators in the U.S. On the other hand, for the shorter Trans-Atlantic services, there are more possibities for "sensible" departure times, the smaller twins become very economical for multi-frequency services. The twins are also ideal for secondary markets like Milan, Stockholm in Europe and Charlotte, Pittsburgh in the U.S. > United's 1986 acquisition of Pan Am's Pacific Division included 11 > 747SPs, which were supplemented in 1987 by the five ex-American > 747-100s and two new 747-200s for New York-Tokyo service. Another > seven 747-200s (ex-QANTAS) arrived in 1991 for the new U.S.-London > service, and 747-400s began arriving in 1989. I believe United now > has the third largest 747 fleet, after Japan Air Lines and British > Airways. As of Dec 31,92, UA has the second largest 747 fleet in the world: it operates 55 747's (13 -122's, 5 -123's, 2 -222's, 7 -238's, 10 SP21's, [ ?? Karl said that there were 11 SP's, my source shows 10 ?? ] 18 -422's) with 27 -400's on order and 30 -400's on option. BA operates one less 747 than UA (15 -136's, 18 -236's, and 23 -436's), but BA has significantly less -400's on order and option, 19 and 15, respectively. I think the gap will further widen because BA will probably retire its -100's a lot sooner than UA will. By the way, the largest 747 operator, JAL, operates 81 747's (plus ~5 747's operated by its subsidiaries) with 15 on order and another 34 on option. [Note: once again, these numbers are as of 12-31-92, since then both UA and JAL have switched a few 747 orders to options or 767's. Also, all the number listed here includes airplanes being mothballed.] Here is some more statistics to further support my argument stated at the beginning: the twelve largest 747 operators account for nearly 60% of the 747's in service, and they are: JAL (81), UA (55), BA (54), Northwest (50), Air France (45), Singapore (37), Lufthansa (37), All Nippon (33), Qantas (33), Cathay Pacific (31), Korean (28), and KLM (27). All 12 airlines have extensive Trans-Pacific or Europe-Asia-Australia networks or both. Out of these 12 carriers, the Pacific Rim operators (six of them, Qantas included) have 243 747's, the European operators (four) have 163, and the US operators (two) have 105. Obviously, one can see where the balance falls. Moreover, the more significant orders are mostly held by Asian carriers: Singapore (25 firm and 17 options), Korean (17+11), All Nippon (16+17), and JAL (15+34). That's why the Pacific Rim is the major target for the proposed 500-800 passerger aircraft. (Some of the airlines metioned above have pretty amazing fleet size if you consider the home market size: Hong Kong, home of Cathay Pacific, has six million people, and Singapore has only 2.5 million people. If the US has the same "number of 747 per capita" as Singapore has, the US would have ~3500 747's in service, and ~4000 on order or option.) >American and Delta were expanding into international carriers at the >same time as United, of course. The major difference was that their >primary emphasis was across the Atlantic rather than the Pacific at >first. By this time the ETOPS 767 (and other twins) had made the 747 >unnecessary for most trans-Atlantic service; heavier routes could be >handled by the DC-10-30 or L-1011-500. Only recently has either of >these airlines gained much of a beachhead across the Pacific, and the >smaller MD-11 now offers them a more appealing aircraft than the 747 >for this service considering their niche markets. Last year, Delta had an ambitious plan to expand in Asia by establishing a hub in Taipei. Supposedly, the plan was postponed to this year. Now, with all the cuts among the US airlines, the plan has not even been mentioned lately. However, if Delta does really want to be a major player in that market, Delta will need the 747, eventually. AA does not seem to be interested in the Asian market other than Japan. With its limited Trans-Pacific services from "secondary" gateways (Dallas and San Jose) and apparent limited interest in the market, AA is not likely to return to flying the 747 any time soon. Andrew From kls Fri May 21 03:44:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: novick@ogicse.ogi.edu (David G. Novick) Subject: Re: Mouse Grounds 767 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Oregon Graduate Institute (formerly OGC), Beaverton, OR Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 May 93 03:44:00 PDT Some years ago, I was on a Hughes AirWest DC-9 short-hopper here in the Pacific Northwest. The cabin lighting was supplied, in part, through two plastic strips in the ceiling that ran down the cabin above the aisle. As we landed and we were deplaning, I distinctly saw, through one of the strips, a mouse walking forward along the strip. I did not fly AirWest again. I did speculate, though, as to the frequent-flyer mileage that mouse must have racked up. --David -------------------------------------------------------------------------- David G. Novick | Department of Computer Science and Engineering novick@cse.ogi.edu | Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and Technology tel (503) 690-1156 | 19600 N.W. Von Neumann Drive fax (503) 690-1029 | Beaverton, OR 97006-1999 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Fri May 21 14:07:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jgladu@bcm.tmc.edu (grungy) Subject: Aeroflot sighting Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 May 93 14:07:00 PDT Organization: Systems Support Center, BCM In a recent swing past Houston Intercontinental Airport (IAH) I saw an unfamiliar aircraft with what appeared to be the cyrillic Aeroflot markings. It was sitting in an out-of-the-way area, next to a 727. It was four-jet, high wing and a tall T-tail with very large horizontal stabilizer. The wing mounted to the fuselage with a decided "shoulder". Can anyone tell what this is from my shoddy description? bcnu - John Gladu Systems Support Center -- Baylor College of Medicine INTERNET: jgladu@bcm.tmc.edu | VOICE: (713)798-7370 US MAIL: One Baylor Plaza, Houston, Texas 77030 .opinions expressed are just that.obviously. From kls Fri May 21 14:07:06 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Aeroflot sighting References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 May 93 14:07:06 PDT >It was four-jet, high wing and a tall T-tail with very large horizontal >stabilizer. The wing mounted to the fuselage with a decided "shoulder". Sounds like an Il-76 or perhaps an An-124. (I'm not certain that the Antonov has a "T-tail" though the Ilyushin does.) These were built as military transports, very roughly -- and without implying any copying of designs -- Soviet equivalents of the C-141 and C-5, respectively. With the collapse of the USSR the Russians have been enthusiastically marketing these aircraft for commercial cargo transport in many other countries, including the U.S. There was a bit of a row last year about proper certification for U.S. operations but that subsequently was resolved. This seems like a decent arena in which the Russians can pursue some hard currency. (About two years ago I was in the Chicago area and heard a *very* unusual sounding jet on approach to 14R at O'Hare. It was much louder than most aircraft at that point but also was qualitatively different, more of a buzz as I recall. What finally came into view was an Il-76. I think the different sound surprised me even more than the fact that it was there at all. Does anyone know of anything unusual about the engines on this aircraft that might cause this difference?) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Sat May 22 01:34:40 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Aeroflot sighting References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 22 May 93 01:34:40 PDT In article you write: >In a recent swing past Houston Intercontinental Airport (IAH) I saw an >unfamiliar aircraft with what appeared to be the cyrillic Aeroflot >markings. It was sitting in an out-of-the-way area, next to a 727. > >It was four-jet, high wing and a tall T-tail with very large horizontal >stabilizer. The wing mounted to the fuselage with a decided "shoulder". > >Can anyone tell what this is from my shoddy description? I saw it earlier this week; it's an IL-76 "Candid." Apparently, it's been making a cargo run for the past several months. The vertical stabilizer has a large Russian flag on it, which makes it look rather military; however, Aeroflot's on the front, in big letters. It looks about like a big C-130 with a BAE-146 wing design and an oversized Russian T-tail. :-) --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Thu May 27 11:23:19 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: 747s and American Airlines References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 May 93 11:23:19 PDT Two quick points, just as an addition to Karl's excellent discussion of AA's 747 operations: 1. AA's choice of the MD-11 to fill its needs for a long-range international aircraft was based on considerations of service frequency and break-even load factors. AA considers the 747-400 too big for its needs; even when a route becomes popular, it prefers to increase frequency rather than aircraft size. Although seat-mile costs are higher, the number of passengers required for the service to break even is considerably lower. As h andrew chuang pointed out in his follow-up, on some routes its hard to increase frequency because of timing problems; AA has very few such routes. The ORD-Tokyo route would have been such a route, and AA did try to obtain 747-400s for it. (Also, the Pacific market--especially the Japanese market--has a strong preference for the 747; one of the reasons UA disposed of its L-1011 so rapidly (aside from their generally poor condition) was strong resistance to this type on the routes to Japan.) 2. The MD-11s actually represent an increase in capacity over the 747SP (251 vs 203 seats in AA's configuration). -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Thu May 27 11:23:21 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: 747s and American Airlines References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 May 93 11:23:21 PDT h andrew chuang wrote: > ... AA does not seem to be > interested in the Asian market other than Japan. With its limited > Trans-Pacific services from "secondary" gateways (Dallas and San > Jose) and apparent limited interest in the market, AA is not > likely to return to flying the 747 any time soon. Actually, AA is still kicking itself for not bidding for PA's pacific routes, and has been very aggressive at trying to obtain additional routes (as in the case of the competitions for the ORD-TKO route). Its not so much a matter of interest as of restictions in the bilateral air agreements limiting further growth. -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Thu May 27 11:23:23 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: tdlowe01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu (Tony D. Lowe) Subject: Backing under own power Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: University of Louisville Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 May 93 11:23:23 PDT Something I've always wondered. Are jet aircraft able to back up under their own power? I've often heard rumor that they can, but usually don't because of visibility problems, etc. I know at UPS, we always use tugs to back our aircraft. About a year and a half ago, my wife and I were flying on an MD-80, and as we were backing away from the terminal, there was a distinct revving to the engines as we began to move. Marshallers could be seen at the wing tips directing the aircraft back. But the biggest thing that gave me the impression that bird was backing under its own power was how quickly we began to move forward again -- 10 to 20 seconds at most; the tugs we use at UPS sometimes require several minutes to disconnect. There was no sign of a tug of any sort moving away afterward. So, did it back up by itself or not? -- Tony D. Lowe, The HapMaster BITNET: tdlowe01@ulkyvx.bitnet University of Louisville INTERNET: tdlowe01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu "People without a sense of humor don't have any sense at all." From kls Thu May 27 11:23:25 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Greg Pisanich Subject: Need help on 747-400 cockpit dimensions. Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 May 93 11:23:25 PDT Hi all, please help if you can. I'm working on a project involved in simulating human computer interfaces, including anthropometric models. The current simulation development is based on the 747-400. We have a 747-400 simulator coming into Ames, but it has been delayed, and we can't wait. We've requested scaled drawings from Boeing, but they are slow in coming. We have drawings but they have no scale associated to check them against. If you have access to a 747-400 or 747-400 simulator, could you please send me the measurements for the outside of the MCP and on of the primaries or EICAS displays? They don't have to be outstandingly accurate, just something reasonable we can start with, we can work out the rest. Thanks in advance. I promise a project description to anyone who can help. Greg Pisanich MIDAS development group. greg@eos.arc.nasa.gov From kls Thu May 27 11:23:27 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Light panels on airliners Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 May 93 11:23:27 PDT For many, many years I've wondered how the cockpit panel lighting in airliners worked. It's *high quality* stuff, completely uniform, near- perfect lettering, no mistakes, is cold-like-metal, etc. Tonight, I learned how. 1. The cockpit panels are made of PLASTIC, not metal. Metallic gray paint is used on the front. 2. The lettering is etched in the panel from reverse. 3. The paint is laid on thick from the front; the letters are preserved through a silk-screening process (not clear how). 4. A lighting panel, containing imbedded light bulbs, is applied to the back of the front panel; it's comprised of transluscent plastic. It has raised lettering on the front, and "sandwiches" precisely into the front panel. The lighting panel is about a quarter-inch thick. 5. On most airplanes, the lighting panel is attached to the front panel; thus, if an element burns out or needs replacing, it has to be sent back to the manufacturer. 6. The connector for the lighting panel is about a third of an inch in radius, and can be found by looking for a very small "X" on the panel. Oh, well, news to me. :-) --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Thu May 27 16:12:31 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: carmicha@ra-iris.arc.nasa.gov (Ralph Carmichael) Subject: Russian Cargo Planes in Texas Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 27 May 93 16:12:31 PDT Aviation Week for 17May93 p.37-38 has photos of Il-96-300 (*not* Il-76) at Ft. Worth Alliance and story about negotiations with Perot on trade routes. ======================================================================== Ralph Carmichael carmicha@ra-iris.arc.nasa.gov (415) 604-6266 Mail Stop N-227-2 NASA Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000 ======================================================================== From kls Wed Jun 2 00:16:07 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM (Geoff Miller) Subject: Re: Backing under own power References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Reply-To: geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Jun 93 00:16:07 PDT tdlowe01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu (Tony D. Lowe) writes: >Something I've always wondered. Are jet aircraft able to back up under >their own power? I've often heard rumor that they can, but usually don't >because of visibility problems, etc. Sure they can. Most airlines don't do that, however, because of concerns about foreign object damage and/or the hazard to buildings, ground personnel, ramp equipment, etc., from the jet blast. I'm sure those concerns would be especially strong in the case of the 737, due to the engines' proximity to the ground as well as their forward position, which places them much closer to the terminal building when the plane is at the gate. I don't know which U.S. airlines currently do this, but I remember that Republic started backing out its DC-9s under engine power in the mid- Eighties. I observed that once at Tucson; a marshaller standing just ahead and to the left of the airplane's nose pointed his light wands together and moved them over each other in a rolling motion, as the signal to begin backing up. The thrust reversers popped out, power was increased, and the plane moved back fairly quickly. The rearward motion was arrested with a burst of forward thrust. The operation was quite noisy, even inside the terminal, and the plate glass windows in the departure lounge shook quite a bit. I remember reading in AvLeak around that time that the procedure called for the pilot to keep his feet planted flat on the floor so that he wouldn't instinctively use the brakes to stop and plant the plane on its tail. Interestingly, I've never heard of this being done with propeller-driven airliners. Geoff -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Geoff Miller + + + + + + + + Sun Microsystems geoffm@purplehaze.Corp.Sun.COM + + + + + + + + Menlo Park, California -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- From kls Wed Jun 2 00:16:12 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Don Webster <71352.340@CompuServe.COM> Subject: Re Backing under own power Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Jun 93 00:16:12 PDT >So, did it back up by itself or not? American Airlines, and I'm sure some others, have had a back-up procedure for some time. I know that the DC-9 can back up quite well on its own power, and as you imply, the MD-80 does as well. United does not do it as a standard policy. The 747 may use reverse to asist the tug if it is deemed safe. I suspect that the low engines on the 737s would be much more prone to foreign object damage than the higher DC-9/MD-80 engines. Back to you. Don Webster 71352.340@compuserve.com From kls Wed Jun 2 00:16:15 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Backing under own power References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Jun 93 00:16:15 PDT In article tdlowe01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu writes: >Something I've always wondered. Are jet aircraft able to back up under >their own power? I've often heard rumor that they can, but usually don't >because of visibility problems, etc. I know at UPS, we always use tugs to >back our aircraft. Airplanes with thrust reversers can generally push back under their own power (not sure about planes with cascade reversers, though). It requires a special ground control clearance, it can only be done in certain wind conditions (no appreciable tail-wind), and it may not always be feasible (airports where it's common often have blast-louvred and reinforced windows near the gates). It may also not be desirable due to ground clutter or personnel. The reason it's done is to save time: if Southwest couldn't push back, I'm sure its efficiency would go to hell in a handbasket. :-) Beats having to wait for a tug, wait for it to hook up, wait for it to disconnect, etc. When is a tug better? To save fuel, when you have the time. A 747, for instance, might start one engine for hydraulics, get a push-back, then start the rest when backed out and waiting for the tug to disconnect. A little bit of fuel on a lot of airplanes means big savings. Tugs tend to be quite noisy, and can generally be easily heard from the cabin. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Wed Jun 2 00:16:17 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: barrt@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (???? Barr) Subject: Re: Backing under own power References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Jun 93 00:16:17 PDT In article tdlowe01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu (Tony D. Lowe) writes: >Something I've always wondered. Are jet aircraft able to back up under >their own power? I've often heard rumor that they can, but usually don't >because of visibility problems, etc. I know at UPS, we always use tugs to >back our aircraft. This maneuver is called a 'power back', as opposed to a 'push back', which uses a tug. The procedure is possible on 727's and DC-9's, and possibly on others as well, I have only seen these two types accomplish this, however. Many airlines do not use this procedure (United for one), because it is rather bad for the engines. During the procedure, a good deal of dirt and grit can be ingested into the intake, and that sand-blasts the turbine. In fact, United normal procedures call for the reverse thursters on a 727 to be off at any speed slower than 80 knots, for exactly this reason. _____________________________ _____ | Keith Barr \ \ U \__ _____ | barr@ncar.ucar.edu \___________\ \/_______\___\_____________ | Commercial/AS&MEL/Inst/A&IGI / ( /_/ ..................... `-. |_____________________________/ `-----------,----,--------------' _/____/ From kls Wed Jun 2 00:16:23 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Stall warning revisited Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Jun 93 00:16:23 PDT Someone some time ago asked how airliner stall warning systems work. I just ran a description of the 727's system; this is a condensed version. Enjoy! 1. Stall warnings are designed to signal an *impending* stall. Inputs are the angle of attack, flap position, and the air/ground switch. The system is comprised of an angle of attack sensor, flap angle transmitter, a stall warning module, a stick-shaker, and the air/ground sensor. The system is 28 VAC; the stick-shaker operates 28 VDC. 2. The angle of attack sensor is a vane, mounted behind the first officer's aft window, beneath the airplane centerline. It takes the form of a V-shaped wedge, acute portion pointing into the wind. There are dowel pins to keep it from reversing (perhaps for mechanical reasons). This is mounted on a little lever assembly, which enters the aircraft through a small, flush port. The port is headed, to alleviate the possibility of ice hindering the effectiveness of the system. The lever is used to generate an electrical signal, which is communicated to two synchro transmitters. One is used by the autothrottle system, if installed; the other sends the raw electrical signal to a device on the left inboard trailing edge flap assembly. 3. This device takes the signal and electrically "rotates" its phase, as a function of actual inboard flap *position*, thus compoensating for configuration-based stall-speed changes. This rotated signal is then sent to a stall warning module. 4. The stall warning module is a simple logic-circuit mounted on the overhead panel in the cockpit. It compares the phase angle to a reference 28VAC value. If it figures out that a warning situation exists, it will issue a signal which activates the stick shaker motor on the pilots' control column(s). 5. The stall warning module interface consists of an OFF light (illuminated in case of electrical failure or major fault), a test annunciator, and a three-position control switch. 6. The control switch has three position: normal, test (activates motor and shows the test annunciator), and heater off (used in ground maintenance). 7. The gear air/ground switch comes into play when the oleo struts are compressed: this suppresses the stall warning during roll-out on the ground. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Wed Jun 2 00:16:26 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: wangermn@phoenix.princeton.edu (John Paul Wangermann) Subject: Traffic Projections Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Princeton University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 02 Jun 93 00:16:26 PDT I'm trying to round up some civil air traffic projections for passenger and cargo traffic into the next century. The sort of thing that AvWeek and Flight often quote, but never properly reference. Could people either a) give me some references (i.e. report nos etc.) so that I can get our library to hunt them down b) give me names of people I could contact for projections in organizations such as ICAO, IATA, ATA, FAA, RAA etc Thanks in advance for any help or advice you may have John ------------------------------------------------------------------- John P. Wangermann wangermn@phoenix.princeton.edu Dept of Mech and Aero Eng. (609) 258 5340 E Quad Olden St Princeton NJ 08544 USA ------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Thu Jun 3 02:57:58 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: weiss@crowe.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) Subject: Airbus A300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 03 Jun 93 02:57:58 PDT I just got back from Houston last night on an Airbus A300, and I thought I would share some thoughts and questions here. One of the things I noticed was the aforementioned (in rec.travel.air, I think) headphone jacks. These were of the two-jack variety. I attempted to see if regular stereo headphones could pick up anything. Nada. They (Continental) sold the typical cheapo plastic tubing types. No movie for me (not that I minded). Unlike other aircraft, the doors of the A300 open like the side doors on a van. That is, they pop out, and then slide horizontally, rather than popping in and swinging out on hinges. Is this common for all Airbuses? The powered approach sounds to me like a more convenient, but less reliable method. The strangest thing I saw was that no trailing edge flap was used on takeoff. I had never seen another aircraft take off without trailing edge flap. Granted, the leading edge slats were extended, but this seemed a bit odd to me. The trailing edge flaps were extended during landing. The flight from IAH to LAX was shorter than the flight from LAX to IAH. This also surprised me, since generally eastbound flights are faster (jet stream). Does anyone have any idea why this happened this time? I flew to IAH on an MD-80 (looked more like it was manufactured when they were still calling them DC-9 Super 80s), and returned on the Airbus. -- \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | / - Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science - - Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles - / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \ From kls Thu Jun 3 02:58:22 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Info on 727 Simulator Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 03 Jun 93 02:58:22 PDT A few users have asked for more information on my 727 simulator, following the blurb on comp.sys.mac.games. So, here's some background. The airplane modeled is a 727-200(ADV), without auxilliary fuel tanks. There are two distinct versions: 1. A *Systems* simulator. 2. A *Flight* simulator. The systems simulator will mainly be of interest to 727 pilots, flight engineers, F/E wanna-be's, and aero-science schools, as a "review guide" (courtesy system synoptic displays), or as low-cost transport-category systems simulator. In general, features include everything EXCEPT voice communications, lighting, oxygen masks, and manual cranks. Minor interface changes have been made to adapt to the requirements of getting everything to work on a computer (e.g., sliders instead of knobs; square push-buttons instead of toggle-switches). This version is nearing final (ultimate) release, late-June. System performance is being constantly re-evaluated and validated, with the generous assistance and input of several pilots and technical personnel from four carriers. The flight simulator == the systems simulator, plus a 6 degree of freedom flight model, world-wide navaid database, additional interface features (flight planner, map mode), and a simple, 3D display (night view). I plan an August release. This should be of interest to a wider market, including airliner enthusiasts, veteran simulator enthusiasts, airline-pilot wanna- be's, etc. The documentation is extensive, but won't teach users how to "fly." There are plenty of retail simulators that can do that. The documentation is written for a user with a private pilot rating and some basic knowledge of IFR navigation, with specific "gotcha" pointers for professional users (i.e., discrepancies between the simulator and the Real Thing). One major design objective is to be completely honest about the capabilities of the simulator; therefore, there will be no nonsensical or wishful claims of "realism." There will be two or three "tutorials" for the flight simulator version, guiding the user from takeoff through a coupled landing at a different airport. These will be intended to introduce newcomers to the basic flow patterns of transport-category operations. Both versions will sell for about $150. The systems simulator will be phased out when the flight simulator has been released, and there should be a nominal upgrade fee (at cost). The target platform is the Mac; a PC (Windows) version of the systems simulator *may* be out this fall. Specific features: Systems Simulator ----------------- Requirements: 2M on disk, 3M RAM partition. Mac II-class machine or better. 640 x 480 display (support 13" monitor in high-res mode) 8-bit color (256 colors) or better Math co-processor NOT required. General Synoptic dialogs Day/night panel display mode. System snapshot-save capability. Point & click interface Four "panels." (pilot, overhead, two flight engineer panels). Extensive documentation. Air conditioning & pressurization Automatic, manual, and standby modes. Faults. APU Start/shutdown Fire Electrical loading Pneumatics support Autopilot Place-holder, mainly. Supports a simple "parametric flight" mode to illustrate the APD and provide some context for pressurization and airspeed warning system demonstration. Electrical system Battery AC generators APU Frequency control & faults Loading Synoptic dialog. External power Faults May be scheduled for random execution within 60 minutes. Engine failure, fire, separation, severe damage. Hydraulic A & B fluid loss/failure. Gear jam APU fire Wheel well fire T/R faults Generator faults: Instability Phase unbalance Differential Exciter ceiling protection Over/under excitation Over/under speed. Flight controls Alternate flaps Ground proximity warning system Airspeed warning system (A/B modes). Anti-ice Synoptic dialog. Fuel system Management Crossfeed Dumping. Icing. Synoptic dialog. Hydraulics A & B systems. Standby power. Alternate flaps. Proper electrical loading. Proper demand-loading as a function of gear or flap select. Control management. Accurate landing gear performance; wheel well fires. Synoptic dialog. Instruments Functioning airspeed/mach/vmo, altimeter, and vertical speed indicators. Consolidated "ECAM" display (glass), designed to provide a monitoring capability from the pilot's panel. This is divided into alert, flap, oil, and hydraulics pages. Pneumatics Ground cart APU support Engine support Air conditioning & pressurization support. Pack trips & faults. Powerplant Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15 Start/shutdown All relevant device support. Failure/fire modes. Accurate run-time performance. Fire control. The Flight Simulator -------------------- Requirements Same as Systems simulator, except: Floating-point chip required (tentative). 4M RAM requirement. 8M on disk. Systems Same as Systems Simulator. Autopilot Loosely based on Sperry SP-150 Altitude hold/select Heading hold/select. Pitch hold. Glide slope/localizer tracking. VOR/localizer tracking. "Manual" mode. Approach Progress display. Autothrottle (tentative) Faults Same as Systems Simulator, plus: Reverser failure Runaway/jammed stabilizer Flight instruments Functioning additude-directional indicator (horizon) Flight director. Radio altimeter. Decision height annunciator & call-outs. Flight model 6 degree-of-freedom flight model representative of a 727-class airliner. Interactive, C*-derivative flight control law. Custom ground control laws. Interface Map position-set mode. Automatic flight plan generator (airways). Automatic V-speed call-outs. Debrief mode. Partial panel dialog ICAO 17 Simulator features (mainly various freeze modes). Position load/set independent of system states. Navigation database World-wide nav database. Around 6,000 navaids. About 4,000 runways. Most dense in the United States. Navigation instruments Horizontal situation indicator. Radio-magnetic indicator with superimposed VOR and ADF needles. Two DME displays. Coupled autopilot support. Visual Simple, light-point display. Runways and airport features only. Perhaps shorelines, eventually. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Fri Jun 4 12:12:12 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Don Webster <71352.340@CompuServe.COM> Subject: Re Airbus A300 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 04 Jun 93 12:12:12 PDT >The flight from IAH to LAX was shorter than the flight from LAX to IAH. While the jet stream is predominantly west to east, it has huge serpentine bends in it as it travels clockwise around a high pressure area and counter- clockwise around a low. It is not uncommon to have essentially no west-east wind component for a flight or even a tailwind for a long flight going west. I recently flew a LA to Tokyo flight and had a 20 knot average tailwind. Don Webster 71352.340@compuserve.com From kls Fri Jun 4 12:12:16 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Airbus A300 flaps References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 04 Jun 93 12:12:16 PDT In article weiss@crowe.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Mic hael Weiss) writes: >The strangest thing I saw was that no trailing edge flap was used on takeoff. >I had never seen another aircraft take off without trailing edge flap. >Granted, the leading edge slats were extended, but this seemed a bit odd to me. >The trailing edge flaps were extended during landing. This one surprised me, so I looked it up: you're right. I couldn't find a flaps data card, but the A300 (B2/B4) flap/slat/krueger flap deployment schedule is: Lever Slats TE Krueger ------------------------------------------------------- Closed 0 0 Up First detent: 16 0 Up Second detent: 16 8 Extend Third detent: 16 15 Extend Fourth detent: 25 25 Extend I also looked it up for the A320. It does something similar. When *holding*, the trailing edge flaps retract in position 1. When in a takeoff or landing mode, they deploy to 10 degrees (slats to 18). Ain't software modalities wonderful? (don't ask me how the airplane figures out if it's holding) On the 707 (no Krueger flaps), 727, 747, and 757, you get leading edge device extension with the first trailing edge setting. So, for instance, with the 727, upon reaching flaps 2 (TE), the slats extend halfway (panels 2, 4, 6, 7--there are four per wing). When the TE flaps reach position 5, all leading edge devices (slats and flaps) are fully extended. The 747 does something very similar. I would guess that this behavior might be a function of manufacturer culture. On the Boeing planes, in normal operation, usually when the trailing edge flaps reach specified detents, a multiple-mode valve assembly kicks into action, thus conveying hydraulic fluid/pressure to the appropriate leading edge device actuators, thus extending them (there are jackscrew assemblies to hold them in place, so none of the DC-10-style nonsense after hydraulic failure would apply--except maybe the 707, but in that case the fluid's trapped in the actuator). Boeing's also known for sticking with what works, so it's under less pressure to innovate or try different things, unlike Airbus (this is a compliment for Boeing's safety culture, not a detraction). Does anyone know what Lockheed did with the L-1011? Or Douglas? (as an explanatory aside, on airliners, the leading edge and trailing edge devices have somewhat different functional aspects, but are selected through a single, common lever. Some manufacturers refer to a "degree" setting, which refers to the trailing edge position. On a 727, it would be Up, 2, 5, 15, 25, 30, 40; on an A320, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. The latter approach is probably more "academically" honest, but the former more user-friendly: "degrees" are probably used to make the pilots feel more like they're "in the loop", and do represent magnitude, but are otherwise relatively meaningless). --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Fri Jun 4 12:12:20 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Airbus A300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 04 Jun 93 12:12:20 PDT In article weiss@crowe.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: >Unlike other aircraft, the doors of the A300 open like the side doors on a van. >That is, they pop out, and then slide horizontally, rather than popping in and >swinging out on hinges. Is this common for all Airbuses? The powered approach >sounds to me like a more convenient, but less reliable method. It sounds unsafe, if that's what happens. Normally, there's some structural integrity protecting accidental or intentional door opening in flight; that's what the swinging-in motion is--working around the frame. I wonder if they just use bolts and air/ground sensing... --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Wed Jun 9 01:29:18 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Bad, bad joke. Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 09 Jun 93 01:29:18 PDT (USAir recently joined the crop of airlines opting for British Airways-clone liveries) Q: "What are those horizontal lines on the vertical stabilizer in USAir's new livery?" A: "Water lines, to tell how deep they are." :-) From kls Wed Jun 9 01:29:30 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.aviation.misc Path: bounce-back From: stadler@apple.com (Andy Stadler) Subject: A ride on an A320 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Followup-To: sci.aeronautics.airliners Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 09 Jun 93 01:29:30 PDT Organization: Apple Computer Inc, Cupertino, CA Last week, I managed to sneak out of work for a week, and while no one was looking, I went down the airport and grabbed a flight to Puerta Vallarta. It's been a long time since I flew a non-US carrier, so I was looking forward to finally seeing a cockpit while in-flight. Imagine my surprise when I walked up to the gate and discovered that I was about to board a shiny new Mexicana A320. After dropping my bags in my seat, I made my usual trip forward to say hi and sneak a peak. I chatted with the pilots for about 5 minutes or so, and made appropriate ooh and aah noises at the panel. I then asked if it would be possible to visit again while we were in flight, and they said "sure." About an hour into our 3 hour flight, the copilot *came back* into the cabin, found me, and said "hey, if you'd like to come up, any time. By the way, if you'd like, you can stay for the landing." As you can imagine, my jaw hit the floor.... I finished my lunch, took another nap (this was the start of vacation after all), grabbed my camera, and headed forward. At this point, we were about 45 minutes away from landing. The captain reached over and pulled out the jump seat and motioned for me to sit down. This was too much. I had already identified myself as a pilot, so they quickly set about showing off their new toy. I got to see lots of instrument display modes, play with the weather radar (tilted down you can really see landforms easily), check out electronic approach plates for every possible landing, view all sorts of system information screens, and so on, and so on.... I asked many questions, and the copilot did most of the answering. I tried to elicit as much information as possible, without going on the attack. I got demos of the glideslope/descent rate controller (the infamous decimal point), the autothrottles, the sidesticks, the nav computers, everything. After a while, I think it became obvious to the copilot that I knew something about the 320, because he finally turned around and said "look, I know what you're thinking, but let me tell you something. I love this airplane. It's the best airplane I've flown. I wouldn't trade it for anything." I have to say, it sounded sincere - not just the company line. At this time, we were already beginning our descent into Puerta Vallarta, so I made an effort to be quiet and just enjoy the show. Sterile cockpit was not a rule I guess, because the crew continued to point things out, explain operations, and so forth. We essentially made a visual approach into the area, on a long right base entry. This was the charted approach, but we flew it completely visually. Descent control was handled completely by dialing altitudes, descent rates, and airspeeds into the autopilot. We turned in behind an Alaska MD-80 and followed him into the airport. Unfortunately, the spacing was a bit tight, and the Alaska jet took WAY too long on the rollout, so at about 2000 AGL the captain zero'd the rate of descent and began a visual go-around! This was incredible - we were at about 2000, completely dirty, and essentially made a huge racetrack hold to allow the Alaska jet time to get out of the way. On the downwind, I noticed just how high our angle of attack was, and I looked back over my shoulder, through the open cockpit door, DOWN into the cabin. I felt a little bad for the passengers, but I have to admit I was loving it.... On the second pass, everything was OK for the landing, so we continued inbound. I was having a tough time deciding how much to spend through the viewfinder (I have a great sequence of landing shots) and how much to enjoy through my own eyeballs. At 100 feet (maybe 200, can't remember) the GPWS starting calling altitudes, in a loud male voice - "One Hundred"..."Seventy Five"..."Fifty"..."Thirty Five"..."Thirty Five"..."Thirty Five"... I couldn't figure out why it stuck at 35 until I started to feel side loading and I realized we were mains down, but nose in the air. The announcement must have self-deactivated when the squat switch compressed, because we lowered the nose in silence and stopped fairly rapidly. We turned off, and taxied to the terminal, and the pilots spent most of the time just chatting with me about the flight and the landing. I was surprised (as I had been all along) at how *little* they had to do. After we found our spot and shut down, I thanked them profusely, and made my way back into the cabin, where I had to fight the crowd to get back to my seat.... While in P.V., I of course made all of my friends hear my story over and over again. The return flight was also on an A320, but some other lucky fellow got to the jump seat. I did ride through most of the SFO profile descent (in IMC, by the way) standing in the doorway, but when we went through 10,000 feet, I went ahead and walked back to my seat. Observations? Obviously, I walked in with a ton of preconceptions about the A320 program and aircraft. I must say that I came away with much more mixed feelings than I went into it with. On the down side, issues like the additive side sticks, the confusing descent controller (which I got a demo of, and it really IS hard to tell its mode), the non-moving throttles, and the nature of software and software development still bother me. On the plus side, however, what I saw was automation used to really make flying simpler. I got a demo of the FMS interface, and it certainly is a big keyboard.... But they didn't really use it that much in the air. I was expecting to see "the fastest typists in the sky". What I saw, however, was an airplane that took care of the crap, and two pilots with their heads on swivels, like they needed to be! On both flights, one -very- VFR and one in basic IFR, what I saw were pilots with extremely good situational awareness and a minimum of time spent on operational details. At no time did I feel like the pilots were along for the ride. Based on this experience, I would guess that highly automated airplanes with standard control laws (like the 747-400 or the 777) will be very successful. One thing I found was that although the displays were extremely sophisticated, they were really quite user friendly. I measure this in two ways. First, although there were many, many screens of data available, the displays did an great job of automatically sequencing them to the correct positions. Two examples: During the flight, a cabin attendant came up and asked them to adjust the temperature. The captian reached up and twisted the "mid cabin temp" knob, and the multi-mode data screen (the lower of the two center screens) instantly switched to a cabin airflow diagram, registered the change, and after then knob had been released, a few seconds later returned to its original display. Later, as we came in for the landing, the data screen automatically switched to a brake temperature display. So, although many options were available, the "correct" option seemed to always come up when you needed it. Second, the displays were clear and extremely readable. I don't have any experience flying behind EFIS systems, but at all times, I was able to glance at the screens and quickly determine exactly what information they were providing. The same was true of the non-CRT displays such as the autopilot controls and the radios. One thing I found interesting: In this world of spring loaded sidesticks and non-moving throttles, the pitch trim wheel was constantly moving back and forth. An interesting piece of mechanical works in the otherwise digital cabin. I found the autopilot and its capabilities to be quite interesting. There was essentially a sequence of four numeric displays across the glareshield. The four displays were speed, heading, altitude, and vertical speed. Below each display was a knob. You could turn each knob to adjust the setting of the display, or you could (pull, push, not sure) it to say "don't care". There were also a set of buttons for special modes, such as "loc" (to change the heading mode to track a localizer), "exped" to command greater rates of altitude change, and "appr" which somehow modified the rate of descent (I suspect it commanded glideslope tracking). I found the interface to be clear and non-confusing. The autopilot knew how to resolve any combinations of care/don't care among speed, alt, and angle. That damn decimal point, however, is definitely too small. The pilots flew the majority of the flight with one hand on these knobs and the head looking out the window. Is this autopilot configuration unique to the A320 or is it standard? Well that's enough rambling for now. It was really a great experience - I recommend it highly.... --Andy stadler@apple.com P.S. followups to sci.aeronautics.airliners. If there are questions you have about anything I did or didn't describe, them, e-mail me and I'll condense into posted responses. From kls Wed Jun 16 14:59:25 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: Re: A ride on an A320 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 16 Jun 93 14:59:25 PDT Andy, Thanks for a very interesting trip report. I had a demo flight from London Heathrow to Aberdeen and back last August. The copilot, who organised the trip, visited City University in May to assist at a presentation on the EFCS which I was giving as part of the series of weekly seminars arranged by the Computer Science Department. Like the pilots you flew with, he adores the A320. He was very good at describing the facilities that the EFCS provides, and at rubbishing some of the urban myths that have grown up around the aircraft. I also had a demonstration of the FMS glide slope/vertical speed interface. You are right that the decimal point is hard to spot, but there are other indications, such as the change in the "aircraft logo" on the PFD. The copilot was of the opinion that confusion of mode could *not* have been responsible for Strasbourg. I am still not sure. Although I was suitably impressed by the demonstration flight, I still harbour suspicions that technical features of the pilot interface, and possibly outright system failure, may have been contributory causes of the three fatal crashes that the A320 has suffered. (I am not a pilot, however. My main interest is safety-critical software.) I am sorry that lack of time prevents me from commenting in more detail on your excellent report. Regards, Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Wed Jun 16 14:59:28 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Jetstream 31 question Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 16 Jun 93 14:59:28 PDT Has anybody noticed that Jetstream 31's almost always appear to have replacement panels on the fuselage in line with the propeller disc? I had noticed this before, but the frequency of its occurrence was brought home to me yesterday at SFO, when only one of 12 or so Jetstream 31s flown in by United Express and American Eagle lacked a replacement panel. By contrast, none of the four Brasilias that came in had such panels (although I remember seeing them occasionally on Brasilias and other prop types). A look through my slide collection confirmed the very high frequency of replacement panels on Jetstreams, and their existence but lower frequency on other types. So, two questions: First, just what exactly causes fuselage damage in line with the prop disc that force panels to be replaced? If the actual propeller blades were coming off, I figure we'd hear about it :-) Second, why are Jetstream 31s so much more susceptible to this kind of damage? Ciao, Stefano --- Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Wed Jun 16 14:59:30 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Collins Air Transport Avionics Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 16 Jun 93 14:59:30 PDT [I'm reluctant to use this newsgroup as a "matchmaker" service, but in this case I think an exception is justified as I recognized the reader and, after a bit of followup research, feel confident that (s)he has a solid reason both for wanting to contact someone at Collins and for doing so confidentially.] A sci.aeronautics.airliners reader would like to get in touch with someone at the Collins Cedar Rapids facility. If any reader works there or knows someone associated with the various FMC programs at Collins and would be willing to accept an email message or phonecall would let me know and I'll put the two of you in contact with each other. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Jun 17 13:02:09 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: driscoll@src.honeywell.com (Kevin Driscoll) Subject: Re: A ride on an A320 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 13:02:09 PDT >and I realized we were mains down, but nose in the air. The announcement >must have self-deactivated when the squat switch compressed, because we >lowered the nose in silence and stopped fairly rapidly. So, you didn't get to the part where the announcement gets insulting to the crew ("Retard ... Retard"). 8^) I was on a A320 flight where the right seater was going to make her very first A320 landing. She was nervous and her gain was way up. She came in shallow and at the first syllable of "Retard" she had the throttle snapped back. The captain calmly said, "We are still 10 feet high." At that point, all we could do was hang on for the landing gear test. >The return flight was also on an A320, but some other lucky fellow got >to the jump seat. Mexicana has only one jump seat? All A320s I have been in have had two. One of the pluses for the A320 is that the jump seat which slides out into the aisle is the best for seeing the controls and displays of any jump seat I have been in (DC9, DC10, 727, 737, 747, 757). >One thing I found interesting: In this world of spring loaded sidesticks >and non-moving throttles, the pitch trim wheel was constantly moving back >and forth. An interesting piece of mechanical works in the otherwise digital >cabin. And one of the few remaining controls available after the FBW goes belly up. >essentially a sequence of four numeric displays across the glareshield. The The Flight Control Unit (FCU) in Airbus speak. >four displays were speed, heading, altitude, and vertical speed. Below >each display was a knob. You could turn each knob to adjust the setting of >the display, or you could (pull, push, not sure) it to say "don't care". The knob operations are: push to "give" control to the Flight Management and Guidance System (FMGS) and pull to "take" control. The latter meaning is that the FCU/"autopilot" is in control versus the FMGS. There really isn't a "don't care"; the control stays with whatever the last push/pull was. >the heading mode to track a localizer), "exped" to command greater rates of ^^^^^ = Expedite Mode >altitude change, and "appr" which somehow modified the rate of descent (I ^^^^ = Final Approach Guidance Mode (ILS or RNAV) >the flight with one hand on these knobs and the head looking out the window. That impressed me too. The much talked about side-sticks are never used in cruise. It looked tiring to keep one's hand up on the FCU for extended periods of time while using the FCU to dodge storm cells. I have been thinking that once you have a electric stick, why not have a switch which couples the stick longitudinal and lateral motion into the altitude and heading FCU inputs respectively? On the other hand, a nice thing about "flying" the plane via the FCU and the placement of the aisle jump seat is that a tall person like myself (6' 4") could easily "fly" the plane from the aisle jump seat. >Is this autopilot configuration unique to the A320 or is it standard? It is a matter of degree; there are similarities and there are differences. >Well that's enough rambling for now. It was really a great experience - I >recommend it highly.... I second that. ----- Kevin R. Driscoll, Staff Research Scientist PHONE: (612) 951-7263 FAX: -7438 INTERNET: driscoll@SRC.Honeywell.com UUCP: {any smart host}!srcsip!driscoll POST: Honeywell M/S MN65-2500; 3660 Technology Drive; Mpls, MN 55418-1006; USA From kls Thu Jun 17 13:02:13 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: gary@sackbut.mitre.org (Gary Bisaga) Subject: Re: A ride on an A320 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: gbisaga@mitre.org Organization: The Mitre Corporation, McLean Virginia Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 13:02:13 PDT About the non-moving throttles on the A320; I asked one A320 captain about them (I am now getting two A320 rides about every 3 weeks so if you all want any questions asked lemme know) and whether they were a problem. He said not at all. You just leave the thing in the flight normal detent during A/T use; when it comes time to deactivate the A/T (done by the red button on the side, which is NOT a G/A switch; for this just shove the throttles forward while in landing config and the plane takes over from there), you look at the ECAM display, which has both the current throttle info and projected throttle info that *would be in effect* if the throttle was set the way the throttle handles are. This is a small circle that moves around the outside of the display (the cirle they call a doughnut). So, if you want to disengage the A/T, you move the lever so that the doughnut lines up with what the A/T is having the throttles really do, then disengage. He said in use it was no problem at all. The G/A mode engage method reminds me of a joke told by a 767 pilot friend of mine. The end of the old joke about the three things heard most often in the cockpit is amended as follows for FMS equipped planes: 1) "What'd the controller say?" 2) "Was that [radio call] for us?" 3) "Where's this thing taking us?" I also asked most of the pilots what they thought of the A320. I heard no real negative comments, with "Love it," "Best plane I've ever flown" being typical responses. Gary From kls Thu Jun 17 13:02:15 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: DMS@ECL.PSU.EDU (Dennis M Straussfogel) Subject: Re: Jetstream 31 question References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Penn State Engineering Computer Lab Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 13:02:15 PDT In spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.Stanford.EDU writes: > Has anybody noticed that Jetstream 31's almost always appear to have > replacement panels on the fuselage in line with the propeller disc? ... > First, just what exactly causes fuselage damage in line with the prop > disc that force panels to be replaced? ... > Second, why are Jetstream 31s so much more susceptible to this kind > of damage? Ice shedding from the props. Some aircraft are equipped with "ice shields" which are rubberized panels that absorb the impact of the ice chunks hitting the fuselage. They would look like replacement panels from a distance. I don't know if the Jetstreams is so equipped. From kls Thu Jun 17 13:02:18 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jambon@imag.fr (Francis Jambon) Subject: A320 - Opinions Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: IMAG Institute, University of Grenoble, France Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 13:02:18 PDT It is very strange, I've spoke with people who do not fly A320, they do not like it, I've spoke with people who fly it, they are found of it ! I cannot understand that. I've done a power on and a take off with one of the 6 axis simulators of Aeroformation (Airbus training school). I was Pilot Flying (in night VFR) at the right place, with an instructor at the left one. It seems to me to be easyer to fly that A320 than a DR400 (As common in France than the C172 in the USA), and much different than home computer flight simulators ! I've try the sticks and the Auto-Pilot : When the other pilot take the control of the airplane, pushing the read button on the stick, a red arrow light on just in front of you (see the paper of R.Dorsett and P.Mellor). When you change the mode of the Auto-Pilot, the value is cleared, a group of three letters change on the Auto-Pilot, and the symbol of the airplane change on the Primary Flight Display (Horizon+speed+altitude). Francis. -- Francis JAMBON - Francis.Jambon@imag.fr __|__ Research in Human-Computer Interaction for... *---o--(_)--o---* Phone: (+33) 76 51 48 54 - Fax: (+33) 76 44 66 75 ! ! ! Laboratoire de Genie Informatique, B206, BP 53, 38041 Grenoble cedex 9, France From kls Thu Jun 17 13:02:19 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: M21986@mwvm.mitre.org Subject: can en route congestion be avoided for commuter flights? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: The MITRE Corporation, McLean VA 22102 Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 13:02:19 PDT I'm looking for ideas about how the en route congestion problems could be avoided by short-haul commuter flights. One suggestion that I have heard is to proceed from tower-to-tower, thereby obviating the need to merge with en route flow. Also, I understand that the low altitude (under 10,000 ft) airways (at least in comparison to the commuter and jetway altitudes) are underutilized. Any comments? Mike Fabrizi The MITRE Corporation My views are my own, not my employer's. From kls Thu Jun 17 23:51:32 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: davelett@athena.mit.edu (Richard Sun) Subject: Strange 727 Flight Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 23:51:32 PDT Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Last Sunday (13 Jun) I was on DL1846 (LGA/BOS Shuttle). As we passed over PVD and prepared for landing, I noticed the plane's attitude changed several times from nose-up about 5 degrees to nose down 5 degrees. Had me stumped. I've flown the shuttle many times before, and this had never happened before. As we landed at BOS, I noticed our speed was very fast. Seemed like the reverse-thrusters were on forever. Of course, I forgot to ask about the strange flight afterwards. Any speculation? I think maybe the flaps or slats were malfunctioning. Any other guesses? From kls Thu Jun 17 23:51:35 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Pilot attitudes on A320 (RE: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 23:51:35 PDT > It is very strange, I've spoke with people who do not fly A320, they do not >like it, I've spoke with people who fly it, they are found of it ! I cannot >understand that. I've a theory on this. Four components: 1. Anyone remember MacEvangelism? The sales and marketing effort for the Macintosh, taken on a slightly "religious" bent. Airbus shares a similar culture, in almost every aspect of production and operations. It *isn't* limited to the marketing people. Engineers, pilots, training, all reflect this. Airbus is proud of its technology, and explicitly makes a big deal of it, for the purpose of differentiating its products. This is actually a fairly sharp tact, since *most* airlines aren't "Airbus airlines," and that single entry into the fleet has to make a significant, favorable impression. What better way than characterizing the traditional, safe, conservative competition as technical Luddites? 2. I suspect the first couple of crashes may be partially attributable to this er, over-enthusiasm. Aeroformation's training program is called VACBI, Video-Audio-Computer-*Based* Instruction. It can be likened to brainwashing: very intensive, one-on-one interaction with the computer: answer the right questions the right way enough times, and you become a Believer. It goes beyond "traditional" teaching techniques. Well, a clear problem with the early software was that it emphasized the gee-whiz features of the systems, at the detriment of basic airmanship and operational philosophies needed to maintain safe flight. After the second plane augured in, Airbus issued plaintive warnings to pilots to fly the airplane the "old fashioned way," and not to maneuver anywhere near the protections, since by default that means one is in a low-energy category to begin with, and may not have sufficient maneuvering capability, to avoid pesky obstacles, like golf courses. Yet even now, as Andy's Mexicana visit article clearly shows, pilots are still flying well into the envelope. There's no excuse for this. 3. Pilots aren't the smartest creatures in the world. Every two or three months in AIRLINE PILOT, the ALPA rag, one sees "letters to the editor" from A320 pilots. These invariably boil down to "gee, it flies great, so why's everyone criticising the airplane?" Sort of like the attitudes of DC-10 pilots: "gee, it flies great, so why's everyone criticising the airplane?" :-) Hey, it makes their landings look good! Flies like a fighter! All that rubbish. The ramifications of an airplane design possibly being responsible for an unnecessary crash every few years doesn't seem to rate very highly among these people. Another significant component of this is that a LOT of pilots, bless them, confuse FBW with glass. Thus, a pilot might upgrade to an A320 from a DC-9, see all the glass, and think it's WONDERFUL, and attribute the existence of glass to the FBW system. This hasn't a great deal to do with the A320's contribution to technology, though, and "glass" predated the A320 by seven years or so. 4. The "Can Do" mentality. Pilots tend to be gadget hounds: they WANT to fly the shiniest, newest airplane on the block, and, once in it, WILL make it work. After you fly a few trips and it doesn't kill you, you become a bit more trusting. This relates to training: *total* immersion: forget everything you've learned, and focus on the new airplane, "make it work." Military pilots, for instance, are legendary in disparaging equipment they're *not* flying. When they transition, though, they HAVE to make it work, or suffer the consequences. It's common to see them become "instant converts." Many pilots are frank about this. I suspect the same psychology is at work, here. Is this sort of "admiration" and "devotion" "real"? Yeah, probably. And I have an ethical dilemma when discussing this sort of thing with pilots: is it wise to undermine their confidence in a system which they HAVE to make work? *My* experience has been similar to the others: A320 pilots luuuuuuuuv their airplanes. Yet when I've probed a little bit, I've usually uncovered some pretty spectacular problems, which they're "working around" to do their job, or otherwise compensating for. I also usually find a dichotomy of intense fondness for the glass, but a real preference for older airplanes, like the 727. "If only they were more glassy..." Whatever the reason, the FACT remains that there have been three A320 crashes, in as many years. No other aircraft of similar technological vintage--757/767, A310, A300-600, 747-400--can claim the same. It is very puzzling that, considering the "glassy" similarities among these air- planes, there haven't been more problems, fleet-wise. Perhaps one difference is that on the other airplanes, pilots are more in the loop, on their toes--whereas with the A320/330/340, one is in that blasted *cocoon*, and taught to BELIEVE! Then again, there is evidence that from a cockpit-workload perspective, older, conventional cockpits, with simpler flight controls, may be safer and have lower workload in emergency situations. See Wiener et. al., "The Impact of Cockpit Automation on Crew Coordination and Communication," released November 1991 as NASA CR 177587. As an old pilot once told me: "NO airplane is safe." All things con- sidered, I'd rather have a pilot with a healthy grain of skepticism for the gee-whiz features, and make this a general requirement for the breed. Perhaps if more pilots were skeptical, manufacturers would be less likely to be "innovative" for poorly based functional or practical reasons. It's telling that Airbus has extended the old maxim "trust your instruments" to "believe in your airplane." Blind faith has no place in an effective safety culture. -- Robert Dorsett Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd From kls Thu Jun 17 23:51:39 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: driscoll@src.honeywell.com (Kevin Driscoll) Subject: Re: Pilot attitudes on A320 (RE: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 17 Jun 93 23:51:39 PDT I have found that the two things that pilots like most about the A320 is the FMS and the side-sticks. The reason for both of these is that they make the pilots life easier and more comfortable. With the FMS, you don't have to fight with charts. Except for a couple of minutes before take-off and landing, you don't see any charts in an A320 cockpit. The side-sticks make eating, doing the log-books, etc. soooo much nicer. These things give the pilots a nice day. Of course, they should balanced against the safety issues which would give a pilot a really bad day. But, you didn't run into very many pilot's that have had really bad days with the A320. Many aren't flying (or even breathing) any more. The fact that one "Oh, sh:t!" cancels 1000 nice days doesn't enter into the pilot's feelings, since they haven't experienced that really bad day. As for the auto-throttles, about 80% of all A320 pilots I have talked to wished that the throttles would move to give them feedback. From kls Fri Jun 18 22:57:00 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Haynes talk at Dryden Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 18 Jun 93 22:57:00 PDT I got a few email inquiries about this, and it's been a year or so since it was last posted, so maybe it's time to post again. Enjoy! (a Mac-formatted Word 4 copy is on rascal.ics.utexas.edu, in misc/av/safety- folder/SUX/haynes1.cpt). NASA Ames Research Center Dryden Flight Research Facility Edwards, California presents The Crash of United Flight 232 by Capt. Al Haynes May 24, 1991 9:30 AM Recording provided by: NASA-Dryden 1991 Distributed with Capt. Haynes' permission. Copyright (c) 1991 by Al Haynes. Unlimited non-profit distribution permitted. Transcript by Robert "transcripts 'R' us" Dorsett rdd@cactus.org Glossary: ATC = Air Traffic Control CLR = Command Leadership Resource Training. i.e., Cockpit Resource Management. GPWS = Ground Proximity Warning System NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board PTS = Post-Traumatic Stress UAL = United Airlines ?? = garbled. (xxxx ??) = my interpretation of garbled phrase. Emcee: Good morning. Today, we're privileged to have Capt. Al Haynes with us. He's a Texas A&M graduate, a Marine Corps flight instructor, and a 35-year veteran of United Airlines. I think everyone probably remembers that on July 19, 1989, United Airlines flight 232 departed Denver at about 2:09 PM, climbed uneventfully to a cruise altitude of 37,000', and at approximately 3:16, the flight notified ATC center that the #2 engine had failed. The aircraft was only marginally stable at that point, and this is the rest of the story. [6-minute excerpt from Alert 3: The Crash of United Flight 232 omitted: ATC and ground communications] [July 19, 1989: 15:23 hrs.] Center: Sioux City, got an emergency for you. Got a United aircraft, coming in, lost #2 engine, having a hard time controlling the aircraft right now, he's out of 29,000 right now, descending to Sioux City right now. He's ?? VOR but he wants the equipment standing by right now. [15:25] Sioux City: Radar contact. UAL 232: So you know we have almost no controllability. Very little elevator, and almost no ailerons, we're controlling the turns by power. I don't think we can turn right, I think we can only make left turns. ?? We can only turn right, we can't turn left. [15:26] Sioux City: United 232 heavy, understand, sir,you can only make right turns? UAL 232: that's affirmative. [15:29] Sioux City: 32 heavy, say souls on board, and fuel remaining. UAL 232: We have 376, fuel ?? [15:32] Sioux City: United 232 heavy, Sioux City. UAL 232: Confirm we have no hydraulic fluid, which means we have no elevator control, almost none, and very little aileron control. I have serious doubts about making the airport. Have you got someplace near there, that we might be able to ditch? Unless we get control of this airplane, we're going to put it down wherever it happens to be. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, standby ?? [15:40] Sioux City: United 232 heavy, say again. 232 heavy, think you'll be able to hold about a 240 heading? UAL 232: We're going to turn into it about right now. Sioux City: When you turn to that 240 heading, sir, the airport will be about oh, 12 o'clock and 38 miles. UAL 232: Okay, we're trying to control it just by power alone, we have no hydraulics at all, sir, we're doing our best, here. Sioux City: Roger, and we've notified the equipment out in that area too, sir. The equipment's here on the airport, standing by, and they're sending some out to that area. [15:46] 232. 232, we're going to have to continue in a right turn. We've got the elevators pretty much under control, but that's 3 or 4 hundred feet, but still can't get much ?? steering. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, understand you do have the elevators possibly under control, will you be able to hold altitude? UAL 232: Negative, we don't have it. We're better, that's all. Sioux City: Roger. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, there's a small airport 12 o'clock and seven miles. The runway's 4000' long, there. UAL 232: Control, ?? myself right now, soon as the captain gets back on, he'll give me a hand here. He's talking on the PA. Sioux City: Roger. UAL 232: United 232, we're starting a left turn back to the airport. Since we have no hydraulics, braking is going to really be a problem. I would suggest the equipment be ?? towards the far end of the runway. And I think under the circumstances, regardless of the condition of the airplane when we stop, we're going to evacuate, so you might notify the ground crew that we're going to do that. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, wilco, sir, and if you can continue that left turn, to about a 220 heading, sir, that'll take you right to the airport. [15:47] Sioux City: United 232 heavy, you're going to have to widen out just slightly to your left sir, to make the turn to final, and also to take you away from the city. [15:51] UAL 232: Whatever you do, keep us away from the city. [15:53] Sioux City: 232 heavy, be advised, there is a four-lane highway up in that area, sir, if you can pick that up. UAL 232: Okay, we'll see what we can do, here. We've already put the gear down, and we're going to have to be putting on something solid, if we can. [15:59] Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, airport's currently at your 1 o'clock position, 10 miles. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, if you can't make the airport, sir, there's an interstate that runs north to south to the east side of the airport, it's a four-lane interstate. UAL 232: We're just passing it right now. We're going to try for the airport. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, and advise me when you get the airport in site. UAL 232: We have the runway in sight, and will be with you shortly. Thanks a lot for your help. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, winds currently 360 at 11, three sixty at eleven, you're cleared to land on any runway. UAL 232: You don't want to be particular and make it a runway, huh? Sioux City: ...010 at 11, and there's a runway that closed, sir, that could probably work too, it runs northeast to southwest. UAL 232: We're pretty much lined up on this one, here, I think we will be. Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger sir, that's a closed runway, that'll work, sir. We're getting the equipment off the runway, and they'll line up to that one. UAL 232: How long is it? [16:00] Sioux City: At the end of the runway is just a wide open field, sir, so the length won't be a problem. UAL 232: OK. [GPWS alarm on CVR] [jumbled ground communications, followed by] Ground #1: Orville, what's the situation out there? Ground #2: ?? Ground #1: 10-4, you're going to need a lot of additional assistance out there, it sounds like? Ground #2: 10-4, I've got engine 3, engine 5, and truck 3, I'm going out to the scene, I'll advise you in just a few minutes. Ground #1: 10-4, I'm going to go ahead and go en route out there to the command post. Let me advise anything that you need, I'll have the comm center go ahead and notify emergency hospitals and also the ambulances. MC: It's my sincere pleasure to introduce to you the person you heard on that video and you saw land the plane, Capt. Al Haynes. Haynes: Thank you, thank you very much. "Land" is a rather loose term for that. Anyone who has seen this video seems to have this one question in their mind, and that is: how did anyone survive an accident of that magnitude? I think there are five factors that contribute to the degree of success that we had at Sioux City: that is, luck, communications, preparation, execution, and cooperation. And I would like to talk about those five things today. First of all, we all have our own personal beliefs and convictions, and I would never intrude on yours, so for the sake of discussion, we call our first factor "luck." You may call it whatever you wish. But what did luck have to do with it? Well, first of all, how did we get the airplane to Sioux City? We're an aviation-oriented audience here tonight, you basically have the idea of how an airplane works. When the #2 hydraulics on the DC-10 blew, or when the #2 engine blew, it took out the #2 accessory drive section, which took out the hydraulics for the #2 system. And some 70 pieces of shrapnel penetrated the horizontal stabilizer and severed the #1 line and the #3 line, and as a result we ended up with no hydraulics. Now, the DC-10, like a lot of aircraft today, and those that'll be made in the future, has no cables going to the controls. You have no manual reversion in the airplane at all. The cables go to the servos, and then hydraulic pressure does your work. So in order to protect against the loss of all fluid, a lot of redundancies are built into the system. The DC-10, for instance, has three completely independent hydraulic systems. They have two engine-driven pumps per system, their own hydraulic reservoir, their own supply lines, their own return lines, they are not connected fluid-wise, in any way. They are connected mechanically, so that if we shut down say, the #1 engine, the fluid in the #3 system runs a motor which runs a pump in the #1 system and the pressure's built right back up, and that's all automatic, you don't do anything about it. Should you lose the fluid in the #1 system due to a leak in one of the components, you won't lose the #2 and #3 system, because they're not all connected together, and all the major component flight controls have at least two, some of them three, of the systems providing power to these controls. And then we have as the last resort an air-driven generator which drops out of the bottom of the fuselage and runs a motor in the tail, that will provide hydraulic pressure to one of the systems. So enough redundancy was built into the system to where the odds were placed at 1 to 10^9th power, or a billion to 1, that complete hydraulic failure would occur. And that is satisfactory to where it is considered fail-safe, if I guess is the word. Well, on July 19th, Murphy's Law caught up with us, and we did lose all three systems. And as a result, we had no ailerons to bank the airplane, we had no rudder to turn it it, no elevators to control the pitch, we had no leading-edge flaps or slats to slow the airplane down, no trailing-edge flaps for landing, we had no spoilers on the wing, to help us get down, or help us slow down, once we were on the ground. And on the ground, we had no steering, nose wheel or tail, and no brakes. So what we had, is, what we kind of went through today, on one of the simulators, was the throttles on #1 and #3 engine to control us. And by manipulating those throttles, we were able to somewhat control the heading, by skidding the airplane into a turn. And controlling the pitch was just about out of the question. We kept saying we think we had the elevators under control. We never had the elevators under control. We thought we did, but we didn't. And I'll get into that, when I talk about reaction. So you see, with those two things to work with--one engine, and the other--just getting the airplane on the ground was a tremendous piece of luck. Amazing. Because it has been tried again, and it didn't work. Everything had to work in the right sequence, and it happened to work, so we got the airplane, at least, to an airport. Another piece of luck was where we were. We could have been halfway to Honolulu, or we could have been over the Rockies, or we could have just been taking off from, say, New York's Kennedy Airport, right over Manhattan. So you see the trouble we could have had. As it was, we were over the relative flatlands over Iowa. And all of us, in the back of our minds, you heard me on the tape, I had serious doubts as to making the airport. Well, there were times when all four of us had serious doubts as to making the airport. But we knew in the back of our mind that where we were, if we had to ditch, we could probably find some fairly flat land, and we might have a chance of survival. So that relieved a lot of pressure on us, in whether or not we were going to make the airport. At least we could get it on some pretty flat ground, another piece of luck in our case. The weather was an amazing piece of luck. I just tried to fly the F-15 simulator under moderate turbulence, and man, if we'd try to control this DC-10 under any kind of turbulence, we'd never have made it. If you are familiar in the Midwest, from the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico, in the summer time, there are usually a line of thunderstorms that are doozies. We had one little build-up that we went around, but the rest was clear skies. 4500' scattered, and about ten miles visibility was the weather, so it was amazing that the weather was that good. A year to the day later, when we went back for a memorial service, there was a huge thunderstorm over Sioux City, directly over the airport. Had that been there a year before, we would never had made the airport. So the weather was a tremendous factor. The time of day was also very advantageous, in two ways: 1, it was day, we could see what we were trying to find. To try find an airport seventy miles away at night over strange territory would be very difficult. By having, especially if it had been runway 22, because there are no lights on that runway. It's a closed runway, it's not used, so the lights are not operative. As it was, it was daytime, we could see what we were doing, we found the airport four or five miles out, we were able to see it, and direct ourselves in that general direction. So that was very important. But more important to the time of day was that it was right at shift-change time for the hospitals. Marion health center, which happens to be a regional trauma center, and St. Luke's, which happens to be a regional burn center, and are both located in Sioux city, were just changing their shifts, and so they were double-shifted for our arrival. Not only that, but all the clinics and health centers around town were all releasing their workers from work, and of course with a 45-minute notice, about a 30-minute notice that we were going to Sioux City, that was broadcast on the radio, and all these emergency services were able to head to the hospital, they had so many volunteers at the hospital, they had to turn them away. They had more than they could use. And the last piece of luck, which turned out to be very fortunate for the crew, and you'll see why in a minute, it was Wednesday, the one day of the month when the Air National Guard at Sioux City was on duty, and 285 trained National Guardsmen were at the airport, waiting for us, when we got there. So, you can see how the luck factor was way up here for us. Some of the other crews who have had accidents, the luck factor was down here. Our luck ran out about fifty feet in the air, but it lasted for a long time. So luck played a very important part in getting the airplane to Sioux City, and having the survival rate that we did have. The second big factor was communications. We had quick response by ATC, MSP center was the one we were talking to, they quickly turned us over to this extremely calm young man that you just heard, Kevin Bockman. He's a controller that happened to be on the radar station at approach control when we turned it over. I met Kevin personally, at the White House about a month later, and when I finally could talk to him--we couldn't say much, the first time we met--but when I finally could, I learned he had moved to Sioux City because he found his previous duty station too stressful [laughter]. And he was looking for something a little quieter. I haven't the foggiest idea where he is now--he's not in Sioux City. But the calmness of his voice, the communications with him was outstanding. The DME did not work at Sioux City that day, and although it's not on this tape, the cockpit voice recorder shows numerous times we were asking where we were in relation to the airport and how far out and he was right there every second giving us every bit of information, he picked out airports we could go to, runways, highways we could land on. The highway state patrol even blocked one of the freeways and had it open for us, if we'd had to land on it, going out to the airport. Communications in the air was tremendous. Probably what helped us the most was the fact that the second officer, Dudley Dvorak--I asked him to get ahold of San Francisco area maintenance, that's maintenance experts sitting in San Francisco for each type of equipment that United flies. They have all the computers, all the logbook history, all the history of the aircraft, all the other information that they can draw on to help a crew that has a problem. Well, unfortunately, in our case, there wasn't anything they could help us with. Every time they tried to find something that we could do, we had either already done it, or couldn't do it, because we had no hydraulics. The hardest problem that Dudley had was convincing them that we didn't have any hydraulics. "Oh, you lost number two," "No, we lost all three," "Oh you lost number three," "No, we've lost all of them," "Well, number one and two work," "No," well we went on like this for quite a while, before he finally convinced them we didn't have anything, and when we told them that, that was all they could do, and I was a little upset with them at first, when I first had Dudley stop communicating with them and turn around for the landing, I was a little ticked, until I realized how frustrating it must have been for these four or five people, there, with all those computers, with all the knowledge at their fingertips, that they could possibly draw on, and there's absolutely nothing they could do to help a crew. That's got to be extremely frustrating for them. And I have not yet had a chance to go down and see them and apologize for what I was thinking, but at least I didn't say it out loud. [laughter] But Dudley's communications with them did two things--it alerted our crisis center in Chicago, and it alerted our dispatch center in Chicago. And those two facilities, knowing that we were going to Sioux City, were able to prepare for our arrival in Sioux City. In fact, they pulled a 727 out of the hangar in Chicago, loaded it with people, and there just happened to be a meeting in our executive offices that day, of our union, and the company, and some other people, and all those people who would be involved in accidents were at the center, and all they did was run and get on this airplane, and fly to Sioux City, and they were in Sioux City before I was admitted in my room at the hospital. So it was very quick response at the company in getting support people and equipment there, all through the communications that Dudley was able to do. So that communications was very important. When we declared an emergency, which Bill did, the copilot, Bill ?? declared an emergency, everything stopped on the ground. Everything went to us. They cleared the frequency for us, they gave us all the help they could get. I don't know how many light airplane pilots you have here today, but I've talked to several groups of several pilots, and this one you can pass on Mary, they're afraid to say anything, they don't like to declare an emergency, they're afraid their' going to cause some problems or something like that. And they said to me, well, you have all these resources of United Airlines at your disposal, and the center, and all this. So do you Three words: I'm declaring an emergency, and you've got it. All the help you want. You've got American Airline's maintenance facility, United maintenance facility, if you stay in the air long enough, they'll patch you through to them, and you can talk to them. So you've got all kinds of help, if you just do that. Now, if you do that, and then land, and nothing happens, you've got a lot of reports to fill out, and you're going to have a lot of airline pilots that are upset at you, especially at a place like Chicago, because they're out holding, while they're getting you on the ground. And you'll probably hear about it. But in truth, and when I've said this, the pilots, yeah, they shake their heads, yeah, they're going to complain, but they're really glad you made it, and they're very happy you're able to use the services available to you. So communicate with the ground, tell them your problem, and they'll help you. They really will. The communications in the cockpit among ourselves, we'll talk about that under reactions, we'll talk about. The communications between the cockpit and the cabin. Very little, actually, because when I called the ?? flight attendant up--a very single flight attendant--and she said she took one look the cockpit and she knew we didn't have an emergency--we had an enormous crisis. And her thought then was, we're at altitude, we've got some time, he told me to go back and prepare the cabin. I'll do that, and I won't bother them. And I'm sure he'll communicate with me again. And that's what happened. They didn't call us. We called them when we had a problem, when we were ready to go. So that the communications, while it was not there, it was good, because it wasn't necessary. And the training did that. The inter-communications between response units on the ground, this tape that you just saw is a six- minute excerpt from a 54-minute tape called Alert 3, and there's about fifteen minutes of communications on this tape prior to this crash that you just saw. And there's a lot of ground communications between emergency response units and the hospital. Excellent communications in that respect. I'll grant you that the 20-minute warning time that we gave them, that we were coming to Sioux City was a great help to them, a great benefit to them. If any of you serve on emergency rescue stuff, or volunteer fire-fighters, you know that if you're in station and ready to go, it's a lot better than being home or something and having to respond. So the twenty minutes we gave them, they were able to put their disaster plan into effect. In fact, I believe it was fifteen minutes before we crashed, the tower changed the alert from alert 2, which is "an aircraft is on its way with problems," to alert 3. And alert 3 means "an airplane has crashed." That's how much confidence they had in us. [laughter]. But fifteen minutes notice of an airplane has crashed. So all the communications were put into motion for an airplane has crashed. The hospital was notified. They called Des Moine and said we were going to need more medical supplies. They were actually loading another Air National Guard plane in Des Moine and took it off shortly after we crashed, heading to the airport with supplies. So, communications and advance notice. Very, very important. The preparation: how do you prepare for something like this? I gave a talk at Anchorage to the Alaska Air Safety Foundation and they subtitled my talk: disaster in the air, are you ready? No, you're never ready. But you might be prepared. And that's one of the reasons that I'm going around the country doing this, hoping that I can get the message out to be prepared. And the preparation for the ground crew, for the emergency rescue unit was: in 1987 they had a drill, they pretended a wide- body aircraft crashed on this closed runway at Sioux City, and they had 150 survivors, and they had this drill, and they found some shortcomings in the drill, which most drills do. They have these once every three years, FAA mandated, live drill, and a paper drill every year, and this was their year for their drill, and they decided to have a crash. They'd had a bus crash from the time before. So in this airplane crash, they found a lot of things they were short. One, they didn't take in enough community. If you're going to have 150 survivors, you're going to need more equipment than the class of airport that Sioux City is. It's not classified for wide-bodied aircraft, so they don't have to have quite the emergency response units that larger airports would have. So they had to rely on the outlying communities. And Gary Brown, the director of services, brought the community people in, made them a part of his plan. They attended the meetings, they attended the practices that they were having, everybody was putting their input into this plan. He also brought in a very important unit, the Post-Traumatic Stress Unit. Now, I was never one to believe much in post-traumatic stress. I had heard it a lot in WWII, from Korean, and Vietnam veterans, and I thought, well, okay, if such a thing exists, I'll let it go, because I don't really believe it. I believe it now. And I'm asking you to believe it. It may never happen to you--I'm fortunate enough not to have suffered PTS--yet. But it can happen tomorrow. I was a little concerned about flying simulators under these conditions because I was afraid it might key something up. But no problem. I've been very fortunate. But it does exist. And it exists. It happens to not just victims of the crash. The 185th suffered a tremendous amount of PTS. So did the people of Sioux City. So did the staff of the hospital. So PTS has to start at the scene of the accident. Fortunately, Sioux City was prepared for that. It was part of their preparation in getting the things done. Because even though they'd practiced this wide-bodied aircraft that they didn't have, on July 19, we put a wide- bodied aircraft on the very same runway they used for practice, and we gave them 200 survivors to start with, instead of 150, so having a drill, having a plan, and taking it seriously, and working on it, is very, very important for any community, no matter what size you are, or who serves you. Up in Alaska, a lot of the pilots said, well you know, we're up here in the bush, and we don't have these things. They're the main trans-continental stop for aircraft going to Japan. And an aircraft is not going to happen right over the major airport. It can happen anywhere out in the tules. I'm not calling Sioux City a tule, I'd never do that, [laughter] but in Alaska, you've got a lot of that up there. But it can happen anywhere, so everybody has to be as prepared as they can be. And they were on the ground at Sioux City. They had a plan that they worked on, and they left some flexibility open in it that it could be changed, and when we get to the reaction, I'll talk about that also. The flight attendants: they were prepared by their training that we have at Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco. That's where flight attendants have their recurrent training. They go back once a year, they go through all the emergency drill preparation, how to open the doors, what they're all supposed to do, how to prepare the cabin, how to prepare the passengers. We have a 767 simulator in Denver that they've got about 40 seats in. And we'd go down there in one of the sessions, and we'd sit in that simulator and several of the attendants are assigned the job of working and about somewhere on takeoff or shortly after takeoff we have a crash. The simulator tips over on its side, it fills up with smoke, it darkens just like it would on an airplane, there's fires outside some of some of the doors, it's very realistic, and it's the kind of training that they give the flight attendants, and it paid off. Each one of them, in a tape they made later, said the training that we had, the training that we had, they kept saying it. So training is very very important. Sometimes boring, sometimes repetitious, but it's very important. As for the crew, there was no training procedure for hydraulic failure. Complete hydraulic failure. We've all been through one failure or double failures, but never a complete hydraulic failure. But the preparation that paid off for the crew was something that United started in 1980 called Cockpit Resource Management, or Command Leadership Resource Training, or any number of things that you want to call it. I think we called it CLR to start with. All the other airlines are now using it. Up until 1980, we kind of worked on the concept that the captain was THE authority on the aircraft. What he said, goes. And we lost a few airplanes because of that. Sometimes the captain isn't as smart as we thought he was. And we would listen to him, and do what he said, and we wouldn't know what he's talking about. And we had 103 years of flying experience there in the cockpit, trying to get that airplane on the ground, not one minute of which we had actually practiced, any one of us. So why would I know more about getting that airplane on the ground under those conditions than the other three. SO if I hadn't used CLR, if we had not let everybody put their input in, it's a cinch we wouldn't have made it. It was, I don't know if any of you remember the old movie Marty, I kind of refer to that, it was Ernest Borgnine, and a group of his cronies, trying to find something to do on a Saturday night, and they said, what do you want to do Marty, and he said, i don't know, what do you want to do Joe, and that's kind of the way we flew the airplane now. What do you want to do, I don't know, and let's try this, and you think that'll work, beats me, and that's about the way it went, really. If you read the cockpit voice recorder transcript, there's a lot of that on there. When are we going to put the gear down, I don't know, how are we going to put it down, well, we do two things, two ways to get it down, which one we're going to use, that type of thing. So CLR really paid off. And CLR is being taken out into other areas. I think it was originally a management course anyway, but now it's being spread all over. I'm going next year to Harrisburg, PA to talk to the Nuclear Power Association. Because they are beginning the CLR concept in their control rooms. There have five stations in a control room. You have a nuclear disaster, you want those people working together, you don't want them working separately. So CLR that we had really prepared the crew for what happened. If you recall the zip-top 737 over at Hawaii, the Aloha, Bob and Mimi used CLR to its utmost, because they could not communicate with each other. They used hand signals to point the things they wanted to do. That's how they got that airplane on the ground. Flight 811, the 747 out of Honolulu, on its way to Sidney, blew the cargo door and lost two engines on the right side, and did damage to the flaps and hydraulics, they used CLR to get the airplane back to Honolulu. They had a grossly overweight airplane that couldn't maintain altitude with two engines out on one side, and by using CLR and the crew working together, and everybody putting their input in, they got the airplane back. The days of the captain being the ultimate authority is gone. He may be the authority on the airplane, he may sign for the papers and all this, but you don't work that way. I think Sister Margaret (?? Wicks) said it the best, she's from Sioux City's (Briar Cliff ??) College, I'll talk about her in a minute, her statement was, when you've got a crisis like this, and got so many diverse things going on, let those in charge take charge. Don't let one individual try to run the whole show. Let those who know how to do their specialties handle those things, and you'll get things done, and that's what happened. Execution: how did we execute? Well, first of all, how did we do it in the air? Not having any experience at all in flying an airplane under those conditions, our basic problem was keeping the airplane in the sky and trying to find an airport. Besides losing all of our hydraulics, which gave us no control, we had two other problems, a problem that I was not really familiar with, maybe you are, I know an awful lot of you are engineers here, is a term called "phugoid." What a phugoid is, an airplane wants to fly its trim speed. And as soon as you cut power on one engine, you lose speed, the nose drops, airspeed starts to build, you'll go through that speed, the nose will come back up, you'll go through the speed again on the slow side, and you'll just oscillate like this. Maybe you can stop it, maybe you can't. The way you have to stop it, is, we found out. Not as much as we know now, a lot of this is after-the-fact knowledge, we weren't this smart in the air. But we found that in order to stop a phugoid, you had to do the opposite of what you would normally do. When the aircraft reached its apex and started down, you had to add power, as the speed built up, you'd have to actually add power to create lift in the wings to get the nose to pitch up. The hardest thing to do though was as the nose start up and started to slow down, and you're approaching a stall, you'd have to close the throttles. And that's very difficult to do. We found out, though, that's what we had to do. Another thing that added to our problem, though, was that the damage to the tail was such that the aircraft constantly wanted to roll to the right. If we left the power alone, the aircraft would roll over. When the engine failed, Bill immediately took hold of the aircraft. Bill is the copilot 26 years flying, he's been with National/Pan Am, came over to United when we acquired the Pacific flying. Very competent pilot, I'd flown with him a month before, had no qualms about him flying at all. And when he grabbed ahold of the yoke, he demonstrated step one in any emergency procedure: that somebody fly the airplane. We've lost several airplanes because everybody was working on the problem and nobody was flying the airplane. One of them was down in the Everglades. Everybody was working on the problem and the airplane flew into the ground. Not to criticise the pilots, because everybody wants to do their share to get the problem solved. But somebody has got to fly the airplane. Bill immediately took hold of the airplane, immediately called ATC and said we lost an engine and had to get a lower altitude, was turning off the airway, all those things you're supposed to do. So my attention now is diverted to Dudley to shut the engine down. At United we don't use much memory items in emergency procedures, we use mostly checklists, and severe engine failure in flight is all textbook. So Dudley got out his book and the first thing it said was, close the throttle. And when I tried to pull the throttle back, it wouldn't come back. Now, I've never shut an engine down in flight on a jet, so I didn't know that when you pulled the throttle back, it didn't come back. In the simulator, when you do it, it always came back. This one wouldn't come back. Dave says, well, try the fuel. The next step is to shut the fuel off. I tried to shut the fuel off, and the fuel lever wouldn't move. So something was binding these controls. So now we know the damage to the tail, there's damage back there other than just the engine failing. We did get the fuel shutoff by pulling down on the firewall shutoff. Which shut off all the electrics and hydraulics to the engine. And then the fuel went off, whether it was coincidental, or it had actually helped it, I don't know, but about that time, it went off. Well, now we'd been about 15 or 20 seconds into our problem. And bill says to me, Al, I can't control the airplane. Now I divert my attention from down here, shutting down the engine, to up here, on the instrument panel. First thing I notice is, Bill had full left aileron control, calling for a full left turn. You'd never see that anywhere on a DC-10, much less at 35,000'. He's also got the yoke right back in his lap. And the only time to do that is to do that is to embarrass the captain on the ground and hit the captain in his fat stomach before he can get it out of the way. That's never there in the air. So that catches my attention real quick. But what really got my attention was will a full left turn called for, and a full nose up called for, we were in a descending right turn. And I tell all pilots around that this is when I said the dumbest thing I've ever said in my life, I said, "I got it." I didn't have it very long. Because we immediately determined that we could not control the airplane: it wouldn't respond to the inputs of the crew. At this time, we were in a right bank, the bank was increasing, we were up to 38 degrees of bank, we closed the #1 throttle completely, and firewalled the #3 throttle, and very slowly, the wing came back up. And three times on our attempt to get to the ground, we got to 38 degrees of bank, and we were doing just what those who were running those tests I went to this morning to just fly an airplane with just the throttles, we were overpowering the airplane, over-controlling because panic was one thing, although we didn't appear to be panicked, not having any idea what we were doing was another, and an airplane about to roll onto its back at 35,000' is pretty scary, so you just do anything you can to make it stop. But by manipulating the throttles this way we kept the wings fairly level--for a while--then we had to start down. Well, we felt--like everyone else--that this cannot happen--you cannot lose all the hydraulics in a -10. That's been told us from time when. When we first sat down and they said this isn't hooked up to anything (as you move the wheel) we said, well, what's going to make this fly, in case it, well--it can't, it can't happen, it--just, you can't lose your hydraulics. And we believed it like everybody else. And now while we were reasonably sure we weren't accomplishing anything with the yoke, we kept flying the yoke. The problem is, it kept both of us, to fly the yoke. We couldn't do it, just one of us couldn't do it. Now in flying the yoke with both hands, and all four hands, now we had to operate the throttles, and we had to do them, let go of the yoke, move a throttle, let go of the yoke, move a throttle, and so forth. Had we known what we know now, I don't know if we would let go of the yoke even now. To let go of the yoke completely is extremely difficult to do. After almost 40 years of flying airplanes and holding onto something, not having something to hold on to--I don't know if we could do that. But what we found out is that it was very difficult to move the throttles. And I was about to have Dudley turn around and take over the throttles--and I'm glad we didn't because we would have lost all that communications, if he had--we were told there was a DC-10 captain in the back, who was an instructor, and we like to think instructors know more than we do--so I figured maybe Denny knew something that we didn't, so we asked Captain Fisch to come up. Well, he took one look at the cockpit, and that's his knowledge. It was sort of funny listening to, reading the transcript, because he's about fifteen minutes behind us now, and he's trying to catch up, and everything he says to do we've already done. And after about five minutes--that's 20 minutes into this operation--he says, "We're in trouble!" We thought: that's an amazing observation, Denny [laughter]. And we kid him about it, but he's just trying to catch up with our thinking--we're 15 min. ahead of him, but he asks--when he found out that he didn't have any knowledge for us, he says, "Now, what can I do?" I said, you can take these throttles, and try to help us with the throttles. So what he did, he stood between us--not kneel on the floor, as the news media said--and he took one throttle in each hand, and now he could manipulate the throttles together. With the #2 throttle frozen, we couldn't get ahold of the throttles together. Now he could. And we said, give us a right bank, bring the wing up, that's too much bank, try to stop the altitude, he'd try to respond. And after a few minutes of doing this, everything we'd do with the yoke, he could correspond with the throttles. So it was a synchronized thing between the three of us, with Dudley still being able to do all his communications. So that's how we operated the airplane, and that's how we got it on the ground. And if I can have the slides on now, I'll show you how we got it on the ground. That's why we can't call it a landing. [Slides] This the pattern we flew. That's the radar tracking we flew. We are coming along like this and were just turning back toward Debuke, Iowa, when we lost the engine. And this straight line, reasonably straight line that we fly here, here's the line of just trying to keep the airplane upright, while we were trying to figure what was going on. Somewhere up in here, and I can't see it from here, there's three very definite slash-marks, and that's where the airplane almost went over on its back. As Denny came up and took over, and we began to descend, and we determined now we were going to Sioux City, they wanted us to go to Des Moines, and that was over 170 miles away, and there was no way we were going to keep the airplane in the air that long. So when we declared an emergency, and they gave us the nearest suitable airport, it was only 70 miles away, now we had to get down, and we did that through this series of right turns. Some of these we did, others the airplane did on its own, and all we did was keep it from doing any more. So we made these right turns. When the NTSB came in to talk to us, they said, why did you make a left turn? And all four of us said we never made a left turn. Even though I said we were starting a left turn back to the airport, we all four swore we never made a left turn. That looks like a left turn [laughter]. And what we determined was, we remembered then, after a while that we all four remembered that there was a build-up about right there, and we had to get around that build-up, not go through it. So we did that. This, right there, is that last 360 degree right turn, we were too low for the radar to pick it up. Then we came in. [slide] There's the airport for Sioux City, Sioux City gateway airport. This is runway 22, this is runway 31. What Kevin was trying to do, since we could only make right turns was bring us in, the city was right down here somewhere. Bring us in this way, a right turn, into the runway. The way things turned out, it was probably good we didn't do it. Had we been able to make the runway, at the end of runway 31 was the Missouri river. So we might have been better off had we not been able to stop or something, to land on something like this. When I asked the runway was, he doesn't say so on the tape, but he did tell us how long it was, 6600', and then he said at the end was a wide-open field. So our scenario was, probably what we do was land, and hopefully stay on our gear, go off the end of the runway, shear our gear, and go on our belly. If we did go sideways, since we couldn't steer it, and we did have a quartering tail-wind that was turning us left to right across the runway, we might go off into the field and shear it en route. We kind of hoped we would do that. We came pretty close to the runway. We got the right wing tip in the center of the runway, the right main gear off to the side. We touched down on the right wing tip, the wing flap fairing, the #3 engine, the one on the right side, the right wing gear, and the nose wheel, all pretty much simultaneously. The right wing broke off--that's the reason for the fire here, spilling all the fuel. The right main gear separated from the airplane. The left gear stayed on. And the airplane slammed on the ground, and we did not hit and cartwheel, like all the news says. We hit and slid on the ground, on the left main gear and the right wing stub. Slid along sideways, for about 2000' or so, when the left wing came up. Also, on impact, the tail broke off, the entire tail section of the aircraft broke off, so there's no weight in the tail at all. So when the left wing came up--probably because of our speed--the tail came up. the aircraft went up on its nose, bounced on the runway three times, on the nose, leaving radome marks on the runway. We went upside down and airborne about right here. We were thinking--even that tape that you see there, that's all we have in the way of tape, and nobody really remembers, and there was so much fire and smoke that nobody could tell. We hit right about here, and upside down. And fortunately for us, the cockpit broke off, and unfortunately for the first-class cabin. And then the aircraft went over on its back and skidded to a halt right over here. [slide] This is our point of impact, where the right main gear touched down. That concrete is 12" thick, and the hole is 18" deep. You normally land the DC-10 at approximately 140 knots. We were doing 215 kts and accelerating. You normally touch down at about 200-300 feet per minute at the most, as a rate of descent. We were doing 1850 feet per minute. And increasing. And you normally like to go straight down the runway, and we were drifting left and right because of the quartering tail-wind. Of ten knots, which gave us ten knots more of speed, as we hit the ground. I'm showing you these for several reasons. One, is to show you that you can survive an airplane crash, because we had survivors in that piece of wreckage. That's the first-class cabin. We actually had one of our dead-heading pilots sitting in the back of the first-class cabin go out a window. I said, you can't go out a window. He said, yes you can. [laughter] When you realize you're upside down and the thing's on fire, you can get out a window. [laughter]. We did lose most of these people, unfortunately, but they did survive. Some of them did survive that. [slide] This is the tail section of the aircraft, which, shows it more better here. It broke off, and went straight down the runway, while most of the rest of the aircraft curved off to the right. We had about four row, three or four rows of seats right here, and two flight attendants, who survived this part of the accident. I've always been concerned about a DC-10, it's concerned me that the engine, sitting on top of the tail, as it was, if the engine blew, you might lose the whole tail. Well, after all that happened to this airplane, that engine housing is still sitting there. So Douglas put that on to stay. [slide-fumbling] It's the main portion of the aircraft, it's upside down, and it burned, of course, after the fire. This is the forward part of the aircraft, and this is the aft portion. And this is where most of our survivors came from. Unfortunately, 34 were trapped back in here, and died due to smoke inhalation, but most came from right here. [slide] In case you don't recognize that, that's the cockpit. There's no metal, no glass, nothing to indicate that's the cockpit. They're guessing that 35 minutes after the crash, we were ignored. They felt that was an uninhabitable part of the avionics compartment. Because all that was holding that airplane together was the wires. Or holding that piece of stuff together was the wires. That gentleman in the blue hat is talking to me. The gentleman without his hat on is talking to the copilot, Bill ?? and you can see a little bit of Bill's shirt right there, and the four of us are right there. And that area is normally about ten feet high. Counting the cockpit and the avionics compartment. That's directly behind my seat. So that's where we are. In the rescue operation, They came in and tried the jaws of life. They put it on Bill's side, and as they did it put pressure on my side. And I happened to be conscious at the time. And I strongly recommended they stop doing that [laughter]. So they came on to my side, and try my side, and Bill did the same thing. Bill's seat had collapsed, the back of the seat, with him inside it. He had eight broken ribs, two broken ribs, and a broken pelvis. So he was in a little bit of pain. So what they did was they came up with the idea to bring a fork-lift over, and run the chains, the heavy chains you saw, straight down, and lift the cockpit straight up. And by doing this raised the cockpit to this height, and pulled us all out of the bottom. That's how they got us out of the airplane. And to say a lot for Douglas and the seat manufacturers, that's my seat. All four of the seats stayed together. All four of the seatbelts and harnesses--they had to cut us out to get us out. That's the only thing that saved our lives, I'm sure, was that those belts held. That was the reaction of the crew, how we got the airplane on the ground. How did the ground people react? Well, the ground crew did exactly what they had been trained to do. By having advance notice they were in the position to put all the aircraft, all the emergency vehicles in a spot in a designated area, and then dispatch them as they were needed. We only gave them two minutes to line up for runway 22. They were all set up for runway 31. And when I told Kevin we saw this runway ahead of us, and that's where we were going to land, he had two minutes to get the equipment off the runway. They were actually positioned on that runway, and we could see them moving off that runway. That's the reason the video is no better than it was. With all the notice we had, everyone was set up for runway 31. The two hangars that are built right off to the left of runway 22 were built after the airport was closed, and you can't see the runway from the tower. And that's where the operator was. So he went clearing down the steps, and if you've ever tried to get down tower steps in a hurry, it's a long way down, and that's as far as he could get, before we got there. The first part of the video was taken by a home video camera, showing us in the air. But that picture in the air is very deceiving. It looks like we have everything pretty much in control. We were starting a down phugoid, and starting a right bank, 300' in the air. And we just, that's where our luck ran out. We just ran out of altitude, trying to correct it. We had the time in the air, trying to correct it. But that close to the ground, we didn't have time. In an attempt to stop the phugoid and the turn, Dennis added power, and unfortunately the left engine spooled up faster than the right, the first time in the day we noticed that it happened, and the bank increased. And in four seconds, we went from four degrees of right bank, to twenty degrees of right bank, and hit the ground. However, safety experts say the tumbling of the aircraft probably saved a lot of lives. It took up most of the inertia, most of the shock, and allowed the people to get out of the airplane. But we were talking about reaction, now. The emergency crews responded as they were trained to do. The preparation was the big thing in their reaction time. The tower switching to the alert three way ahead of time really set the wheels in motion, and their reaction there was such that they knew it was going to be bad, and they were able to start that motion. We had at the hospital an unusual situation. There were so many doctors there, and nurses, that the director was trying to figure out what to do with all these people. So came up with an idea: he formed a line, and he put a doctor, a nurse, and a tech, and they formed a line, regardless of the doctor's specialty, they all had medical training, so it didn't matter what it was. They had psychiatrists, they had obstetricians, pediatricians, they had everything in this line. And then when they brought the ambulance up, and pulled the gurney out of the ambulance, well, this survivor already been through triage at the airport, he already had EMT care all the way in to the hospital, and now he had a doctor, a nurse, and a tech on him immediately, and they stayed with him until they were either sent to a room, released, or whatever was done with them. So the medical care was instantaneous and continuous, and that was through a preparation, and little bit of flexibility that the plan had that they could use in it. The other flexibility in the plan was: where was everybody going to stay. I usually get in rouble with the media for saying this, but with that notice that came out that we were going into Sioux City, CNN had broadcast that there was an aircraft was over Sioux City, and on its way in, and that there was a problem. And all the news media was very interested in this. So they reserved all the rooms in all the hotels in Sioux City. So when the survivors started getting through, and being released several hours later, there was no place to put them. And one of the doctors at St. Lukes looked up at Briar Cliff college, which sits up here on a hill overlooking Sioux City, and call Sister Margaret Wicks, and see if she could do anything. It was summer, and they had a skeleton crew there of a small summer staff. Yeah, she did something. By nightfall, she had 250 people in her dormitory. The reaction of everybody was just fantastic. Which brings us to the fourth thing, the fifth one, rather, the cooperation. The cooperation that took place was outstanding. Just unbelievable. First of all, we start with us in the cockpit. The team effort with the four of us. This is Dudley Dvorak, the second officer. This is his first month in the DC-10. He had just had his initial operating experience flight. This was his first time in the 10. Bill ?? has flown a lot of 1011's for Pan Am, and he flew 1011's for United when he first came over, and then switched to the DC-10, lot of experience in three-engined aircraft, but none in what we were doing. But that was his experience. Mine, I had about 7,000 hours in the DC-10. I spent about nine years as a copilot in the DC-10. I was flying to Honolulu, and was getting 14 days a month on the beach at ?? at the company expense, and I saw no reason to go to work, I stayed as a copilot. laughter But I had a lot of time in the 10. Denny was a DC-10 instructor, but what we didn't know was it was his first or second month as an instructor in the 10. But what we had was, as I said, was 103 years of experience, but that showed in the way we reacted to the problem. The way we cooperated with each other, in getting things done. Everybody throwing out a suggestion. And when it came time to put the gear time, it was one of the big problems that--not problems, but the way we used CLR, and cooperation with the crew. There are two ways we can get the gear down on the DC-10 with hydraulic failure. You can put the gear handle down, which manually unlocks the doors and the doors fall open and the gear just falls out, because it's been resting on the doors. Or, there's an alternate method of doing that, when you use no flaps. Because we have four ailerons on the DC- 10. You fly with the inboard ailerons at high speed, and then you unlock the outboard ailerons for landing when you lower the flaps. Well, we didn't have any flaps. So we couldn't unlock the outboard ailerons. So that's what this alternate gear method is for. And we talked about this: how do we put the gear down, and it was suggested, we unlock with the outboard ailerons, with the alternate gear, because there might be something out there, because we might be able to get some fluid out there, there might be some trapped out there. So this was all talked about. The one thing we all agreed upon was that the gear was going down. Because we had to have a shock absorber. Something had to absorb that shock. With the rate of descents that we had, I was afraid if we had touched down as we did without the gear, we would have just exploded. And if we'd had a higher rate of descent than we had, because we had higher rates of descents somewhere during this time, than we actually had when we touched down. So the gear was going down but the CLR and cooperation of the crew on how to do it. The cooperation between the cabin and the cockpit crew was very very good. We had some communications gaps there because of our attention to duty that we could not turn. I never turned around to the flight attendant, looked at her while I talked. In fact, when the second day after the accident, I asked to go see the rest of the crew, and they put me in a wheelchair and wheeled me down to intensive care where bill and Dudley were, I mean Bill and Dennis, and as they were taking me to Dennis Fitch's room, this captain came up to help us, and I thought, if there's more than one captain in the room, I won't know what he looked like. He stood right here, for thirty minutes, and sat down, and worked the throttles for us for landing, and I haven't the foggiest idea what the man looked like, because I never looked back and looked at him. But he was the only one in the room, so it made it a little easier to find out who he was. But that's the way our communications was--we had to communicate without looking at each other. The aide came up and did her thing, went back. The cooperation among her group--the procedure for United is, when you're going to have an emergency preparation, you call all the flight attendants together, the aide does, the senior flight attendant, she briefs them, then they go out to their duty demonstrations, and demonstrate, and tell what they want done. When this engine blew, it was so loud, and so violent--they even heard it on the ground-- everyone in the aircraft knew. Besides that, I had channel 9 on, and everyone with a headset on channel nine knew we'd lost an engine because they were listening to ATC. Fortunately, I got it off, before we got to the really bad stuff. One of the survivors even commented, "We were listening until the captain turned us off," he says. They didn't know how badly we really were until we told them later. But, what Jan decided to do was, go back there, and brief each station individually. Because, bringing everyone together, she thought, would upset the passengers. Any more than they already were. And by their doing this, the cooperation between them and the passengers was outstanding. It was children's day unfortunately, on United, we had some 30 children on the airplane, a lot of them traveling by themselves. What the flight attendants did were ask the adults to move, so that there was at least one adult sitting next to every child. And the passengers cooperated without hesitation. When they selected the people to sit by the emergency exits, they all responded very quickly. Great cooperation. And when the airplane crashed--after the crash--several of the flight attendants were assisted getting out of their harness by the passengers. Because they were upside down in their harnesses as well as their belt and they couldn't get the belt to loosen. John Trance who helped one of them out, Gary Priest who helped one of them out. You've heard--I KNOW you remember this story, I'm sure you do if I recall it. There was an infant, that was separated from her parents. And one of our survivors, Gary (Schimel ??), was just leaving the airplane, getting out of that thing, full of smoke, fire ?? and he hard the baby crying. And he went back into the airplane, searching for the baby, found her in an overhead bin, she'd actually been thrown up into an overhead bin, and took her out. So that's the kind of way the passengers responded and cooperated with everybody. I've talked about what ATC did, I've talked about what the 185th, how they helped. The surrounding areas. They actually called these outlying cities, when we said we might not make the airport, and said there's a DC-10 headed your way, coming for the airport, and they'd actually dispatch trucks out to the highway, to look for us, so if they found us, and we didn't make the airport, at least there'd be somebody there. I'm not familiar with mutual aid too much, but I know it exists, and I've seen pictures where a fire truck is sitting on a county line while a house across the street burns because they don't have mutual aid. They threw mutual aid out the window: they didn't even consider it. That was part of their plan: that they wouldn't worry about mutual aid, we'll have response, then we'll worry about the mutual aid end of it, who's going to get paid for what they did. And that's the way they cooperated with each other. Marion Health Center, their north campus, which is their mental health campus, their emergency post-traumatic stress program. I was asked, did you get any therapy while you were in the hospital? I said no, I don't think so. They said, no psychiatrists or psychologists came? I said oh yeah, but all they did was come to the room and talk. [laughter] Then it dawned on me just exactly what therapy is. I--when I woke up in the hospital, when I first really remembered what was going on, there was a gentleman holding my hand. Of course, the next thing I looked for was the security guard with my wallet, and he had it in his hand. But this guy was holding my hand, and he said, "I'm doctor (Pensy ??), I'm the staff psychologist." And he was with me from the time I woke up until the last person I saw when I left the hospital before I left the car was doctor Pensy. So I had therapy from day one. Because all of us had guilt complexes. Several guilt complexes. One was this: the captain of the flight, I had felt a responsibility for the accident, but that's this they had to convince us that, really, there wasn't a lot more that we could have done in the airplane to do it, and it took some time, because we all had guilt complexes about this. And we all had the why me syndrome. Why did 112 people die, and 184 survive? How do we decide who lives, who dies? Why me? Why did I survive? And that's another thing, that's one of the biggest problems of post-traumatic stress. So that's what everybody was working on. But the cooperation there was tremendous. The people of Sioux City, or Sioux-Land, as they like to be called, since it's a four-state area, they cooperated, they headed to the airport immediately. And they didn't go out there to see what was going on. They had with them food, blankets, clothes, where ever they could be sent to take it. They ended up at Briar Cliff. Often in their cars. A lot of people stayed in their homes. A lot of people offered their homes for the night. [click] Does anyone know what that was? I jump at noises, sudden noises. [laughter] Anyway, they offered their cars, they took the clothes from the people that were soiled by the dirt, by the farmland, took them home, washed them, brought them back. They just did everything. Over 400 people lined up at the blood bank to give blood, and there was no call for blood, there was no announcement that we need blood, get out there, they were there, they had to turn them away, they had so many. The cooperation of the people United Airlines, the cooperation they gave everyone, I was very impressed with that. A lot of people, were upset at first, there weren't enough people from United to take care of survivors. Well, we have about a five or six person staff at Sioux City. Well, what United did, when they knew this plane was going to crash, they pulled ticket agents, passenger agents, reservations clerks, right off their jobs at San Fran, Seattle, wherever they could, threw them on the first available airplane, without even going home, and headed them to Sioux City. So by the next morning, or the middle of the next day, they had at least one United employee for every family that was there. And I think any airline does that, I'm not just saying that's United's doing. But the cooperation of United with everyone else and us was good. They kind of turned us over to the union. The Airline Pilots Association and the Association of Flight Attendants kind of handled us, relieved the company of any responsibility there. One of the biggest responsibilities is the press. We were not in any condition to talk to the press. We were the survivors of this spectacular crash, so the press wanted to talk to us. The ALPA hired a policeman, they him on my door, they put him on Dudley's door. They didn't need them on Bill and Denny's, they were in intensive care, and you can't get down there anyway. But I often wondered if that policeman was on my door to keep me in or keep the press out, but whatever it was, it worked. Because, they left us alone. That's why at the end of five days, we had to hold a press conference because we had held the press at bay, and they were entitled to an interview and to a talk. And so we held a press conference and did it that way. But the cooperation from the two unions was great. I've talked about how well the passengers did. But the best help, I think, came later. And that came from our families, and our friends. And this is where you can come in, if you know anyone that has had any kind of a crisis, or any kind of a trauma in their life. I had a lot of people tell me, I didn't call you, because I felt you were going to be so busy, that I didn't want to bother you. You're not bothering anybody. If somebody has a crisis or has a trauma, help them: call them, tell them that you're there. Maybe they won't talk to you, maybe someone else will answer the phone. That's all right. At least, give them a call, let them know you're thinking about them. Let them know you're concerned about them, because that's part of the healing process. Talking about it is part of the healing process. This is my 52nd speech on 232. Every time I give it--and I've talked to the doctors about this, and I've asked the psychiatrists about this--every time I give it, I think I convince myself just a little bit more that there was nothing else I could do. And it's part of my healing process. To not talk about it, to bury your head in the sand and pretend it didn't happen, you're going to explode someday. So, if somebody wants to talk about a trauma, listen to them. If they want you to talk, you talk about it, and listen to them. But be there for them, and help them. That's very important. Having a response program is very important. And I'll close--I want to make a statement about that, as I close. But first of all, they said we had a little time for questions, if any of you have specific questions you'd like answered, I'll try to answer them for you. Don't get too technical on me, now. But if you have some, I'd be happy to try to answer it. Anybody have any? We're going to ask you to step up to the microphone, if you don't mind. That's going to cut down on the questions, see. [laughter] It also does that, too. Q: What is your personal opinion of the DC-10 aircraft? H: I love it. It's a great airplane, I've enjoyed flying it. I've flown it, I said, for 9 years as a copilot, and I'll end up flying it four years as a captain. It's my favorite airplane. It's a pilot's airplane. It's an old man's airplane. You just have to have one good finger and you can fly a lot of it, [laughter] Nothing wrong with the copilot, you just have to switch hands, which may be kind of difficult. No, I love it. It's a great airplane. I have every confidence in the world in MDC and GE, and this is something that happened, and it's going to happen to any airplane--it's happened to almost any airplane. Maybe not exactly the same thing. It's happened to a '47, it's happened to an L-1011, similar. I love the airplane. Q: What do you think of the mandatory age 60 retirement law? [laughter] H: I get that every time. Well, this is kind of not the way to answer your question, but since I'm going to be sixty, this is great. This is not United, this is not ALPA, this is not even a lot of my friends, this is just me. My feeling. As we get older, we hate to admit it, but things happen to us. We forget things, we react slowly to things. A young pilot can react a lot faster than an older pilot. He may react wrong. The senior pilot, the experienced pilot may wait a second and do the right thing, so they kind of balance each other out. But we do things as we get older that I'm not so sure our physicals can pick up. A very dear friend of mine was having trouble remembering things. The crews he was flying with accused him of early senility, or drinking on layovers. When they finally diagnosed him, after about a year, they found a tumor the size of an orange in the back of his brain. So all this is going on, anytime this is happening in this year, he could have had a very serious situation at a very critical time, and we could have had problems. This doesn't just happen to 55 year olds, this happens to 30 year olds, I know. Until we come up with a very definite way to check the medical aspects of a person as he gets older, and until we find a way to check the ability of a pilot--as you get older, you might lose some of your abilities, rather than gain some. And you can also fake it. Any pilot, on any given day, can pass a a checkride. And the best pilot in the world in a given day can flunk a checkride. When you get into that situation, you get into an extended program of trying to test his competency. SO until we have a better way to test the competency, and a better way to test the mental and physical aspects of an individual, I think we need an age to stop. I think that's the best way to do it, just pick an age. We're going to hurt some people. I just met the other day, or a couple of months ago, a guy down in CA, he's 82 years old, he just decided it was time to retire as a teacher of acrobatic flying. And he was sharp as a tack. He didn't wear glasses, could hear, didn't wear a hearing aid, and everything else. But he's a freak of nature [laughter]. Well, he's like Nolan Ryan. Nolan Ryan, if you're a baseball fan, is a freak of nature. Nobody 42 years old should be able to throw as hard as he does, and last as long as he does, and most pitchers don't. Yeager is another one. Most his age don't have the eyesight Yeager has, and the hearing Yeager has, and all this sort of thing. But they're exceptions to the rule. The rule is, somewhere along the line you should stop. Now, I don't care if it's sixty. Right after I retire, they can make it 65, it's ok with me. But somewhere along the line, we have to have a place to stop. If they can come up with good medicals, and good things, then go ahead. But I think the cost, and everything else--we're all looking at the bottom line, and it's just not worth it. Anybody else? Q: Have you done any commercial flying since? H: Yes. I went back to work Halloween night, as a matter of fact [laughter]. Three months after the accident, I went back to work. Dudley came back a week later, Bill came back two weeks later. Dennis, unfortunately, severed a nerve in his hand that controlled the motor function of his hand. Along with that, he broke his harm, and they had to put a plate in. While in therapy to fix the arm, the plate broke, and they had to redo the plate. And so he's been out almost a year, just waiting for the arm to heal. But I just head that all of us are back, including the flight attendants. I would have gone sooner, but I had to wait to get the paperwork done. I had a concussion, so the FAA determined I had to have a neurological exam, and they didn't tell us until I was ready to go back to work, so I had to take some extra time to do that. I've been flying since October 1989, now. Anything else? Q; What were your injuries? H: My injuries? Just let me go over quickly the injuries of the crew. Bill, sitting right there, had eight broken ribs, hips, and the pelvis, he had internal injuries, multiple bruises and contusions. Sitting in the jumpseat, in the second officer's seat was the captain, Dennis Fitch. And let me clarify something right there, before we get any further, it got out in Sioux City that Denny Fitch came up to take over from Dudley Dvorak because Dudley couldn't handle the job, and that really irritated me. Dudley was doing what we asked him to do. And we'd had him turned around, and started handling those throttles. If any of you have run through this simulator over here, you know how complicated that is. Dudley did not have time to figure out what the power changes it took. So the second time he added power and was corrected by one of us, he looked up to the captain, and said do you want this seat? You know what you've been doing here, do you want this seat? So that's why the captain was sitting in Dudley's seat, and why Dudley was sitting in the jump seat. Cleared that up. Dennis's injuries were a dislocated left shoulder, a broken right shoulder, the hand, broken rib, other internal injuries, serious internal injuries. And Dudley suffered a large burn on his right arm, we don't know where that came from, the only burn in the cockpit. He smashed his right ankle, had to have three pins put in that. And he has a permanent injury. Me, I put a three-inch cut in my right ankle, I bruised my sternum, bruised one rib, and I got fourteen lacerations in my head. This ear [left] was almost cut off, and this ear was cut. It took ninety two stitches to sew me up. But I didn't break anything. Varying degree of injury in that small confine. Some of our flight attendants, a lot of the passengers, weren't even hurt. The next day, four of the flight attendants walked into my room to go home. Three of them looked like they were dressed to go to work. They didn't even get their uniforms dirty. Q: Were you aware during the slide-out that the airplane ?? -- H: No. Was I aware? No. As soon as we hit the ground, I went out. I have absolutely no recollection of anything from the time we hit the ground until I came to in the cockpit. Trying to figure out where I was. And then we had some conversation, and then the operation started, and I was in and out throughout the whole thing. I remember parts of the rescue, I remember parts of the ambulance ride. I don't remember the ride into town at all. I remember being in the emergency room, but I don't remember what was going on in there. I was on my stomach. They kept me on my stomach. They put me on a thing and threw a towel over my head. I think they were writing me off, I'm not too sure. I woke up with a tag on my big toe, I swear I did. [laughter]. They always tag each individual. they put a number on him, and a flag wherever they found him. And I guess they didn't have a grease pencil, Dudley they wrote on his foot. But me, they put a tag on my big toe. I saw that, and get that thing off of there, right now. [laughter]. But I don't remember too much about it. In fact, we were all in and out. Bill remembers sliding down the runway, sideways, or on the side, like that. And thinking something was going to happen. But then suddenly the cockpit filled with dirt, and then it started to tumble. And he doesn't recall any tumbling sensation at all. None of them do. Q: With what you've learned since the crash, if you found yourself in the same situation, would you do anything different? H: Well, after going to this simulator I went to this morning, I probably would. For one thing, the inputs to the controls would be a lot less than they were. We were shoving the throttles up full board and back again, and it just take very little movement to accomp-- I'm going to go fly the 720 here, and I think it's going to be a little different. But in the F-15, just a little bit of power does it. But basically, I don't think so. I don't know if we'd still try to fly the yoke. And, of course, it can't happen now, since they've modified the airplane. So we'll have an aileron, and leading edge devices, and slaps, and all that. But to do it again, the answer to that at the press conference was, we didn't know what would happen when we did something at the time, and there's no way I'd try to second-guess what would happen if we tried something else. With the knowledge that we have now- -I don't think so. If I were still going to try to fly the airplane, which I'd probably do, I'd still have somebody operate the throttles. That's what they do now, they fly the stabilizer with trim, but they have aileron control. And the best way to do it, really, is to put one guy on the throttles for pitch, and the other to fly the yoke. So I don't think we'd try to do it much different. Except try for a better landing. Q: Was fuel transfer tried, or would it be tried nowadays? H: It would probably be tried now, if you had the time. Well, 41 minutes seems like a lot of time. But we spent the first fifteen minutes just trying to keep the shiny side up. So we were so busy with that that we didn't have time to experiment with anything. I know that Bob and Mimi on the Aloha accident actually had time to fly the airplane, and the presence of mind to see how many flaps they could put down, and how slowly they could fly, and so forth. This airplane was flying its own speed. We had very little control. And the phugoids. We went down as low as 180 knots. And went right up as high as 280 or 300 knots, that sort of thing. So we didn't really have the time to see how slow we could go or how we could fly it. I wish we had, but we didn't. Q: Is MDC looking at any redesign of the isolation of the hydraulic lines that caused the emergency? H: My understanding is that the MD-11, as well as the DC-10, are going to be, well, the DC-10's are, fixed with a fuse in the #3 hydraulic system. An excessive flow or low quantity in the #3 system will close that fuse and direct no more fluid to the tail. And the fluid is then directed to one aileron, the leading edge slats, the nose wheel steering brakes, and so forth, so you that you can fly the airplane. The tail is now operated off a special motor that drives the stabilizer. It's a flying tail. You have no elevators, but you have stabilizer trim. We had no trim at all in the airplane. You fly the pitch of the airplane with the throttles and the stab trim, and you can steer the airplane with the ailerons. And as I understand, that's also the fix on the 11. What they're going to do with the 12, i have no idea, or the 777, or some of those airplanes. They're going to, I think, strictly FBW, and I have no idea how they're going to do that. I don't even know what that means, really. They tried to tell me this morning. Q: What was your speed when the engine let go? We were doing 272 knots. We were at cruise, M = 0.83, 272, and we thought that was the airspeed the airplane wanted to fly. Engineers told us later that when the engine blew, the disk and the fan, about six feet in diameter, that whole thing went out, and tore this big whole in the side of the airplane, the housing, not the airplane, and when that thing went out and changed the trim speed to 215 knots or something like that. Then we put the gear down and got to a lower altitude, and the trim speed was then, in effect, with the burning of the fuel, was lowered to another thing. Did I ever answer your question about transferring fuel? We didn't. We thought about it now, but at the time we didn't. We dumped as much as we could. In the DC-10, you have to have 33,000 some-odd pounds left after you dump, it's an automatic shutoff, and you can't stop it, you can't control it, it's going to stop itself. You have to have that much fuel, unfortunately. Q: ?? Are there ever any emergency situations where a decision has to be made so quickly that ?? H: The only one I can think of right off the bat that did happen that happened to us again was the Colorado Springs 737 where at about 1200' he suddenly in six seconds went from level normal flight to over on his back and into the ground. Who's going to make a decision in six seconds, I don't know. That's the only time where your reaction time would have to be such--for example, in our case, Bill's reaction time was ahead of mine. So his reaction was fine. If we had been right close to the ground, one of us would have had to react, but the CLR has got to come in, where you could have a little time to discuss. Okay? Well, I thank you for being here. It's very important to me. I go around now giving these talks. And unfortunately I don't have enough time to sit around and see that we do it in Seattle. But preparation for a disaster is very important. The things you do here at Edwards AFB may prevent a lot of disasters. It would probably prevent this one if we could ever put into use what they're working with right here at Dryden. But you're not going to stop all the disasters, no matter how hard you try. And there's all kinds. There's not just airplane crashes, there's train crashes, there's hurricanes, tornadoes, there's certainly earthquakes, that can spread disaster over a pretty wide area, which can require communication and emergency effort. So having a good, workable emergency plan is very important. On July 18, 1989, 112 of us--passengers and crew of 232--did not survive, and I hope you will remember them, and think of them, whenever you have occasion to recall the events of 232. But 184 of us did. And I think that's due largely in part to the fact that Sioux City gateway airport and the surrounding communities were prepared to respond to a practiced, organized, updated emergency plan. So what I ask of you, although you're probably aren't familiar with it now, is to go back to your own communities, and look into your emergency plans, check with those people that make them and determine that such a disaster befall your community, would you be as prepared, and more importantly, if not--why not. Thank you for your time this morning. Appreciate it. Capt. Haynes refers to flying the F-15 simulation here at Dryden. Here's an article from Dryden's newspaper which discusses it. >From ``The X-Press'', 31 May 1991: Study paves way for control of crippled aircraft A massive hydraulic failure disables the flight controls of an airplane miles from the nearest airport. Is a crash landing inevitable? Not necessarily. An engineering study at Dryden shows that multi-engine aircraft with specially programmed flight control systems can touch down safely using just the engines to turn and land. NASA's study resulted fro several recent incidents in which the hydraulic control systems on large aircraft failed during flight. The pilots were left with little or no capability to land normally using ailerons, rudder and elevators. Engineers at Dryden are doing the work on a simulator programmed to look at the engine-only handling and flying qualities of a variety of aircraft, including large transports and a twin-engine jet fighter. According to Bill Burcham, chief of Dryden's Propulsion and Performance Branch and the study's initiator, the next major step will be to modify the digital flight control system in NASA's F-15 research aircraft for proof-of-concept flights. The flight program, done in cooperation with the U. S. Air Force, could take place within the next 18 to 24 months, pending formal approval. The system tested at Dryden is solely for research and is not intended for operational use on existing aircraft. data from current and future phases of the studies will be available to the aircraft industry for possible application to commercial and military planes. Disastrous flight control system failures are rare in commercial aircraft, said Burcham, ``but if you can save just one aircraft every 10 years, the system is worth it.'' The augmented flight control system on a disabled aircraft would take the pilot's stick inputs and convey them into engine throttle commands, Burcham said. The flight control system would automatically program the engines to turn the aircraft, climb and descend, and eventually land safely by varying the speed of the engines individually or collectively. In the Dryden study, the engineer-pilot research team used the simulator to compare handling and control characteristics of a four-engine jet transport and the NASA F-15. They ``flew'' the aircraft in both the augmented mode and with manual engine control using hand throttles. The comparative study showed both types of aircraft can be controlled somewhat by manual engine control during level flight and benign maneuvers, but they are extremely difficult to land. In the augmented mode, safe flight and landings are possible even in turbulence and crosswinds. Preliminary flight evaluations by NASA pilots in the F-15 and in two business-size aircraft (a twin jet and a twin propeller) verified simulator predictions that some control is possible using just the hand throttles. But landing tasks are extremely difficult unless the flight control system has been tailored for engine control. The engine-control idea is limited to multi-engine aircraft with electronic engine and flight control systems It can be applied to either jet or propeller-driven aircraft. Other members of the Dryden study team are research pilot Gordon Fullerton; Jim Stewart, F-15 Flight Research Facility project manager; Glenn Gilyard, Propulsion and Performance Branch; and Tom Wolf, Integrated Test and Simulation. ZZ~h From kls Fri Jun 18 22:57:17 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: sandee@Think.COM (Daan Sandee) Subject: A340 long distance reord Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 18 Jun 93 22:57:17 PDT Organization: TMC With reference to a discussion recently on a record-setting 747-400 London to Sydney flight : CNN reported that an A340 had set a record (long distance for airliners) by flying Paris to Auckland in 21.5 hours (miles were given , but I don't remember). They said "cabin furnishings had been stripped to be able to take on more fuel", or something. A half-second shot of the cabin interior showed it look quite bare. Minor problem : "take on more fuel" ? does that mean that A340s are built with more tank capacity than you can normally use without exceeding MGTOW, unless you throw out cabin furnishings ? doesn't make sense. Solutions : - they used supplemental tanks - CNN screwed up and they stripped the aircraft just to make it lighter, not to take on more fuel. Daan Sandee sandee@think.com Thinking Machines Corporation 1010 El Camino Real, Suite 310 Menlo Park, CA 94025 (415) 329-9300 From kls Fri Jun 18 22:57:19 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: cfhxl@ux1.cts.eiu.edu (Herbert Lasky) Subject: commercial air safty Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 18 Jun 93 22:57:19 PDT Organization: Eastern Illinois University I am looking for articles and/or statistics on commercial carrier safty. Close friends of mine will not fly out of fear for their lives. They regard my love of flying to be a form of madness. Any suggestions?: From kls Fri Jun 18 22:57:23 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: commercial air safty References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 18 Jun 93 22:57:23 PDT >I am looking for articles and/or statistics on commercial carrier safty. Interesting question. There are a variety of books of varying quality on the subject, but they tend to focus on one or a few accidents rather than taking a broader view. I'd like to see something along the lines of a compendium of crashes of transport category aircraft, with some basic statistics (date, location, type, operator, registraton, injury and fatality counts) along with a brief synopsis of what happened, a page at most would be fine if there were adequate references to other sources for further details. Indexes based on date as well as aircraft type would be very nice. Alas, I don't know of any such compendium. If anyone else does please share it with the group. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Mon Jun 21 14:04:49 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: landmark@cs.tu-berlin.de (Torsten Kerschat) Subject: Re: A340 long distance reord References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Technical University of Berlin, Germany Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:04:49 PDT sandee@Think.COM (Daan Sandee) writes: >CNN reported that an A340 had set a record (long distance for airliners) >by flying Paris to Auckland in 21.5 hours (miles were given , but I >don't remember). The distance was over 19.000 km non-stop (more than 12000 miles). But it was not the only record they made, because flight time around the world (from Paris to Paris) was less than 49 hours. >They said "cabin furnishings had been stripped to be able to take on >more fuel", or something. A half-second shot of the cabin interior >showed it look quite bare. It's right, that they stripped of the cabin furnishings, because they tried to save fuel. >Solutions : >- they used supplemental tanks no they don't >- CNN screwed up and they stripped the aircraft just to make it lighter, > not to take on more fuel. that's better Torsten -- * Torsten Kerschat | E-Mails to: landmark@cs.tu-berlin.de * * TU - Berlin | torsten@prz.tu-berlin.de * * Fachbereich 20 | landmark@marie.physik.tu-berlin.de * * Germany | landaiaj@w250zrz.zrz.tu-berlin.de * From kls Mon Jun 21 14:04:50 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: shafer@ferhino.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) Subject: Haynes talk at Dryden References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:04:50 PDT Just an extra bit of information--I'm the Mary that Capt. Haynes refers to when he talks about declaring an emergency. I still have 4 or 5 copies of the video tape of the talk, which I'll send to the first requestors. There are some limits on requestors-- I'd like to put this in the hands of people who'll show it to large groups. So--Aero departments at universities and colleges, company flying clubs, companies with aeronautical departments, libraries--are the people I'd like to send these to. Write on your letterhead to NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility Ms Mary Shafer Mailstop 4840D P.O. Box 273 Edwards, CA 93523-0273 Mary Shafer DoD #362 KotFR NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA shafer@ferhino.dfrf.nasa.gov Of course I don't speak for NASA "A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all." Unknown US fighter pilot From kls Mon Jun 21 14:04:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.aviation.misc Path: bounce-back From: mtravis@vnet.IBM.COM Subject: (U) Airline pilots Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:04:52 PDT Hello netters! I am interested in talking to any airline pilots, corporate pilots, part 121, part 135 pilots, or CFIs on the net. If you fit this descrip- tion, PLEASE contact me by email. (Those on the net that also have close aquaintence with those fitting the above description, PLEASE contact me.) I am not interested in a job. I am on an information gathering mission and these are the ones that could best help me. I just have a couple of questions that I would rather not clog up the net with that could only be answered by those that have been there before. (Do I have your curiousity up yet :+) ) Thanks. #incl Internet id: MTravis@vnet.ibm.com Mark ___________|___________ ------------------------------- \ \_^_/ / INTERNET: MTravis@vnet.ibm.com __\___{_+_}___/__ (404) 835-6143 T/L 269-6143 o/ \o From kls Mon Jun 21 14:04:55 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: stadler@apple.com (Andy Stadler) Subject: Re: A ride on an A320 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Apple Computer Inc, Cupertino, CA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:04:55 PDT In article driscoll@src.honeywell.com (Kevin Driscoll) writes: > >>The return flight was also on an A320, but some other lucky fellow got >>to the jump seat. > >Mexicana has only one jump seat? All A320s I have been in have had two. I really meant that more figuratively - they already had a guest. >>four displays were speed, heading, altitude, and vertical speed. Below >>each display was a knob. You could turn each knob to adjust the setting of >>the display, or you could (pull, push, not sure) it to say "don't care". > >The knob operations are: push to "give" control to the Flight Management >and Guidance System (FMGS) and pull to "take" control. The latter >meaning is that the FCU/"autopilot" is in control versus the FMGS. >There really isn't a "don't care"; the control stays with whatever the >last push/pull was. Operationally, however, I would definitely call it a "don't care". Obviously in approach mode it would be different, but for just "flying around" (which is what we did - a totally manual & VFR approach and landing) the BEHAVIOR of the system was that if you pushed the knob in (thanks for clarifying that) what you were saying was "I don't care what you do with this parameter", thus giving the FCU freedom to alter it as necessary to achieve the "do care" inputs. --Andy stadler@apple.com From kls Mon Jun 21 14:04:58 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk (Mike Collins) Subject: Re: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk Organization: DIS(organised) Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:04:58 PDT In article rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu writes: >what ever the reason, the FACT remains that there have been three A320 >crashes, in as many years. No other aircraft of similar technological >vintage--757/767, A310, A300-600, 747-400--can claim the same. It is >very puzzling that, considering the "glassy" similarities among these air- >planes, there haven't been more problems, fleet-wise. Perhaps one >difference is that on the other airplanes, pilots are more in the loop, >on their toes--whereas with the A320/330/340, one is in that blasted >*cocoon*, and taught to BELIEVE! > But hang on here. I can remember as a kid in the mid sixties reading about a series of crashes involving the B727. Uk newspapers were running headlines like "Jinx Jet Crashes Again". Well they would wouldn't they? They were trying to sell the Trident. But the fact remains that the cause of these crashes (as far as I remember) was pilots were upgrading from piston craft to jets and had no idea of the true handling "quirks" of the 727. The common problem was allowing speed to decay on the approach. We are talking the same problem here with the A320, a change from a familiar technology to a new. I think. Perhaps half the problem lies with who airlines choose to be their pilots. If they put a "boy racer" in charge of a multi million dollar arcade game like the A320 what do they expect. I think the voice commands from the FMS should, every 5 minutes, repeat what every pilot learnt at his instructors knee."There are old pilots and there are bold pilots but there are no old bold pilots" Mike Collins From kls Mon Jun 21 14:05:03 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Scott Jacobson <75706.2201@CompuServe.COM> Subject: AF Retires 707 970 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:05:03 PDT Last week the Air Force retired 707-153B tail number 58-6970 (MSN 17925, line # 33). This aircraft was delivered to the Air Force in 1958 and was the first (KC-135s aside) jet transport used by the air force. It has spent its entire 35 year career at Andrews AFB flying VIP missions, accumulating some 20,000+ flying hours ( a youngster - fatigue wise). 970 was used briefly by Eisenhower but was never officially "Air Force One". Kennedy also used the aircraft at times. By the time Jet power was accepted for regular presidential travel 707-353B 62-6000 had arrived for duty as Air Force One and 970 was relegated to flying lesser VIPs. 970 still had a role to play in history. The aircraft was used by Kissinger while negotiating the end to the vietnam war, Al Haig while trying to negotiate a peaceful end to the Falklands conflict, and by LBJ when he flew to Dallas in Nov 63 (LBJ returned to DC aboard 26000 with Kennedys body). It was the "shuttle" in shuttle diplomacy. The aircraft will be making a final flight to the Air Force Museum at Wright Patterson AFB sometime in the near future. I will post the date and time when I get it. I don't know exactly why it is being retired as it seems to have plenty of hours left. I expect the Air Force did not want to try hushkitting/reengining a 707 subtype that had not already been modified commercially - I could be wrong.. BTW: Plans are afoot to replace the remaining 707s at Andrews with 767s sometime before the end of the decade - Funds permiting. One last note: If anyone out there in netland has any interesting anecdotes about 970 or any of the other aircraft in the fleet at Andrews I'd like to hear from you and swap stories...... Scott Jacobson From kls Mon Jun 21 14:05:05 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: dowlatir@cu1.crl.aecl.ca (Ramin Dowlati) Subject: position of engines on wings? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: AECL Research Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:05:05 PDT I'm interested in knowing what are the main factors in determining ^^^^ where the engine is located on the wings of commercial aircraft? (eg. stress load on wings, aerodynamic performance, drag, etc..) Is there a minimum distance which has to be maintained between the engine and the main fuselage? Thanks. -Ramin -- dowlatir@cu1.crl.aecl.ca From kls Mon Jun 21 14:05:06 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: bounce-back From: pmc@merit.edu (Philip M. Chuang) Subject: Re: commercial air safty References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Merit Network, Inc. Ann Arbor, MI Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:05:06 PDT >I am looking for articles and/or statistics on commercial carrier safty. Close >friends of mine will not fly out of fear for their lives. They regard my love >of flying to be a form of madness. Any suggestions?: > Karl's right in that most books tend to focus on a few accidents/incidents so they tend not to make very comfortable reading. However, the British magazine "Flight International" publishes both military and civilian accident/incident report every six months. While that report lists all the accidents in the precious six months, it also includes general statistics such as "Number of fatalities per 100,000,000 miles flown," but you then need to do some homework to compare that to some local auto accident statistics of your area. From kls Mon Jun 21 14:12:06 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: jaap@cs.ruu.nl (Jaap Romers) Subject: Re: A340 long distance reord References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Utrecht University, Dept. of Computer Science Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 21 Jun 93 14:12:06 PDT In sandee@Think.COM (Daan Sandee) writes: >CNN reported that an A340 had set a record (long distance for airliners) >by flying Paris to Auckland in 21.5 hours (miles were given , but I >don't remember). This is what I read this morning in the newspaper: Departed last wednesday 11:58 local time at Le Bourget, Paris. Arrived in Auckland 21 hours and 48 minutes later (non-stop, 19246 km). "Pitstop" of 5 hours in Ackland. The return-flight was 21 hours, 32 minutes and 19100 km. The A340 arrived at Le Bourget on Friday at 12:21 loxa time. On board were 20 people. Jaap From kls Thu Jun 24 00:37:43 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: weiss@hurricane.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) Subject: Re: Strange 727 Flight References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: School of Engineering and Applied Science, UCLA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 00:37:43 PDT In article davelett@athena.mit.edu (Richard Sun) writes: >I noticed the plane's attitude >changed several times from nose-up about 5 degrees to nose down 5 degrees. >As we landed at BOS, I noticed our speed was very fast. Well, it sounds like particularly heavy traffic in BOS. Often what will happen is planes will be stacked like a wedding cake on approach durring heavy traffic. That is, the aircraft will be put in circles, each separated vertically by 1000' (FAA regs require either 1000' vertical separation or 1 mile horizontal separation at all times). As each plane at the bottom of the stack lands, the aircraft above are allowed to descend 1000', and would be asked to do so quickly. Consequently, while holding, the attitude would be 5 deg up, and while descending would be 5 deg down. Adding to this, aircraft would be asked to land quickly when they are at the bottom of the stack, so a relatively high landing speed would not be unheard of. I believe that there were some weather delays on June 13th in the midsection of the US, from where many connecting flights originate. Consequently, there would be a higher traffic flow during the late afternoon. I'm speculating here, but it sounds reasonable. -- \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | / - Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science - - Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles - / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \ From kls Thu Jun 24 00:37:47 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kbennett@access.digex.net (Keith R. Bennett) Subject: Need Opinion: Possible Mechanical Failure? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 00:37:47 PDT I know very little about aeronautics, but would like your (collective) opinions about an incident that occurred while I was flying. I was on a flight from Indianapolis to Washington National on U.S. Air flight #1506, June 15th. About 15 minutes before landing, the lights in the plane went out, except for the emergency lights on the floor aisle. The engines became silent, and our downward motion accelerated quickly. The plane remained level. We eventually landed without incident. Not being an expert, and not being in the cockpit, I had no way of knowing whether there was any danger or not. My gut feeling, however, was very clear. It was *very* distressing. Is there any way for me to find out if a mechanical failure occurred? I have written to U.S. Air Consumer Affairs but question whether they will be honest in their response. After we landed I asked the pilot what happened. He said that he had been told to go down to a certain altitude while passing Dulles Airport, and that he wasn't given as much time as usual to do that. I have been on a few dozen flights in my life, and have *never* experienced such a drastic loss of power. If the pilot's explanation was correct, is it acceptable for air traffic control to be giving such short notice that such drastic measures need to be taken? Other possible explanations that have crossed my mind: 1) The engines failed and it took a few minutes for the pilots to get them going again. 2) The pilot wasn't on the ball and had to make a sudden adjustment. 3) Something on the wing (flap, aileron, I don't know, you tell me) got stuck and in a position of drag or downward motion, and the pilot cut the power to slow the altitude loss until he could get it unstuck. What do you think? Thanks for your opinion... - Keith -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Keith Bennett Bennett Business Solutions, Inc. C++/C Software Development 1605 Ingram Terrace kbennett@access.digex.com Silver Spring, MD USA 20906-5932 From kls Thu Jun 24 00:37:48 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu Organization: DSO, Stanford University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 00:37:48 PDT Mike Collins writes > But hang on here. I can remember as a kid in the mid sixties > reading about a series of crashes involving the B727. Uk newspapers > were running headlines like "Jinx Jet Crashes Again". Well they > would wouldn't they? They were trying to sell the Trident. But > the fact remains that the cause of these crashes (as far as I > remember) was pilots were upgrading from piston craft to jets > and had no idea of the true handling "quirks" of the 727. The > common problem was allowing speed to decay on the approach. We > are talking the same problem here with the A320, a change from > a familiar technology to a new. I think. That, to me, is the most convincing explanation of the several A320 accidents. That's not to say that there may not be specific problems with the way this or the other feature are implemented (there definitely are) but that these problems alone would not be, to my mind, critical except that they are new and unfamiliar. Having said that, I think Airbus and the travelling public would have been better served by more humility on Airbus' part. They _may_ be right that the accidents were, _technically_, pilot error (note emphasis before flaming). However, just as they wrote complicated control laws that incorporated current aerodynamic knowledge, they should have incorporated current human-factors knowledge. A system might be _technically_ perfect but will still be unsafe if it assumes perfect operators. Having said that, let me add that the A320 pilots that I've talked to have all expressed a great deal of respect for the aircraft's possible interface faults in the wake of the accidents. I've always thought that few aircraft types are safer than those who have just had a major accident: everybody seems to take more care of them all around. So I happily fly A320s. And DC-10s. -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Thu Jun 24 00:37:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Robert Dorsett Subject: Re: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: rdd@cactus.org Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 00:37:52 PDT In article Mike@oscar.demon.co.uk (Mike Collins) writes: >In article rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu writes: > >>what ever the reason, the FACT remains that there have been three A320 >>crashes, in as many years. No other aircraft of similar technological >>vintage--757/767, A310, A300-600, 747-400--can claim the same. It is >>very puzzling that, considering the "glassy" similarities among these air- >>planes, there haven't been more problems, fleet-wise. Perhaps one >>difference is that on the other airplanes, pilots are more in the loop, >>on their toes--whereas with the A320/330/340, one is in that blasted >>*cocoon*, and taught to BELIEVE! >> >But hang on here. I can remember as a kid in the mid sixties reading about >a series of crashes involving the B727. Uk newspapers were running headlines >like "Jinx Jet Crashes Again". Well they would wouldn't they? They were trying >to sell the Trident. But the fact remains that the cause of these crashes (as >far as I remember) was pilots were upgrading from piston craft to jets and >had no idea of the true handling "quirks" of the 727. Two points: 1. The A320 should be compared to aircraft with similar avionics and operating philosophies: those are the airplanes listed. There have been no 757 crashes (released 1982), one 767 (1983) crash, two (?) A310 (1982) crashes, one (?) A300-600 (1982) crash, and no 747-400 (1988) crashes. Yet in the first three years of operation, the A320 had three. Something's wrong, there. Yeah, it *could* be bad luck--that happens. But the circum- stances gel quite well with critics' theories and concerns raised by pre- existing research. 2. The 727 situation was a different era, and should be viewed accordingly. The pilots were upgrading to *jets*, and had no experience with jets. In particular, jet aircraft can sustain very high rates of descent, quietly, which is believed to have played poorly on the "flying instincts" of the previous-generation prop pilots. I would suggest that the 707, 727, and DC-8 provided the "learning curve" for the jet age: they had higher accident rates because they were first. If one looks at the post-60's accident record, the 727 fares as well as other, more modern aircraft. It WAS a learning curve drawn in blood, though, one which we should honor, with incremental, need-driven airframe and avionics evolution. Now, Airbus, of course, would have us believe that *its* interface is the "future" of jet transport, and, if we accept that, then its accident rate is as easily "justified." The problem here, though, is that they haven't changed that much about airplanes fly--only how they're flown--and NOBODY else is jumping on the same bandwagon. The FBW is proprietary, and their control laws are unique. They are vaguely similar to what Boeing was con- sidering on the 7J7, but guess what--Boeing's opting for a "conventional" control law and interfaces on the 777. The industry's exploding in many different directions, many different standards, and we're going to pay for it in more blood. I think we're reaching the point of negative returns on systemic safety "improvements." > The common problem was >allowing speed to decay on the approach. This was discussed in depth on airliners a few months ago; see the airliners archives on rascal.ics.utexas.edu for more information. There aren't many parallels that I can see: only a fool would purposely fly a 727 on the back side of the power curve, yet it seems to be par for the course for many pilots on the A320. :-| >Perhaps half the problem lies with who airlines choose to be their pilots. >If they put a "boy racer" in charge of a multi million dollar arcade game >like the A320 what do they expect. It's really a question of philosophies. There are two major philosophies for the future (three, if you count keeping things like they are). The first is to continue with the automation of technology, and isolate the pilot. One day, perhaps, he will become superfluous: yet, by regulation, now, he must be in the loop. There is strong evidence that insulated pilots tend to become careless pilots, "out of the loop." So do we accept the "management" philosophy, and choose people who are basically clerks, who can be trained to push the right buttons and take orders, and hope that the innate reliability of the systems doesn't *require* a stick & rudder man? The other approach is to "keep" the pilot in the loop, yet somehow "protect" the airplane from his mistakes. This is the "cocoon" approach. Let him maneuver with some discretion, give him things to do, but forbid things from getting too far out of hand. This may be undesirable, too, in that the pilot may grow to rely on the "protections" being there to save his bacon. There is a theme unifying these approaches, and that's to drive down the novelty of the personnel requirements which "make the pilot." This appeals to third world and European countries, which either don't have a military or civilian pilot pool to draw from, or forbid their military pilots from flying with air carriers. More pragmatically, it eventually opens the way to piloting as being a mere technical skill, something that anyone with a a two- year college degree or high school diploma can handle just fine (as British Airways is currently doing with its ab initio program). If you lessen the personnel requirements, you eliminate the novelty, you vastly broaden the pilot pool, and you end up getting to pay pilots a small fraction of what they're currently making. I don't know about you, but I'd rather not have a $20,000/year kid flying my $140,000,000 747, responsible for the lives of 600 people, worrying about how he's going to pay for his kid's braces. Is such a person going to shout down company management if he feels the airplane is unsafe? Ha! (cf. Continental and Eastern under Lorenzo) Yet we have technocrats from all directions who are happily trying to make this the case: ATC automation/authority proponents, the airlines, the manufacturers. Just what we want: a committee responsible for airplane safety--with their butts safely on the ground, naturally. :-) But for now, is continued evolution along the automated/cocoonish tract as safe as previous approaches? Probably not! Is one unnecessary crash every five years unacceptable to the bean counters? Probably not! IMHO, the A320 combines the worst of the two mainstream "modern" control philosophies. It has a very high degree of automation (the pilots only touch most system switches, for instance, during pre-flight, to verify that everything is functional), together with the promises and pitfalls of protections. All the while providing a NEW method of flight control, in the form of three major control laws, and countless permutations within those control laws. Plus the known human factors problems of FMS-based flight guidance systems (i.e., cumbersome and too "heads-down"). I could accept one of these problems--but not all three, not in the same airplane. Perhaps some of the Honeywell or Boeing people on the net would like to comment on the 777 cockpit philosophy? I understand it makes some attempts to keep the pilots in the loop, but I haven't read anything on it, recently. >I think the voice commands from the FMS should, every 5 minutes, repeat what >every pilot learnt at his instructors knee."There are old pilots and there are >bold pilots but there are no old bold pilots" Yeah, but how do you reconcile the old/bold parable with pilots who are selected and trained to view it as a 9-5 job, and are neither bold nor timid? :-) In other words, "boldness" isn't the problem, it's the environ- ment and training and their very strong influences on human behavior. If you are aware of the problem, you can work around it; if not, you can fall victim to the environment and make a mistake that kills you and your passengers. --- Robert Dorsett Senior Luddite rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Thu Jun 24 00:37:54 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 00:37:54 PDT Robert Dorsett writes: >1. The A320 should be compared to aircraft with similar avionics and >operating philosophies: those are the airplanes listed. There have been >no 757 crashes (released 1982), one 767 (1983) crash, two (?) A310 (1982) >crashes, one (?) A300-600 (1982) crash, and no 747-400 (1988) crashes. >Yet in the first three years of operation, the A320 had three. I don't know what "released" means but those dates aren't internally consistent either since the 767 preceded the 757. First flight for the 767 was 1981, 757 and A310 were both 1982, A300-600 was 1983, and the 747-400 was 1988. First delivery was the following year in each case. With regard to crashes, I came up with the following: 757 none 767 5/26/91 Lauda Air 767-3Z9(ER) OE-LAV crashed 20 minutes after departure from Bangkok after an in-flight deployment of the thrust re- verser on one engine. A310 7/29/92 Thai A310-304 HS-TID crashed into a ridge on approach to Kathmandu after reporting some problem had been resolved. A300-600 none 747-400 none Note that the A300-600 is a substantially different aircraft than the earlier A300 models. In particular, the critical area for the purposes of this discussion is the flight deck. The A300-600 shares the same modern glass cockpit as the A310, whereas the older A300 models had an older "lots of gauges" cockpit. Looking further at the crashes of the A320's peers, neither exhibits the "pilot error" problems claimed for all three A320 crashes. The Lauda 767 was, I believe, ultimately blamed on inadequate redundancy in the thrust reverser mechanisms on the PW4000 tied to an inability of large twins to survive an in-flight thrust reverser deployment on only one side. I'm not sure a final cause has been assigned to the Thai A310 crash though what I recall hearing seemed to be suggesting pilot error. However, this was under difficult conditions at a poorly equiped airport that is *very* difficult to land at -- nothing at all like the circumstances of the three A320 crashes. The question then remains: why have three A320s crashed, allegedly due to pilot error, when none of its technological peers have crashed except for reasons unrelated to the pilot interface? The spate of early 727 crashes due to pilot error doesn't appear to be comparable. For the record, I could find two of the older A300s that had crashed: A300 10/7/80 Malaysian A00B2-120 OY-KAA (leased from SAS) crashed while attempting to land in heavy rain at Kuala Lumpur. 9/28/92 PIA A300B4-203 AP-BCP crashed 8 miles short of runway on approach to Kathmandu. In addition, Iran Air A300B2-203 EP-IBU was shot down 7/3/88 by the US Navy over the Persian Gulf, and several other older A300s were destroyed on the ground in the Middle East. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Jun 24 00:37:56 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ak336@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (John Dill) Subject: Re: can en route congestion be avoided for commuter flights? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: ak336@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (John Dill) Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 00:37:56 PDT >I'm looking for ideas about how the en route congestion problems >could be avoided by short-haul commuter flights. One suggestion >that I have heard is to proceed from tower-to-tower, thereby >obviating the need to merge with en route flow. Also, I understand >that the low altitude (under 10,000 ft) airways (at least in comparison >to the commuter and jetway altitudes) are underutilized. Any comments? >Mike Fabrizi >The MITRE Corporation The low altitude airways are perhaps "under utilized" by IFR traffic, but that airspace below 10,000' is often (especially on week-ends) populated by "indians" (controller slang for Navajo...Cherokee...etc.). The commuter flights are usually in the high teens to low twenties and are usually segragated at the arrival fix from jet a/c by altitude. Most enroute delays or vectors are for spacing with other commuter traffic...not jet a/c. John Dill ATCS, Cleveland ARTCCC -- Dan Quayle was right! It's the family stupid! From kls Thu Jun 24 13:38:14 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: mellott@db.erau.edu (David Michael Mellott) Subject: Question about COmputerized Maint. Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 13:38:14 PDT Organization: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL USA I was wondering. Have the major airlines totally computerized their maintenance records or do they still use a paper trail. Also do they airlines (or corporate aviation) use management informations systems in other areas besides computer reservation systems. Any information would be appreciated. If you could please post respones so that the information can be shared, if not please e-mail responses to mellott@erau.db.erau.edu I thank you in advance mike From kls Thu Jun 24 13:38:16 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: f88-oas@alv.nada.kth.se.\E (Olof \Estrand) Subject: ATC equations. Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 13:38:16 PDT Organization: Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden Hi, I am going to write a program to calculate the flight paths of aircrafts, and would be interested in any information I could get. It is for a future European ATC system and I am aware of the fact that the time I have available is alittle bit to short. If there is anyone who knows anything about this subject or is intrested to learn more, I would be happy If you would contact me. ======================================== I am doing this for my final thesis (12 Weeks) at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm where I major in applied mathematics. I am doing this in cooperation with Celsius-Tech where they have a system for Air traffic control. However their flight models are very much oversimplified and I am going to use a more accurate model. Thanks in advance, Olof Astrand. ,,, (o o) +-------------------------------oOO--(_)--OOo------------------------------+ Olof Astrand f88-oas@nada.kth.se +------------------------------------------+-------------------------------+ From kls Thu Jun 24 13:38:18 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: barr@ash.mmm.ucar.EDU (Keith Barr) Subject: Re: Need Opinion: Possible Mechanical Failure? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Jun 93 13:38:18 PDT In article you write: >I was on a flight from Indianapolis to Washington National on U.S. Air >flight #1506, June 15th. About 15 minutes before landing, the lights >in the plane went out, except for the emergency lights on the floor >aisle. The engines became silent, and our downward motion accelerated >quickly. The plane remained level. We eventually landed without incident. This sounds pretty normal to me. I don't know if it was an evening or night flight, but it is normal procedure to turn out the cabin lights so the passengers eyes can adjust to the darkness, in case an emergency evacuation becomes necessary. The rapid, quiet descent can be explained by the fact that most jets are very "slippery", and can be hard to slow down while descending. The best way to slow it down is to pull the throttles back to flight idle, possibly deploy the spoilers to their flight position, and point the nose downhill. >I have been on a few dozen flights in my life, and have *never* experienced >such a drastic loss of power. If the pilot's explanation was correct, is >it acceptable for air traffic control to be giving such short notice that >such drastic measures need to be taken? ATC can ask for any rate of descent, but the pilots do not have to accept the clearance if they feel it is excessive. The penalty for denying a clearance, however, could be length delays that would surely cause pasx complaints. I have friends who fly for United into Denver, and they complain fairly regularly about the descents that are given to them here. In general, apparently aircraft are handed off to Denver approach at FL220 (roughly 22,000 feet above sea level), at cruise descent airspeed. Approach then requests them to cross Keann at FL170 at 250 knots, which is only a few miles ahead. To comply with the crossing restriction is sometimes a problem, but doable if passenger comfort is somewhat sacrificed. In the tight airspace surrounding IAD and DCA, I would guess that steep descents would be regularly called for. _____________________________ _____ | Keith Barr \ \ \__ _____ | barr@ncar.ucar.edu \___________\ \/_______\___\_____________ | COMM/AS&MEL/IA/A&IGI / ( /_/ ..................... `-. |_____________________________/ `-----------,----,--------------' _/____/ From kls Mon Jun 28 22:34:51 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (Stefano Pagiola) Subject: Re: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu Organization: DSO, Stanford University Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jun 93 22:34:51 PDT Robert Dorsett writes > 1. The A320 should be compared to aircraft with similar avionics > and operating philosophies: [747-400, 757, 767, A300-600, A310] I'm not sure what `similar' means in this context but it seems to me that the A320 isn't really comparable to any of these designs. Yes, they all have `glass' cockpits and digital avionics (as do the MD-88, MD-11, and Fokker 100), but none of the other designs is FBW, and none attempts to give the kind of `protection from errors' that the A320 attempts (what Bob Dorsett called the `cocoon' approach). The A320 will be comparable to the 777, when it comes out. I fully expect the 777 to compare favorably, if only because Boeing could draw on 5 years of A320 experience. (Also because Boeing doesn't tend, in my experience, to be quite as arrogant about these things as Airbus can be.) But for now, lets not compare apples and oranges. > 2. The 727 situation was a different era, and should be viewed > accordingly. The pilots were upgrading to *jets*, and had no > experience with jets.... > > Now, Airbus, of course, would have us believe that *its* interface > is the "future" of jet transport, and, if we accept that, then > its accident rate is as easily "justified." The problem here, > though, is that they haven't changed that much about airplanes > fly--only how they're flown--and NOBODY else is jumping on the > same bandwagon. The FBW is proprietary, and their control laws > are unique. They are vaguely similar to what Boeing was con- > sidering on the 7J7, but guess what--Boeing's opting for a > "conventional" control law and interfaces on the 777. Rephrase that a little and it won't seem so bad: Airbus believed (and probably still does) that its interface approach was the future. It was, in fact, one possible future. Whether it was (or is) the best possible future is clearly subject to debate, but it is not, IMHO, a debate that can be undertaken a priori. You have to try it to see. I think Airbus deserves praise for attempting the transition to a new way of flying. I think they deserve censure for appearing to be so unwilling to learn. A bit like Columbus insisting he had really found India 20 years after he found America. > It's really a question of philosophies. There are two major > philosophies for the future (three, if you count keeping things > like they are). > > The first is to continue with the automation of technology, and > isolate the pilot.... There is strong evidence that insulated > pilots tend to become careless pilots, "out of the loop." > > The other approach is to "keep" the pilot in the loop, yet somehow > "protect" the airplane from his mistakes. This is the "cocoon" > approach... This may be undesirable, too, in that the pilot > may grow to rely on the "protections" being there to save his > bacon. Well put. I think the latter approach is inevitable. I think technology does let us build in safeguards that are helpful and useful. The lowly stick shaker was an early example of this, but it could only alert. Technology is reaching the point were it can do more, and it would be silly not to use it. But in doing so, we have to be very wary to not lock pilots out of the loop and make them overconfident. Walking that fine line isn't going to be easy. What I worry is not that Airbus is trying to walk it, its that its doing so with the wrong attitude; with too much confidence in its technical capabilities and not enough consideration for human factors. > If you are aware of the > problem, you can work around it; if not, you can fall victim to > the environment and make a mistake that kills you and your > passengers. As I said, I think most A320 pilots are, at this point, aware of the potential pitfalls and treat them with respect. That's why I don't lose any sleep over flying on A320s. But I hope it doesn't take a periodic crash to keep people watchful. -- - Stefano Pagiola Food Research Institute, Stanford University spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) spagiola@FRI-nxt-Pagiola.stanford.edu (NeXTMail encouraged) From kls Mon Jun 28 22:35:02 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ernst@Tymnet.COM (Dennis Ernst) Subject: Risks articles Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jun 93 22:35:02 PDT I saw the following articles in comp.risks and thought the group might be interested: Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 11:38:26 +0100 From: Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: Flight control computers `to bypass pilots' [In the following item, the statement: "The system also ensures that no mistakes are made" especially caught my eye! And I imagine that RISKS readers such as Don Norman will have something to say about: "[Pilots] will control by exception, in other words leaving all routine tasks to be done automatically by the computers." Brian Randell, Dept. of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk +44 91 222 7923] Flight control computers 'to bypass pilots' The Independent (a national UK paper), 19 May 93 Christian Wolmar reports on a new electronic system for air communications While aircraft flown with the aid of computers have transformed the role of pilots, communications between aircraft and ground control have changed little since the early days of aviation. "Roger" and his pal "out" still feature prominently, and misunderstood instructions have led to several of crashes. All that is set to change. Yesterday the first test demonstration of equipment which will allow pilots and air traffic controllers to communicate through computers was held. An experimental BAC 1-11 "flying laboratory", belonging to the Defence Research Agency at Bedford, flew above East Anglia sending and receiving messages on its on-board computer. This project, called the Experimental Flight Management System, is part of a Europe-wide programme that is expected to enable commercial aircraft to begin communicating in this way by 1998, saving time and reducing the risk of accidents. Trevor Gilpin, programme manager for the National Air Traffic Services, the organisation responsible for air traffic control, says the new system has many advantages: "The airwaves are getting very cluttered and would not be able to cope with the expected doubling of air traffic over the next 15 years. The system also ensures that no mistakes are made." Pilots will be able to get weather information on their screens, whereas at the moment they can only do so by tuning to a special radio frequency. The messages from ground control can also go direct to the plane's auto pilot, which raises the possibility, already mooted by the European aircraft manufacturing consortium Airbus, that pilots may become redundant. Aircraft could be controlled from the ground with a person in the cockpit as a failsafe. A ground-based computer could ensure pilots have carried out its instructions and send a warning if they have failed to do so. Mr Gilpin feels that there will always be a pilot but accepts that the role of both pilot and air traffic controller will be different: "They will control by exception, in other words leaving all routine tasks to be done automatically by the computers." At the core of the system is a new form of radar communication, called Mode S, which allows information to be transmitted electronically. For it to be used widely, new transmission centres will have to be built throughout Europe. Mode S allows aircraft to be tracked in four dimensions - including time - which enables tighter control of airspace, reducing delays. Partial introduction of the system is expected in 1996. Electronic information also needs to be sent between air traffic control centres and already nine, mainly in northern Europe, are able to send messages to each other's computers. This is reducing delays since previously air traffic control centres had to telephone each other with flight plan information. The urgency of introducing the new system was highlighted last month in a letter to Flight International in which a pilot said that air communications between the Far East and Eastern Europe were so bad because of high demand and old equipment that an accident appeared inevitable. He said: "If and when an accident does occur, I can imagine the amount of words which will be spoken and published in the press and official inquiries wondering how a state of affairs like this has been allowed to exist for so long." A long-haul pilot also told the Independent that at times he was unable to contact ground control when there were bad radio conditions over the Atlantic "while the guy in the back can phone his wife on a mobile telephone using satellite links". ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 08:37:31 +0100 From: erling@wm.estec.esa.nl (Erling Kristiansen) Subject: Re: Flight control computers to bypass pilots (RISKS-14.65) The Independent article says > Yesterday the first test demonstration of equipment which will allow pilots > and air traffic controllers to communicate through computers was held. It is not quite true that this was the first demonstration of such capabilities. The European Space Agence (ESA), in cooperation with several organizations and airlines, demonstrated our PRODAT satellite mobile communication system with, among other features, ATC digital communication, starting in 1987. The trials included installations on several aircraft - including the very same BAC 1-11 quoted in the Independent article. One Airbus 310 was flying the equipment for more than a year, and ATC experimenters were collecting flight data on a regular basis, but the system was not actually part of the ATC operations of this aircraft. One dedicated flight, with a private Jetstream aircraft, between Madrid and London, was carried out with the PRODAT link as primary ATC communication channel (and voice as backup) for the part of the flight taking place in Spanish airspace. Admittedly, the scope of the PRODAT trials was more limited than that of the Mode-S. The goal was to demonstrate the feasibility of digital satellite communication for ATC (and airline) purposes. All equipment was to prototype standards, and a possible commercialization would have taken place in a second phase. The trial system incorporated capabilities for the controller to access flight data, but no to down (up?)-load data into the aircraft equipment. Pilot-to-controller messaging was also provided. The aeronautical part of PRODAT has been discontinued for a variety of reasons (competing systems, standardization going in other directions). PRODAT still continues, and is on the verge of commercial deployment for land mobiles - but that is another story. The RISK? When the press proclaims a FIRST, do not always believe it. Erling Kristiansen, ESTEC, European Space Agency, Noordwijk, The Netherlands ------------------------------ ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 09:18 MDT From: timothy@tbucks.com Subject: Re: Flight control computers 'to bypass pilots' (RISKS-14.65) I would like to address this subject; I am an Air Traffic Controller with 13 years experience in most control functions, including Radar and Oceanic Non-Radar. Most communications with pilots over or near land take place under VHF or UHF A/G radio. If, for example, I want to descend a flight to FL 240 (24,000 feet) I say "Flight No., descend and maintain flight level two four zero." The pilot will acknowledge by repeating his flight number and the assigned altitude, then begin a descent. (Well, lots of times they will question the altitude but let's not get into that ). At the same time I'm speaking, I will punch the flight id and altitude into my computer, and the assigned altitude will be displayed on the scope. But that bears no relation to what I've said, or the pilot heard or said back to me. I might be thinking 240, punch 240 into the computer, but say 220. I should catch the error when the pilot reads back the clearance, but I might not. I might say 240, but the pilot hears 220, and I don't catch the error on read-back. He might read back 240, but put 220 into his flight director. Each of these errors happens from time to time, and can cause problems. Using Mode S, I would enter the flight id and altitude and that would be sent to the cockpit, where the pilot would acknowledge by pressing a button. My display would indicate the acknowledgement. The pilot could still question the clearance via voice radio. Mode S would not eliminate errors; I might for example punch in the wrong flight id or altitude. But it should reduce greatly incidents in which the pilot is doing something other than what is shown on my display. Since I am continually scanning that display for potential conflicts, it is vital that it accurately reflect the intentions of the pilots. There will, I think, always be a pilot (though perhaps someday only one) but the pilot in command already leaves many tasks to the computer. A commercial airliner is on auto-pilot most of the time after take-off, and can begin a landing approach. The most advanced systems can make a landing in zero visibility conditions, which a human pilot cannot. Timothy Buchanan ------------------------------ I recently was on a 737-300 United flight. The pilots gave me a nice demo of the computerized infomation system. It has all the nice things with all the SIDs and STARs for airports as well as their flight plan, etc. The thing that they thought was the neatest was their digital radio datalink. With it they could access the United database while in flight (and on the ground), and get weather info enroute and at the destination. They could also do the reporting of maintainence items that they usually do by voice. I did ask, just to make sure, whether they still have to dial in the ATIS on arrival. They do, but you could imagine that, if this system works out, that function may be the one of the first things switched over entirely to the digital link. Dennis Ernst From kls Mon Jun 28 22:35:04 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Strange 727 Flight References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jun 93 22:35:04 PDT In article weiss@hurricane.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) wrote: > Well, it sounds like particularly heavy traffic in BOS. Often what will > happen > is planes will be stacked like a wedding cake on approach durring heavy > traffic. That is, the aircraft will be put in circles, each separated > vertically by 1000' (FAA regs require either 1000' vertical separation or 1 > mile horizontal separation at all times). As each plane at the bottom of the > stack lands, the aircraft above are allowed to descend 1000', and would be > asked to do so quickly. Consequently, while holding, the attitude would be 5 > deg up, and while descending would be 5 deg down. I don't think that's it. It's ATC's responsibility to maintain separation in IFR: they'll clear aircraft below before they ask aircraft above to descend. For them to clear multiple aircraft simultaneously, they'd have to synchronize all their rates of descent, which might not be possible (and I don't believe I've ever heard of it). Maybe one of the air traffic controllers subscribing to the group could elaborate on this further. Also: The 727 is a flying brick (apologies to F-4 fans): if you dropped the nose ten degrees while holding, you could easily punch 4000 fpm (or even peg the IVSI at 6000), I would think. This creates other problems, and isn't really desirable in a terminal environment. It sounds more like porpoising: improper technique (hands-on or autopilot), a faulty autopilot, or some kind of a control system failure. > Adding to this, aircraft would be asked to land quickly when they are at the > bottom of the stack, so a relatively high landing speed would not be unheard > of. I believe that there were some weather delays on June 13th in the > midsection of the US, from where many connecting flights originate. > Consequently, there would be a higher traffic flow during the late afternoon. > I'm speculating here, but it sounds reasonable. Airline pilots are trained to "fly by the numbers." Professional pilots will tend to politely decline ATC requests to "expedite" approaches, and will tend to fly approaches safely, how they are trained to. If they don't land "on the numbers" (vis. VRef), they won't make legal stop distances, will land long, tend to balloon, etc. Thus creating a thoroughly unsafe situation. It is ATC's responsibility to adapt to pilot requirements for safe flight, NOT the pilot's responsibility to keep things "orderly" for ATC. It's best when both interests can be served harmoniously, but the buck stops at the pilot, always (FAR 91.3). Even if the pilot "cooperates" and keeps speed up through the initial approach, or while maneuvering, I don't think the 727 would have *any* trouble slowing down to the proper reference airspeeds, so at the point the passenger would become aware of speed differences (last 1000' of flight), it should be well into a standard profile. Possible explanations for the high speed are that it was a hot day, the airplane was unusually heavy (fuel, passengers, cargo), that there were high winds aloft (there was a 70-knot wind at 2000' here in Austin, recently, even though ground winds were 15 knots), or even that it had a bit of a tail-wind on final (I've noticed that controllers won't switch the runway if there's a light tail-wind following frontal passage, until traffic dies down). Or maybe a variety of optical illusions: whizzing through scud, for instance, can give an illusion of speed. Perhaps a combination of all these effects. For reference, a 727-200 at 110,000 lbs has a VRef of 108 knots; at 155,000 lbs (max. landing weight) 133 knots; to this you can add wind + 1/2 gust, to a maximum of 20 knots. Approach maneuvering speed, flaps up, is 200 knots. All standard conditions. Cheers, -- Robert Dorsett Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd From kls Mon Jun 28 22:35:07 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Glenn Radinsky (S05152@doc.flc.colorado.edu) Subject: Maintenance and Management Information Systems References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jun 93 22:35:07 PDT Dear Mike: > I was wondering. Have the major airlines totally > computerized their maintenance records or do they still > use a paper trail. Also do they airlines (or corporate > aviation) use management information systems in other areas > besides computer reservation systems. Any information would > be appreciated. If you could please post responses so that > the information can be shared, if not please e-mail > responses to mellott@erau.db.erau.edu > I thank you in advance I was an intern at United Airlines last summer, and it is my impression that they do computerize their maintenance records. I think they try to computerize almost everything that has to travel a lot (like maintenance records, scheduling information, etc). so that it can be delivered electronically rather than through the USPS. And while I cannot speak for other major airlines, I would be willing to bet that those who have the money and the resources to do it (such as American and Delta) would computerize their records as well. After all, in many instances those records have to be where the plane is, and in many cases they are easier to update electronically. As far as MIS's are concerned, I think that most of the stuff that United does is done with a computer. This is mostly due to the sheer volume of the transactions it has to process and the data it has to keep track of. And because all of this information has to be tracked quickly and accurately, a good MIS becomes a necessity. Indeed, American was the first airline to make its MIS a competitive weapon (SABRE and fare structuring being an example of this). Well, just some thoughts... Hope this helped, Glenn From kls Mon Jun 28 22:35:09 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Pete Mellor Subject: Strasbourg A320 crash: "Pilot Error" - Official! Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jun 93 22:35:09 PDT In France-Soir of Monday 10th May (which was recently sent to me by a friend) there is a report that the Commission of Enquiry into the crash of an A320 near Strasbourg on 20th January 1992 is about to deliver its final report. (Given the date of the report, it has probably already done so.) The conclusion on the cause of the accident is "pilot error". The main error was the confusion of the "flight-path angle" (FPA) and "vertical speed" (V/S) modes of descent, selected on the Flight Management and Guidance System (FMGS) console. The pilots were inadvertently in V/S when they should have been in FPA mode. The error was not noticed on the console itself, due to the similarity of the number format display in the two modes. The other cues on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) screen and elsewhere (e.g., altitude and vertical speed indicator) were not noticed since the pilots were overloaded following a last-minute change of flight plan, and presumably were concentrating on the Navigational Display. The actions of the ATC did not help the situation. The result was that the aircraft descended at a vertical speed of 1100 metres/minute when it was only 1500 metres above the terrain. Following the accident, the rescue teams took 2 hours to find the crash site, which probably led to the deaths of between 6 and 20 passengers who had survived the impact, and could have been saved by prompt attention. This in turn was partly due to chaotic organisation, plus the fact that the emergency radio beacon was destroyed on impact. Further details when I have had time to translate the report properly, or get hold of a copy of the final report. Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@csr.city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Mon Jun 28 22:35:10 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis) Subject: Re: A340 long distance reord References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jun 93 22:35:10 PDT DS> == sandee@Think.COM (Daan Sandee) writes: TK> == Torsten Kerschat [in regard to "how did Airbus get the A340 to fly nonstop from Paris to Auckland?"] DS> - they used supplemental tanks TK> no they don't According to Aviation Week (June 28, 1993, p33), they did, in fact, add supplemental tanks. "The A340-200, equipped with five additional fuel tanks that increased total capacity by 28.5 tons, burned 125.4 metric tons of fuel on this leg [Paris-Auckland] and had 14.6 tons remaining in the tanks on landing, crewmembers said." Coupled with the stripping of cabin furnishings mentioned earlier in this thread, I can hardly call this flight anything more than a publicity stunt. -- * Christopher Davis * * * [CKD1] * MIME * RIPEM * "Those who cannot remember history are doomed to repost it every month, with diffs marked with change bars." --Ed Vielmetti From kls Mon Jun 28 22:46:41 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: fulghum@esds.mdc.com (Milton L. Fulghum) Subject: Re: AF Retires 707 970 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Visual Simulation Systems Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 28 Jun 93 22:46:41 PDT In Scott Jacobson <75706.2201@CompuServe.COM> writes: >970 was used briefly by Eisenhower but was never officially "Air Force >One". >Kennedy also used the aircraft at times. I was under the impression that any aircraft hauling the President was considered "Air Force One". ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Milton L. Fulghum PHONE: (314) 925-8576 FlightSafety International FAX: (314) 925-8444 2590 North Highway 94 E-Mail: fulghum@esds.mdc.com Saint Charles, MO 63301-0037 From kls Tue Jun 29 09:22:50 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Francis.Jambon@imag.fr (Francis Jambon) Subject: Re: A340 long distance reord References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: IMAG Institute, University of Grenoble, France Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jun 93 09:22:50 PDT >According to Aviation Week (June 28, 1993, p33), they did, in fact, add >supplemental tanks. "The A340-200, equipped with five additional fuel >tanks that increased total capacity by 28.5 tons, burned 125.4 metric tons >of fuel on this leg [Paris-Auckland] and had 14.6 tons remaining in the >tanks on landing, crewmembers said." NO THEY DON'T ! According to Air & Cosmos of this week, they use ACT for Additional Center Tanks, these tanks used as optional tanks for A310 and A300-600 today. -- Francis JAMBON - Francis.Jambon@imag.fr __|__ Research in Human-Computer Interaction *---o--(_)--o---* Phone: (+33) 76 51 48 54 - Fax: (+33) 76 44 66 75 ! ! ! Laboratoire de Genie Informatique, B206, BP 53, 38041 Grenoble cedex 9, France From kls Tue Jun 29 09:22:52 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: Robert Dorsett Subject: Re: A320 and a bit on the bloody DC-10 (was: cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: rdd@cactus.org Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jun 93 09:22:52 PDT In article spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (Stefano Pagiola) once wrote: >Robert Dorsett writes >> 1. The A320 should be compared to aircraft with similar avionics >> and operating philosophies: [747-400, 757, 767, A300-600, A310] > >I'm not sure what `similar' means in this context but it seems to me >that the A320 isn't really comparable to any of these designs. Yes, >they all have `glass' cockpits and digital avionics (as do the MD-88, >MD-11, and Fokker 100), but none of the other designs is FBW, and >none attempts to give the kind of `protection from errors' that the >A320 attempts I'll try to word this carefully, since there are a number of nuances at play. The A320 is rather aggressively compared to the first-generation-glass airplanes (757, A310) by *Airbus*, not me. They're proud of the high-tech, but use this to try to silence critics that view the airplane as a radical departure. In particular, the operational philosophy is a derivative of the A310. The major environmental changes are the use of fully integrated flight displays (doing away with electromechanical instrumentation), and a full-time electronic flight control system (FBW). Further adaptations to the flight management & guidance system (FMGS) operational philosophy have been made to take advantage of various features offered by the EFCS. What results is a relatively simplified "management" environment (or, at least, fewer controls). Now, *I* think that the various changes are pretty radical departures, when considered in totality, and I doubt you can find too many experts that view the A320 as a 1981-vintage product, but like I said, Airbus (these days, at least) prefers to point out the overt similarities with other, pre-existing systems. Electronically and physically, there are certainly similarities. > (what Bob Dorsett called the `cocoon' approach). I believe the credit should go to E. Wiener and R. Curry, who, as far as I know, first outlined this concept in detail in a 1980 document. > The >A320 will be comparable to the 777, when it comes out. I fully >expect the 777 to compare favorably, if only because Boeing could >draw on 5 years of A320 experience. I am not sure that's the case. *Electronically*, the 777 is a significantly different, more advanced airplane, and really does push new frontiers. The cockpit environment itself will have more in common with the 747-400 than the A320, however. When it comes to nuts and bolts, when I talk about airplanes of the same vintage, I'm mainly referring to the technological goals and capabilities, not *necessarily* the specifics of design. Somewhat like comparing a Russian and American warship ca. 1965: there will be no doubt they're of the same vintage, but there will also be definite differences in design approaches. >Rephrase that a little and it won't seem so bad: Airbus believed (and >probably still does) that its interface approach was the future. I can't really see that. It's a highly proprietary, closed system. They do not license it, it isn't in the public domain. The source code for all the software is a jealously guarded secret, one which not even the author- ities are privy to. The various schema are the byproduct of marketing product definition, and changed throughout the airplanes' development. Even keeping an open mind, I can't really find anything in the literature which suggests they expect or would desire that others follow their example: only that what they're doing is *better* than what others have *done*. It's a defensive posture (rightfully so). I WOULD agree that Airbus CERTAINLY believes that its interface approach is *its* future. :-) >debate that can be undertaken a priori. You have to try it to see. >I think Airbus deserves praise for attempting the transition to a new >way of flying. Given the academic research, which really doesn't support the design decisions, I can't help but think that this is "technology for technology's sake," which is often counter-productive to safety. Once again, my battle- cry: evolution, not revolution! >> If you are aware of the >> problem, you can work around it; if not, you can fall victim to >> the environment and make a mistake that kills you and your >> passengers. > >As I said, I think most A320 pilots are, at this point, aware of the >potential pitfalls and treat them with respect. That's why I don't >lose any sleep over flying on A320s. But I hope it doesn't take a >periodic crash to keep people watchful. Take the following with a grain of salt: I mention it both for the moral and a slightly different take of the mechanics of the crash (as opposed to how it's generally treated in the media--but it's generally supported by the accident report, p. 35, subsection 1.17.3). Also consider that the man really dislikes the DC-10. I had an interesting conversation with a maintenance type a few weeks ago. We were discussing the DC-10. He was kind of down on pilots, and mentioned a DC-10 pilot who was real proud of his airplane. They got to talking about the O'Hare crash, when the pilot got offended and insisted that the slat- retraction problem had been "fixed." "How?" he was asked. "Well, changes to the hydraulics system were made such that you couldn't lose your slats if you lost hydraulic pressure." Fine, my friend said, but that wasn't the cause of the crash. Yes, they lost one (maybe two) hydraulic systems, but the problem was that the slats were moved and held in place by *cables*, which are driven by "hydraulic motors" in the middle of the main fuselage. In fact, a common actuator is used for both the left and right slats. When the engine tore off, it took out the #1 system, but more importantly, it took out the cables, so there weren't opposing forces, and the slats simply retracted. The "real" fix to the problem was that the DC-10 takeoff profile was *really* shallowed-out, so that appropriate airspeed margins were kept in case of a similar catastrophic engine failure. But *this* pilot had a mystical faith in a non-existent "hardware solution." Kind of like the expectation a lot of us had that the MD-11 MUST have been changed significantly, SOMEHOW... but really wasn't. :-) So the moral of the story, I guess, is that knowledge of the problem isn't always indication that the problem (or the nature of its work-around) is really understood. I'll concede that this is kind of apples and oranges, and thus far, pilots have been surprisingly good at working around the problems posed by glass (maybe it does have a benefit--at least in most glassy airplanes, it keeps 'em on their toes? :-)) --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Tue Jun 29 09:22:55 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Slat extension locks Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jun 93 09:22:55 PDT In previous DC-10 discussions (last year, mainly), I erroneously referred to the Boeing use of "jackscrews" to lock leading edge devices. This is incorrect. Jackscrews are used to some extent for trailing edge extension, but aren't used for leading edge devices in any airplanes I'm familiar with. I recently learned that the locking mechanism for the LED's is to trap hydraulic fluid downstream of the actuator. The locking mechanism is located in the extension piston itself, and may not be opened again except by more hydraulic pressure, during the retract cycle. Thus, if the hydraulic system is lost, the device itself will remain firmly wedged extended, with a small quantity of hydraulic fluid present in the sealed piston. Probably held more firmly than with hydraulic pressure present. I'm told that this system is so reliable that it's caused many a problem for maintenance-type people once an actuator itself fails: there's no way to retract the slats on the ground. Boeing apparently sells a little hand- pump to permit the fluid to be removed, but I'm told of one incident which involved the use of a hacksaw. :-) Sorry for any confusion, for those who hang on my every word. :-) Egomaniacally, --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Tue Jun 29 09:22:59 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Boeing fuse pin revisited Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jun 93 09:22:59 PDT The July 5, 1993 issue of Businessweek has an article on the 747 fuse pins, on page 96. The upshot is that on June 18, Boeing announced a fuse pin replacement strategy. The rest of the article is rather bad, like most of the reporting on the El Al crash has been. It also fails to differentiate between the freighters and the rest of the fleet. It does contain an interesting note, though, that Airbus apparently doesn't believe in "break-away" engines (the fuse pins installed on Boeing airplanes are there to permit the engine to shear away following substantial engine vibration, on the theory that it's better to drop an engine than risk damage to the airframe or wing). "If an Airbus crash-lands, the plane can even skid on its engines without their falling off." An issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology reported earlier this year that Boeing had found the problem was that Boeing had underestimated shear forces in one part of the assembly by 1000% or so. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Tue Jun 29 09:23:04 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov (Michael T. Palmer) Subject: re: Risks articles References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA USA Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jun 93 09:23:04 PDT In article ernst@Tymnet.COM (Dennis Ernst) writes: [etc deleted from RISKS articles] >All that is set to change. Yesterday the first test demonstration of >equipment which will allow pilots and air traffic controllers to >communicate through computers was held. An experimental BAC 1-11 "flying >laboratory", belonging to the Defence Research Agency at Bedford, flew >above East Anglia sending and receiving messages on its on-board computer. [and also...] >It is not quite true that this was the first demonstration of such >capabilities. The European Space Agence (ESA), in cooperation with several >organizations and airlines, demonstrated our PRODAT satellite mobile >communication system with, among other features, ATC digital communication, >starting in 1987. > >The trials included installations on several aircraft - including the very >same BAC 1-11 quoted in the Independent article. One Airbus 310 was flying the >equipment for more than a year, and ATC experimenters were collecting flight >data on a regular basis, but the system was not actually part of the ATC >operations of this aircraft. One dedicated flight, with a private Jetstream >aircraft, between Madrid and London, was carried out with the PRODAT link as >primary ATC communication channel (and voice as backup) for the part of the >flight taking place in Spanish airspace. While interesting, these tests are not necessarily the first or the most extensive investigations of the use of digital datalink. NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, VA has been conducting experiments in this area using our Boeing B737-100 "flying laboratory" (which has two complete and fully functional cockpits - a normal one up front for safety, and a full-size experimental cab about where coach class would start) since the early '80s. These tests have examined not only the visual formatting of the information but also the procedures for use. This includes using "Roger," "Roger/Enter," and "Unable" keys for handling ATC flight plans, modifications, and terminal area vectors. The "Roger/Enter" key is the interesting one, since it not only sends back an acknowledgement but also enters the values into the appropriate window(s) of the mode control panel. NOTE, however, that the pilot usually still must take another action to actually initiate any changes in the aircraft's guidance, such as pressing the "EXEC" button on the CDU or pressing the "Altitude Capture" button on the MCP. Specific attention was given in these trials to the interaction of the pilot with the datalink and how it affected air/ground communication as well as cockpit procedures. Current work (running from about 1989 to the present) includes national and regional scale satellite weather radar in the datalink system. I participated in an initial evaluation of this concept which compared weather avoidance performance using the datalink graphical weather presentation, a datalink textual presentation similar to what was done earlier, and voice communication with a simulated company dispatch. This paper is currently in the review process and should be published and distributed by October. A follow-on experiment is nearly complete, in terms of collecting data. The analysis and writing will, of course, take a little while :-). Dr. Charles H. Scanlon is the lead researcher in this experiment, and is responsible for the development of the graphical weather concept and much of the datalink work here at NASA Langley. If anyone is interested in this work, let me know and I'll put you in contact with him. Michael T. Palmer | "A man is crazy who writes a secret in any m.t.palmer@larc.nasa.gov | other way than one which will conceal it RIPEM key on server | from the vulgar." - Roger Bacon, 1220-1292 From kls Tue Jun 29 09:23:06 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: shafer@ferhino.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) Subject: Re: AF Retires 707 970 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jun 93 09:23:06 PDT On 28 Jun 93 22:46:41 PDT, fulghum@esds.mdc.com (Milton L. Fulghum) said: Milton> In Scott Jacobson Milton> <75706.2201@CompuServe.COM> writes: >970 was used briefly by Eisenhower but was never officially "Air >Force One". Kennedy also used the aircraft at times. Milton> I was under the impression that any aircraft hauling the Milton> President was considered "Air Force One". Only if it's an Air Force plane. When Reagan came to Dryden to watch STS-4 land, he came in Marine One (a big green helicopter). -- Mary Shafer DoD #362 KotFR NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA shafer@ferhino.dfrf.nasa.gov Of course I don't speak for NASA "A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all." Unknown US fighter pilot From kls Tue Jun 29 13:10:22 1993 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: bounce-back From: pab@po.CWRU.Edu (Pete Babic) Subject: Re: A320 cockpit visit) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: pab@po.CWRU.Edu (Pete Babic) Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (USA) Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Jun 93 13:10:22 PDT In a previous article, spagiola@frinext.stanford.edu (Stefano Pagiola) says: >Robert Dorsett writes >> >> The other approach is to "keep" the pilot in the loop, yet somehow >> "protect" the airplane from his mistakes. This is the "cocoon" >> approach... This may be undesirable, too, in that the pilot >> may grow to rely on the "protections" being there to save his >> bacon. > >Well put. I think the latter approach is inevitable. I think >technology does let us build in safeguards that are helpful and >useful. The lowly stick shaker was an early example of this, but it >could only alert. Technology is reaching the point were it can do >more, and it would be silly not to use it. But in doing so, we have >to be very wary to not lock pilots out of the loop and make them >overconfident. Walking that fine line isn't going to be easy. What >I worry is not that Airbus is trying to walk it, its that its doing >so with the wrong attitude; with too much confidence in its technical >capabilities and not enough consideration for human factors. I'm a total layman when it comes to piloting but I've been following the A320 views with great interest. If the cocoon approach continues to be used would it make sense to setup some kind of logging mechanism in the aircraft to keep track of the times when the system "saves the pilots bacon"? If a pilot uses the automation to let him get away with sloppy flying this would show up in the log resulting in disiplinary action from his supervisors. This would serve as incentive to not push the envelope too much. -- Pete Babic - pab@po.cwru.edu Case Western Reserve Unv. **************************** THE BOTTLE WAS DUSTY ************************* BUT THE LIQUOR WAS CLEAN